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Chapter 1: Trade credit in production chains In an economy where production takes
place in multiple stages and is subject to financial frictions, how firms finance intermediate
inputs matters for aggregate outcomes. This paper focuses on trade credit – the lending
and borrowing of input goods between firms in a production chain – and quantifies its
aggregate impact. Motivated by empirical evidence, our model shows how trade credit
alleviates financial frictions through a process of credit redistribution and creation, thus
leading to a higher out- put level in the steady state. However, the flow of trade credit is
prone to disruptions when financial crises hit the economy. The decline in economic activities
following crises is in turn amplified by disruptions in trade credit. The model simulation
suggests that the drop in trade credit during the Great Recession can account for almost
one-fourth of the observed decline in output.
Chapter 2: Financial development beyond the formal financial market This paper
argues that to understand the quantitative importance of finance in economic development,
it is important to look beyond the formal financial market. We document that informal
financing is more accessible in countries with a highly developed formal financial market. The
volume of informal financing, as well as the substitutability of informal financing for formal
financing, are both positively correlated with the development of the formal financial market.
x
We build a quantitative model in which a fundamental contract enforcement problem delivers
the documented empirical patterns. The model is then disciplined to match aggregate and
distributional moments of bank credit and trade credit – an important informal financial
institution – of the U.S. and Chinese manufacturing firms, respectively. Our quantitative
analysis suggests that by focusing on bank credit only, we understate the importance of
finance in explaining the income differences between these two countries.
Chapter 3: Economic reforms and industrial policy in a panel of Chinese cities
We study the effect of place-based industrial policy on economic development, focusing on
the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China. We use data from a panel of
Chinese (prefecture-level) cities from 1988 to 2010. Our difference-in-difference estimation
exploits the variation in the establishment of SEZ across time and space. We find that the
establishment of a state-level SEZ is associated with an increase in the level of GDP of about
20%. This finding is confirmed with alternative specifications and in a sub-sample of inland
provinces, where the selection of cities to host the zones was based on administrative criteria.
The main channel is a positive effect on physical capital accumulation, although SEZ also
have a positive effect on total factor productivity and human capital investments. We also
investigate whether there are spillover effects of SEZ on neighboring regions or cities further
away. We find positive and often significant spillover effects.
xi
Chapter 1
Trade Credit in Production Chains
1.1 Introduction
Most studies on the macroeconomic effect of finance focus on financial activities between
nonfinancial and financial sectors, or those within financial sectors, such as the inter-bank
lending market. In this paper, we look into the nonfinancial sector and show how trade
credit – a short-term loan in the form of input goods between nonfinancial firms – affects
macroeconomic outcomes.
In practice, trade credit is an important financial resource for U.S. firms. Take the U.S.
nonfinancial corporate sector as an example. Accounts payable (trade credit liability) are
about one-third the size of the quarterly GDP in 2006. Trade credit is pro-cyclical and very
volatile. The standard deviation of trade credit is about twice as high as that of quarterly
GDP. During the 2007–09 financial crisis, short-term liabilities decrease for about 457 billion
dollars from 2007Q4 to 2009Q2. More than 70 percent of the drop could be accounted for
by the drop in trade credit.
Despite the size of trade credit, its macroeconomic implication is largely unexplored. We
try to fill in the void by providing a quantitative assessment of how trade credit affects the
1
level and volatility of the aggregate economy.
We find that the existence of trade credit significantly increases the aggregate output of
the U.S. economy during normal times as well as its volatility over credit cycles.
During normal times, that is, the steady state of the economy without aggregate shocks,
trade credit channels financial resources to flow into firms whose production is constrained
by their capacity to obtain bank loans. By borrowing input goods from their suppliers, con-
strained firms achieve a larger production scale that is closer to the optimal level. Resources
are better allocated in the economy, and aggregate output is higher.
During a financial crisis, bank lending, including short-term lending, is tightened. Short
of liquidity, firms cut back trade credit extension and demand that sales be made on the
spot. Constrained firms who are able to use trade credit before the crisis are no longer able
to do so. In this case, the financial crisis affects the real economy through its impact on trade
credit. This indirect effect of financial crisis, vis-à-vis the direct effect through the tightening
of bank credit, brings additional damages to the economy and amplifies the magnitude of
financial shocks.
We begin our exploration by documenting two sets of empirical facts using firm level data.
First, in a pooled sample of firms from Compustat and the Survey of Small Business Finances
(SSBF), we show that in net terms, trade credit flows from unconstrained to constrained
firms. Second, using a panel of Compustat firms that borrow from the syndicated loan
market, we document that firms respond to a disruption in their access to the financial
market by cutting back their lending of trade credit.
We then build trade credit into a dynamics general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
entrepreneurs to deliver the documented empirical patterns at the aggregate and firm levels.
In the model, production takes place in two stages: intermediate goods production stage
and final goods production stage. Each stage is populated by a measure one of heterogeneous
entrepreneurs operating a decreasing return to scale technology. Entrepreneurs differ from
2
each other by productivity and wealth.
There is a competitive banking sector. The production scale of entrepreneurs is bounded
by a working capital constraint à la Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Due to the moral hazard
problem of entrepreneurs, bank loans are limited by the amount of collateral that they have
to offer. As a result, only entrepreneurs with enough wealth can obtain enough bank loans
to finance working capital and achieve their optimal production scale.
Trade credit exists because intermediate input entrepreneurs have a certain comparative
advantage over banks in lending input goods. In particular, following Burkart and Ellingsen
(2004), we assume that unlike bank loans, intermediate input goods can not be diverted.
Under this assumption, it is secure for intermediate goods entrepreneurs to lend input goods.
Banks internalize this comparative advantage by lending to intermediate goods entrepreneurs
against accounts receivable (accounts receivable financing).
Although intermediate goods entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage in lending in-
put goods, trade credit can be expensive. For constrained intermediate goods entrepreneurs,
cash flow is valuable since it can be used to finance their own working capital. Extending
trade credit means postponing cash flow, and thus it needs to be compensated for by an
interest rate on trade credit. The more constrained intermediate goods entrepreneurs are,
the higher the trade credit interest rate is in equilibrium.
We capture the demand and supply forces of trade credit by assuming a competitive
trade credit market. Very constrained final goods entrepreneurs borrow from this market
while relatively unconstrained intermediate goods entrepreneurs lend to it. This creates a
flow of trade credit from unconstrained to constrained entrepreneurs.
Trade credit changes entrepreneurs’ access to financial resources in two ways: First, trade
credit increases available financial resources for final goods entrepreneurs by reallocating
unused bank credit from intermediate goods entrepreneurs to their constrained customers.
This is labeled as credit redistribution channel. Second, there is the credit creation channel.
3
Credit is created when banks lend against accounts receivable. Trade credit extension,
combined with accounts receivable financing, increases the collective access to credit for
both final and intermediate goods entrepreneurs.
We calibrate the steady state of the model to match aggregate and distributional data
moments for the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector. In particular, the steady state is cal-
ibrated to match the ratio of trade credit to gross value added, in order to capture the
importance of trade credit in financing production and the distribution in firms size and
revenue.
With the calibrated model as benchmark, we proceed to quantify the aggregate effects
of trade credit by comparing key economic outcomes generated by the benchmark and a
counterfactual economy, in which all the transactions of input goods have to be made on the
spot.
In the steady state analysis, the parameters of the counterfactual economy without trade
credit are set to be the same as the benchmark economy. With the same set of parameters,
the aggregate output of the counterfactual economy is 24 percent lower than that of the
benchmark. This can be decomposed into 15 percent lower capital stock, 24 percent lower
labor, and 8 percent lower aggregate TFP. Trade credit greatly alleviates the borrowing
constraint of final goods entrepreneurs. This leads to a higher aggregate TFP and output
of the final goods sector. Although the impact of trade credit on the aggregate TFP of the
intermediate goods sector is negligible; trade credit increases the output of the intermediate
goods sector through a general equilibrium effect – a higher demand for intermediate input
goods from the final goods sector.
To analyze the role of trade credit during the 2007-09 financial crisis, we simulate the
benchmark model with an unexpected shock on the collateral constraint. The magnitude of
the shock is calibrated to match the observed drop in both the ratio of credit market liability
and trade credit to nonfinancial assets during this period.
4
Following the shock, the aggregate output drops by 6 percent in the benchmark, closely
matching the data. Constrained entrepreneurs are affected by the shock. They are forced
to scale down their production. Unconstrained entrepreneurs increase their production scale
in response to lower prices for input goods. Because unconstrained entrepreneurs are on
average less productive than constrained ones, this shift in production scales leads to a lower
aggregate TFP and a drop in the aggregate output.
The aggregate effect of the financial crisis can be decomposed into two parts: The first one
operates directly through the tightening of bank credit, which is the standard mechanism in
financial crisis research. The second part operates indirectly through changing firms’ ability
to use trade credit. Following the shock, both intermediate and final goods entrepreneurs
become more constrained. Final goods entrepreneurs want to borrow more trade credit,
while intermediate goods entrepreneurs want to cut back their trade credit lending. This
leads to a spike in the trade credit interest rate from a pre-crisis level of 2.7 percent to as high
as 8.3 percent. Modestly constrained final goods entrepreneurs find it no longer profitable to
use trade credit to finance production. Only very constrained ones use trade credit, but at a
smaller scale. The aggregate volume of trade credit experiences a huge drop–the percentage
drop in trade credit is almost twice as high as that in output. The drop in trade credit
volume and the increase in trade credit interest rate both indicate that the financial shock
hinders the role of trade credit in improving allocation efficiency.
To quantify the indirect effect of financial crisis through trade credit, we first recalibrate
the counterfactual economy without trade credit such that it is comparable with the bench-
mark in steady state. We then feed into the counterfactual economy the same financial shock
that generates the 2007–09 financial crisis in the benchmark. Following the shock, aggregate
output only drops by 4.6 percent, which is a 1.4 percentage points smaller than the 6 percent
drop of output in the benchmark. This means that, without trade credit, the output drop
during the 2007–09 financial crisis would have been 23 percent smaller.
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Related Literature This paper belongs to several strands of literature.
First, our model builds on previous research that studies the financial aspects of trade
credit.1 Empirically, starting from Meltzer (1960) and more recently in Cunningham (2004),
authors document that small firms rely more on trade credit than large firms do. Theoreti-
cally, previous papers such as those of Cunat (2007), Biais and Gollier (1997), and Burkart
and Ellingsen (2004) show that the existence of trade credit is a result of a certain com-
parative advantage that intermediate goods producers have over financial intermediaries in
lending to their customers. Our model builds up on the above papers but differs from them
by jointly analyzing the demand and supply of trade credit.
Second, this paper is also related to papers that study how trade credit propagates
financial shocks. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a) build a model in which firms are linked through
an input-output channel as well as a trade credit channel. Shocks to one firm are propagated
to their suppliers through a chain of defaults in trade credit. Raddatz (2010) constructs a
cross-country dataset on trade credit linkage between sectors. The paper shows trade credit
contributes to the comovement between sectors along the business cycle. In Jacobson and von
Schedvin (2015), using Swedish firm-level data, the authors show how bankruptcy propagates
through loss of trade credit. In these papers, the propagation mechanism operates through
trade credit default while in our paper, the mechanism operates through changes in trade
credit on the intensive margin.
Third, this paper also contributes to a relatively new strand of literature that studies how
financial frictions and financial shocks affect real economy when taking account of the input-
output linkage. Among them, Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2016) show that a financial shock
that affects only a subset of firms can be transmitted to other firms through an input-output
channel and amplified by the complementarity of input goods. Bigio and La’O (2014) shows
1See Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Cunat and Garcia-Appendini (2012) for excellent surveys of the
literature.
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that the input-output production network leads to a "liquidity multiplier" that amplifies
liquidity shocks. They assume that only a fixed fraction of the input goods can be purchased
using trade credit. This economy is more fragile in the face of liquidity shocks compared to
an economy without the input-output linkage, because it requires a higher level of liquidity
to sustain production. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014) builds up on Kim and Shin (2012) and
develops a model of production chain in which firms hold interlocking claims and obligations
of trade credit. A financial shock is amplified in this economy because long production chains
are less viable during a financial crisis. We think that our paper is complementary to Bigio
and La’O (2014) because we take as given the production structure of the economy while
explicitly modeling firms’ choice of trade credit. The endogenous changes in trade credit,
rather than the input-output structure itself, amplifies the financial shocks.
More broadly speaking, this paper belongs to a long strand of literature that studies how
shocks originating from the financial sector are transmitted and amplified to affect the real
economy (see Bernanke et al., 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997b; Jermann and Quadrini,
2012). More recently, researchers further the understanding of this question by studying
the 2007–09 financial crisis. Among them, Bigio (forthcoming) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) study how changes in banks’ net worth affect their ability of financial intermediation.
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012) study the impact of credit crunch on consumption. Mian and
Sufi (2011) and Midrigan and Philippon (2011) show how financial crises affect the economy
through the consumer demand channel. Buera et al. (2015a), Siemer (2014), and Arellano
et al. (2012) focus on explaining how the 2007–09 financial crisis affects the labor market. We
contribute to this literature by discovering an amplification mechanism outside the financial
sector and quantifying its size during the 2007–09 financial crisis.
Finally, this paper is reminiscent of a strand of literature that studies the efficiency and
stability in the interbank lending market. According to Lee (2015), the circulation of repo
contract improves the allocation efficiency, but endogenous changes in repo spread exacerbate
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the financial crisis through a positive feedback loop. Zhang (2014) illustrates how a shock
to the collateral risk of the repo is amplified through a chain of repo defaults. According
to Boissay and Cooper (2014), through the process of lending to firms, banks create "inside
collateral," which can be used to borrow in the interbank lending market. The creation
of collateral gives rise to multiple equilibria in the interbank lending market and makes it
more fragile. Our paper shows that similar to interbank lending, trade credit helps channel
financial resources to their most productive use but makes the economy more vulnerable to
financial shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents empirical evidence on
trade credit that motivates our modeling choices, section 1.3 introduces the benchmark model
and section 1.4 defines its recursive equilibrium. We calibrate the steady state of the bench-
mark model to match the U.S. economy in section 1.5 and study the model dynamics during
the 2007-09 financial crisis in section 1.6. Section 1.7 introduces a counterfactual economy
without trade credit and studies the aggregate implication of trade credit by comparing the
benchmark and the counterfactual economy. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Empirical motivation
In this section, we document two sets of empirical facts. In the first part, we use firm level
data to establish the linkage between firms’ choice of trade credit and financial constraints
that they face. In the second part, we examine the impact of financial market disruptions on
trade credit by studying how disruptions in the syndicated loan market during the 2007-09
financial crisis impacts the extension of trade credit for firms who borrow from that market.
The measurement of trade credit deserves some discussions before we present the empir-
ical evidence. Ideally, a comprehensive measure of trade credit should consist of transaction
records between firms, including for example value of sales, value of sales made through trade
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credit, interest rate of trade credit, and its maturity. Unfortunately such transaction records
are not available at large scales, forcing us to take an indirect approach to measure trade
credit. We infer trade credit extension and usage from firms’ balance sheet. Trade credit
extended to other firms appears on the asset side of balance sheet as accounts receivable
(AR). Trade credit borrowed from other firms appears on the liability side of the balance
sheet as accounts payable (AP).2 Net accounts receivable (Net AR), which is defined as AR
net AP, measures the firm’s net lending through trade credit. Dividing AR, AP, and net
AR by sales gives three variables that measure trade credit in this paper: 1) AR to sales
ratio (AR/Sales), measuring the extension of trade credit, 2) AP to sales ratio (AP/Sales),
measuring the using of trade credit, and 3) Net AR to sales ratio (Net AR/Sales), measuring
the net lending through trade credit.
1.2.1 Trade credit and being financially constrained
In this section, we show how being financially constrained affects firms’ choice of trade credit.
Section 1.2.1.1 discusses the data and the definition of financially constrained firms. Section
1.2.1.2 presents and discusses the results.
1.2.1.1 Data
To construct our sample of firms, we combine Compustat North America annual and SSBF
data for the years when SSBF data is available (1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003). Firms in the
financial sector (SIC 60-69) and wholesale and retail sector (SIC 50-59) are dropped. Since
we focus on firms that engage in production, it is clear why financial firms are excluded. The
decision to exclude wholesale and retail sector firms are due to two reasons. First, previous
2Accounts receivable and payable include receivable and payable that are not related to trade credit.
Whenever the data is available, we use "trade receivable" and "trade payable" on the balance sheet to
measure trade credit. Using the Compustat data, we find that on average approximately 90 percent of the
account receivable is trade receivables. Moreover, the ratio of trade receivable over accounts receivable is
rather consistent across different industries and firm sizes.
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research shows that the choice of trade credit between retailers and their suppliers is affected
by the monopolistic power of large retail stores such as Walmart. Second, accounts receivable
of retails might contain consumer credit, which is not the object of this study.
We first consider a sample consisting of only Compustat firms. Following Almeida and
Campello (2007), we create three separate dummy variables for financially constrained firms
in this sample. The first one is based on payout ratio – firm 𝑖 with 0 payout in year 𝑡 is
identifies as being financially constraint in that year (𝐼_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1). The second one
is based on firms’ access to bond market, a firm is identified as financially constrained if it
has neither a long-term nor a short-term bond rating from the Standard & Poor. The third
one is based on asset size of firms. A firm is financially constrained if it is among bottom 30
percentile in the asset size distribution.
Second, we augment the above sample of Compustat firms with SSBF data, which con-
tains small and private firms. The combined Compustat-SSBF sample offers a more compre-
hensive view of the whole population of U.S. firms. For this sample, we again define a firm to
be financially constrained (𝐼_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1) if it is among bottom 30 percentile in the
asset size distribution. Compustat firms consist of 22 percent of the financially constrained
firms in this Compustat-SSBF sample.
1.2.1.2 Being constrained and the choice of trade credit
We apply the following specification to estimate the effect of being financially constrained
on the choice of trade credit,
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡, (1.1)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is one of the three measurement of trade credit – AR/Sales, AP/Sales, and Net
AR/Sales – of firm 𝑖 in sector 𝑠 of year 𝑡, 𝜑𝑠𝑡 is the sector-year fixed effect, and 𝜒𝑖 is a
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vector of other non time-varying fixed characteristics of the firm including whether it is a
Compustat firms and whether it is a corporation.3
The coefficient on the dummy variable 𝐼_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛼, is the object of interests,
for it estimates the effect of being financially constrained on trade credit choices. The
results are presented in Table 1.1. In Panel (A), the dependent variable is Net AR/Sales.
Compared to unconstrained Compustat firms, constrained ones maintain a significantly lower
net AR/Sales: 6.2 percentage point lower for the firms that have 0 payout (column 1),
5.8 percentage point lower for the firms that do not have a S&P rating (column 2), 11.5
percentage point lower for the firms that are among the bottom 30 percentile of the asset
size distribution (column 3). A similar result holds for the Compusta-SSBF sample. As
shown in column (4), the net AR/Sales is 17.1 percentage points lower for constrained firms
in this sample and highly significant. Since Net AR/Sales measures the relative position of
firms in the network of trade credit, results in Panel A suggest that constrained firms are
the net borrower of trade credit while unconstrained firms are net lenders.
We have established so far that net lending through trade credit is significantly higher for
constrained firms. We continue to explore whether the difference in net lending is due to the
difference in the trade credit extension or usage. In Panel (B) and (C), we run specification
1.1 while using AP/Sales and AR/Sales as dependent variable, respectively. As shown in
Panel (B), constrained firms use significantly more trade credit than their unconstrained
counterparts: 6.6 percentage point more for 0 payout firms, 7 percentage point more for
firms without public bond rating, and 10.1 and 12.3 percentage point more for small firms
in the two samples respectively. On the contrary, the effect of being financial constrained
on AR/Sales is much weaker and more ambiguous (see Panel C). Firms with 0 payout ratio
(column 1) and firms without public bond rating (column 2) extend slightly more trade
3Unfortunately, due to the limited information on firm age in the Compustat data, we can not control
for firm age in these regression, which admittedly is an potentially important factor in trade credit choices.
11
credit compared to the unconstrained firms. Small firms in both samples extend less trade
credit, but the point estimates are relatively low – 1.4 percentage point for Compustat sample
(column 3) and 4.8 percentage points for the Compustat-SSBF sample (column 4).
In summary, we find that constrained firms borrow more trade credit than unconstrained
ones. However, they do not seem to extend less trade credit to other firms.
Accounts receivable financing Accounts receivable financing is a practice in which firms
use accounts receivable as collateral to obtain bank loans.4. It is an important and often
neglected part of trade credit in the previous literature. Due to the lack of data, it is difficult
for us to evaluate the aggregate volume of accounts receivable financing in the U.S.. We can
infer, however, the importance of accounts receivable financing by looking at the syndicated
loan market using Thomson-Reuters Dealscan data.5 We document that, among all secured
credit line facilities that were opened during 2004-06, 46.3 percent of which require accounts
receivable as collateral. The rest of the facility requires other assets including inventory,
property, plants, or equipment. In addition, accounts receivable is a type of rather liquid
asset compared to the rest. Among these facilities, average advance rate (borrowing base
percentage) for "accounts receivable" is 87 percent, which is much higher compared to a 59
percent for "inventory of all kinds", and a 29 percent for "property, plant and equipment".
We emphasize the importance of accounts receivable financing because it could potentially
explain the weak correlation between being financially constrained and trade credit extension.
Without accounts receivable financing, extending one unit of trade credit means one unit
less cash flow for the firm. With accounts receivable financing, extending one unit of trade
credit decreases cash flow by one unit. However, at the same time, it increases the firm’s
access to bank credit by creating one unit of collateral. In this way, the marginal cost of
4The accounts receivable financing in the U.S. was a financial innovation that had started in the early
1900s (see Murphy, 1992)
5More information about this dataset can be found in section 1.2.2.1.
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trade credit extension is greatly reduced for the constrained firms. In fact, if the advance
rate of AR is 100 percent, the cost of trade credit extension is 0.
Furthermore, the existence of accounts receivable financing changes the nature of trade
credit. Without accounts receivable financing, trade credit serves merely as a redistribution
channel that directs credit from unconstrained firms to constrained ones. With accounts
receivable financing, in addition to the credit redistribution channel, collateral is created
when firms extend trade credit to customers. Through a process of credit creation, accounts
receivable financing increases collective access to bank credit for both trade credit lenders
and borrowers.
1.2.2 Trade credit and the disruption in financial market
This section contains the second set of the empirical evidence that studies how the access to
financial market affect firms’ choice of extending trade credit. To this end, we adopt a similar
strategy as in Chodorow-Reich (2014). Using the performance of firms’ relationship bank
during the 2007-09 financial crisis as an exogenous source of variation in the availability of
credit, we estimate the impact of financial market disruption on firms’ choice of trade credit
extension.
This section uses data on the syndicated loan market and Compustat firms who borrow
from that market. We introduce data on the syndicated loan market in section 1.2.2.1.
Section 1.2.2.2 presents evidence on disruptions in the syndicated loan market during the
2007-09 financial crisis. In section 1.2.2.3, we discuss the empirical strategy and present the
results.
1.2.2.1 Data
A syndicated loan is a type of loan whereby two or more lenders jointly issue fund to a
borrowing firm. We use Thomson-Reuters Dealscan to obtain information of syndicated
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loans. This data set contains information on syndicated loans issued globally and in the
United States. Its coverage of the U.S. syndicated loan market is rather comprehensive,
especially in the post-1995 era. Each observation is a facility (loan). Detailed information
of the loan, such as loan type, size, and maturity, are gathered from SEC filings, including
13-Ds, 14-Ds, 13-Es, 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, and S-series.
1.2.2.2 Disruption in the syndicated loan market during the 2007-09 financial
crisis
We use characteristics of credit line facilities in the syndicated loan market to show its
disruption during the 2007-09 financial crisis. Credit line facilities can be categorized into
three types: 1) unsecured credit line, 2) secured credit line, with accounts receivable as
collateral asset, and 3) secured credit line, with other types of asset as collateral. In Figure
1.8, we plot changes in several key characteristics of newly opened credit line facilities during
2006-10.
Across different types of credit lines, we see similar patterns of decreasing number of
newly opened facilities, total facility size, and maturity. Take the accounts receivable backed
credit line as an example. Compared to the 2006 pre-crisis level, in year 2009, total number
of new facilities dropped by around 60 percent, total size of these facilities dropped by around
60 percent, and average maturity dropped by about 20 percent.
Interestingly, borrowing base percentage of the secured credit line facilities does not
change by much during the same period. In fact, borrowing base percentage for "other
assets backed facilities" even increased slightly compared to the pre-crisis level.
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1.2.2.3 Effect of disruptions in the syndicated loan market on trade credit ex-
tension
The multiple lenders in a syndicated loan can be categorized into two types: lead lender and
participants. As discussed in Sufi (2007) and Chodorow-Reich (2014), a leader lender differs
from participants in various dimensions, the most important difference being that the lead
lender has accumulated superior information about the borrower. It is costly to switch into
a new lender, because the accumulated information of the current lead lender would be lost
during the process. Therefore a firm’s access to credit is hindered if its lead lender becomes
unhealthy.
Following the strategy in Chodorow-Reich (2014), we construct a sample of firms and
their lead lenders in the syndicated loan market. Using performance of lead lenders during
the crisis as an exogenous variation of access to credit market, we estimate the effect of
disruptions in the syndicated loan market on the trade credit extension.
We first construct the Dealscan-Compustat sample (DC sample) with firms and their
relationship banks. We first use the link table provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) to
match facilities to their corresponding borrowers in Compustat. We drop the observation if
1) the firm is in financial, insurance, retail, and wholesale sector, 2) the facility has multiple
lead lenders, 3) the facility is not open during the period of Jan.1st 2004 to Dec.31 2006, and
4) the lead lender is not among the top 43 lenders as defined in Chodorow-Reich (2014). If a
firm has only one open facilities during the period of Jan.1st 2004 to Dec.31 2006, we define
the lead lender of that facility to be its pre-crisis relationship bank. If a firm has multiple
open facilities during that period, we define the lead lender of the newest open facility as its
relationship bank.
This process yields a panel of 1219 firm-bank pair over the period 2007Q1 to 2009Q4.
This sample is a good representation of the whole universe of Compustat firms in terms of
sectoral composition. However, comparing to the rest of Compustat firm, firms in the DC
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sample are much larger. On average, asset of DC firms is 8 times the size of the rest of
Compustat firms. Among the 1291 DC firms, 393 have third party credit rating. In short,
the DC sample consists of very large and financially advantageous firms.
For each firm-bank pair in this sample, we define a dummy indicator 𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑖, which
takes value 1 if the bank’s percentage drop in new loan issuance during the financial crisis
is higher than that of the median bank.6
We define a crisis indicator 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡, which takes value 1 during the period of crisis times
(2007Q4 to 2009Q4). The dependent variable is AR/Sales of firm 𝑖 and time 𝑡. Our baseline
regression is a fixed effect regression of the following form,
𝐴𝑅/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑃/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 * 𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑖
+𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 *𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 * 𝛾𝑠 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 * 𝜓𝑖
+𝜒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,
where 𝜒𝑖 is a set of firm-level fixed effect, which absorb time-invariant differences in terms of
trade credit extension. We include accounts payable to sales ratio (𝐴𝑃/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡), controlling
for firms’ borrowing from other firms through trade credit. The crisis indicator 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
captures the average change in accounts receivable to sales ratio during the crisis. The
interaction term of 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 * 𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑖 thus captures the additional change in accounts
receivable to sales ratio of firms with unhealthy banks, compared to the other firms. Other
control variables include the interaction of crisis indicator with sectoral fixed effects (𝛾𝑠),3rd
party bond rating indicator (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖), and firm size fixed effects (𝜓𝑖), capturing respectively
the sectoral differential trend during the crisis, differential effects of crisis on firms with
6The information of banks’ loan issuance is taken from Chodorow-Reich (2014). Unhealthy banks in the
DC sample include BMO Capital Markets Financing, Banco Santander, Bank of New York Mellon, Bear
Stearns, CIT Group, CIBC, Citi, Comerica, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Banks, GE Capital, Goldman Sachs, JP
Morgan, KeyBank, Lehman Brothers, M&T Bank, Merrill Lych, Mitsubishi UFJ Financing Group, Morgan
Stanley, National City, Rabobank, Scotiabank, Societe General, UBS, and Wachovia.
16
alternative financial resources, and effects on firms with different asset size.
The coefficient on the interaction term 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡*𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑖, 𝛽3, is the object of interests.
We expect 𝛽3 to be negative and significant, indicating that having an unhealthy relationship
bank during crisis time reduces firms’ extension of trade credit more than firms with healthy
banks.
The result is displayed in Table 1.2. Since firms in the DC sample are very large and finan-
cially integrated, not surprisingly, the effect of being in crisis time does not seem have a signif-
icant impact on the decision of trade credit extension. The coefficient on 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 is insignifi-
cantly and positive. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 *𝑈𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑖
show that having an unhealthy bank during crisis, on the other hand, significantly reduces
the firm’s trade credit extension. Firms’ extension of trade credit, measured by AR/Sales,
is around 1.3 to 1.8 percentage point lower, if their relationship bank is unhealthy. The
estimates are consistently negative and significant with different sets of control variables.
1.3 Model
Time is discrete with infinite horizon. There are two types of goods in the economy: inter-
mediate goods and final goods. Final goods are used for both consumption and investment.
Intermediate goods are used exclusively as input in producing final goods.
The production of final goods takes place in two stages: intermediate goods and final
goods production stage. Each stage is operated by a continuum of entrepreneurs with mea-
sure 1. Entrepreneurs differ from each other by wealth and productivity. The productivity
process 𝑧 is stochastic. It is parameterized by a poisson process with death rate 𝜋 and a new
draw from distribution 𝐺(𝑧) after death.
There is a continuum of workers with measure 𝑁 . Workers provide labor and consume.
They do not have access to asset markets, i.e. they are "hand-to-mouth".
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The banking sector is competitive with one representative bank making zero expected
profit.
1.3.1 Preference, endowment and production technology
The preference of workers is time separable, with instantaneous utility function 𝑢(𝑐ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡),
such that,
𝑈ℎ(𝑐ℎ, ℎ) =
∑︁
𝑡
𝛽𝑡𝑢(𝑐ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡), 𝑢(𝑐𝑡, ℎ𝑡) = 𝑐
ℎ
𝑡 − 𝜓
ℎ1+𝜃𝑡
1 + 𝜃
,
where 𝛽 is the discounting factor, 𝜓 represents disutility from working, and 𝜃 is the inverse
of Frisch elasticity.
The preference of entrepreneurs is time separable with instantaneous utility function of
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐𝑡). The expected utility of the entrepreneur can be written as,
𝑈 𝑒(𝑐) = E
∑︁
𝑡
𝛽𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐𝑡),
where the expectation is taken over the stochastic process of productivity 𝑧 and wealth 𝑎.
Intermediate goods entrepreneurs operate a decreasing return to scale production tech-
nology (𝜇1 < 1) that transforms capital and labor into intermediate goods, such that
𝑦1 = 𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) = 𝐴1𝑧(𝑘
𝛼𝑙1−𝛼)𝜇1 .
Final goods entrepreneurs operate a decreasing return to scale production technology
(𝜇2 < 1) that transforms capital, labor and intermediate goods into final goods, such that
𝑦2 = 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1) = 𝐴2𝑧((𝑘
𝛼𝑙1−𝛼)1−𝜒𝑥𝜒1 )
𝜇2 .
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1.3.2 Financing production without trade credit
Entrepreneurs enter each period with wealth 𝑎. After the productivity 𝑧 is realized, the
entrepreneurs make choices of production 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1, consumption 𝑐, and next period wealth
𝑎′. To achieve this production scale, entrepreneurs need to raise an inter-temporal debt
𝑑 = 𝑘 − 𝑎, with interest rate 𝑟.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that due to mismatch between pay-
ment and revenue realization, entrepreneurs need to finance working capital using intra-
temporal loan. In particular, they need the loan to cover 1) investment into next period
𝑖 = 𝑎′− 𝑎, 2) consumption 𝑐, 3) interest payment 𝑟(𝑘− 𝑎), and 4) input goods cost: 𝛿𝑘 +𝑤𝑙
for the intermediate goods entrepreneurs and 𝛿𝑘+𝑤𝑙+𝑝1𝑥1 for the final goods entrepreneurs.
The interest rate of the intra-temporal loan is assumed to be 0.
The amount of intra-temporal bank loan needed for the entrepreneurs are,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑚1 = 𝑎
′ − 𝑎 + 𝑐 + 𝑟(𝑘 − 𝑎) + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙,
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝑚2 = 𝑎
′ − 𝑎 + 𝑐 + 𝑟(𝑘 − 𝑎) + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑝1𝑥1.
Using budget constraints of the entrepreneurs,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙, 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑝1𝑥1,
we derive that intra-temporal bank loan needed to finance production is equal to the revenue
of production. That is, 𝑚1 = 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) and 𝑚2 = 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1).
Working capital constraint without trade credit The ability of entrepreneurs to
borrow from the bank is constrained by limited enforceability of bank debt obligations. In
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particular, we assume that at the end of each period, after revenue is realized, entrepreneurs
can default on their liabilities and divert the revenue. After default, the bank has an option to
liquidate the wealth of entrepreneurs. Once the liquidation process starts, with probability
𝛾1, the bank can successfully liquidate the whole value of wealth 𝑎′ and with probability
1− 𝛾1 they get nothing. However, the bank and entrepreneurs can renegotiate on their debt
before the liquidation option is exercised. In particular, entrepreneurs can make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer such that the bank is indifferent between liquidation and non-liquidation. In
this case, entrepreneurs will offer to repay only the expected liquidation value 𝛾1𝑎′. Hence
the default value for intermediate goods entrepreneurs are 𝑦 − 𝛾1𝑎′ and non-default value is
𝑦 −𝑚1. The incentive compatibility constraint leads to a constraint on the intra-temporal
loan, such that 𝑚1 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′. Similarly, the incentive compatibility constraint for final goods
entrepreneurs gives constraint 𝑚2 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′. Therefore the limited enforceability yields a set of
working capital constraints for entrepreneurs in an environment without trade credit,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (1.2)
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1) ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′. (1.3)
1.3.3 Trade credit
Following previous literature on the existence of trade credit such as Burkart and Ellingsen
(2004) and Biais and Gollier (1997), we postulate that the existence of trade credit is due to
a certain comparative advantage of intermediate entrepreneur in lending to their customers.
Here we assume that the comparative advantage lies in the fact that intermediate goods
entrepreneurs have better control over their customers than the bank does. As an example,
suppliers can threat to stop supplying to the customer if trade credit is not repaid (see
Petersen and Rajan, 1997). In addition, we assume that intermediate goods entrepreneurs
can perfectly enforce repayment of trade credit. In other words, lending of trade credit to
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customers is always secure.
Modeling trade credit We assume that there is a competitive market for intermediate
goods and trade credit. Two prices – price of intermediate goods 𝑝1 and interest rate 𝑟𝑡𝑐 of
trade credit – clear the market.
An intermediate goods entrepreneur enters the market with a contract (𝑦1, 𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝑝1𝑦1)
to offer. The contract provides intermediate goods of value 𝑝1𝑥1 and a loan of size 𝐴𝑅.
Once the contract is accepted by the market, the intermediate goods entrepreneur proceeds
to produce and expects to collect a payment of size 𝑝1𝑥1 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅 from the market by
the end of this period.
A final goods entrepreneur enters the market to purchase a contract (𝑥1, 𝐴𝑃 ≤ 𝑝1𝑥1). By
signing the contract, the final goods entrepreneur receives a loan of size 𝐴𝑃 and commits to
purchase intermediate goods of value 𝑝1𝑥1. A payment of size 𝑝1𝑥1 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑃 is expected
to be made to the market by the end of this period.
Assuming that intermediate goods are identical and infinitely divisible, both the supply
and demand of contracts can be divided infinitely. Hence there exists a market clearing
algorithm to allocate the contracts, as long as aggregate demand for intermediate goods and
trade credit equate aggregate supply of the two.
Our modeling of trade credit merits some discussions. Trade credit in reality is not an
explicit loan as is in our model. Instead, extending trade credit essentially means delaying
receipt of cash flows that can be used to finance production, investment and etc.. However,
modeling trade credit in this more realistic way requires an alternative timing and adds
an additional state variable. As an example, in Appendix A.1, we provide an alternative
model of trade credit extension as delayed cash flow. In it, we assume that trade credit is
carried over into the next period, instead of repaying at the end of this period. Hence this
specification adds trade credit from previous period as another state variable.
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Clearly, the modeling of trade credit in this paper makes computation less intensive. At
the same time, we believe that it very well captures the essence of trade credit – a reallocation
of financial resources, whether it is cash flow as in Appendix A.1, or explicit loan as in here.
Working capital constraint with trade credit Offering trade credit 𝐴𝑅 increases in-
termediate goods entrepreneurs’ need for intra-temporal bank loan by the amount 𝐴𝑅. By
using trade credit 𝐴𝑃 , final goods entrepreneurs’ need for intra-temporal loan decreases by
𝐴𝑃 . Therefore, their needs for intra-temporal loan with trade credit are,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : ?ˆ?1 = 𝑚1 + 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑎
′ − 𝑎 + 𝑐 + 𝑟(𝑘 − 𝑎) + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 + 𝐴𝑅,
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : ?ˆ?2 = 𝑚2 − 𝐴𝑃 = 𝑎′ − 𝑎 + 𝑐 + 𝑟(𝑘 − 𝑎) + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑝1𝑥1 − 𝐴𝑃.
Using budget constraints of the entrepreneurs,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝐴𝑅, 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝐴2𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑝1𝑥1 − 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝐴𝑃,
we derive the need for intra-temporal bank loan for intermediate goods entrepreneurs as
?ˆ?1 = 𝑝1𝐴1𝐹(𝑘, 𝑙) + (1 + 𝑟
𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅 and for final goods entrepreneurs it is ?ˆ?2 = 𝐴2𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)−
(1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑃 .
Upon default, a renegotiation process begins. Intermediate goods entrepreneurs would
propose a take-it-or-leave-it offer to repay only 𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅, where 𝛾2𝐴𝑅 is the expected
liquidation value of accounts receivable for the bank. The value of default for intermediate
goods entrepreneurs is therefore 𝑦 + 𝐴𝑅 − (𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅) and the value of non-default is
𝑦 + 𝐴𝑅 − ?ˆ?1. The incentive compatibility constraint gives ?ˆ?1 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅. Similarly,
for final goods entrepreneurs, the incentive compatibility constraint leads to a constraint on
intra-temporal bank loan ?ˆ?2 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′.
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In the end, we can write the working capital constraints with trade credit as follows,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑝1𝐴1𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) + (1 + 𝑟
𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅, (1.4)
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝐴2𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)− (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑃 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′. (1.5)
A comparison between working capital constraint 1.2 and 1.4 shows that, for intermediate
goods entrepreneurs, by extending one unit of trade credit, the need for intra-temporal bank
loan increases by 1+𝑟𝑡𝑐, but it is partially compensated by an increased intra-temporal bank
loan limit with accounts receivable as collateral. A comparison between working capital
constraint 1.3 and 1.5, on the other hand, indicates that by using one unit of trade credit,
final goods entrepreneurs reduce the need for intra-temporal bank loan by 1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐.
Figure 1.8 summarizes the flow of goods and credit after trade credit is introduced in the
economy. Intermediate goods entrepreneurs supply input goods of value 𝑝1𝑦1 (black arrow)
as well as trade credit of size 𝐴𝑅 (green arrow) to final goods entrepreneurs. The bank
provide intra-temporal loan of size 𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅 and 𝛾1𝑎′ to intermediate and final goods
entrepreneurs, respectively (blue arrows).
1.4 Recursive competitive equilibrium
In this section, we present the problem of households and entrepreneurs, define recursive
competitive equilibrium, and analyze entrepreneurs’ choice of trade credit.
The problem of households is stationary. It can be written simply as follows,
max
𝑐ℎ𝑡 ,ℎ𝑡
(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝜓ℎ1+𝜃𝑡 )1−𝜈
1− 𝜈 , 𝑠.𝑡. 𝑐
ℎ
𝑡 = 𝑤ℎ𝑡. (1.6)
Given current state variables (𝑎, 𝑧), intermediate goods entrepreneurs choose input goods
𝑘, 𝑙, trade credit extension 𝐴𝑅, consumption 𝑐, and next period wealth 𝑎′. The choices are
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subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint 1.8 and a working capital constraint 1.9.
Two additional constraints on accounts receivable require that it is nonnegative and does
not exceed the value of output. We also require that entrepreneurs always hold positive
wealth. The problem of intermediate goods entrepreneurs can be written recursively as
follows,
𝑉1(𝑎, 𝑧) = max
𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝐴𝑅,𝑎′
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1(𝑎′, 𝑧′), (1.7)
𝑠.𝑡. 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝐴𝑅, (1.8)
𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) + (1 + 𝑟
𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅, (1.9)
0 ≤ 𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙), 𝑎′ ≥ 0.
Similarly, we can write the problem of final goods entrepreneurs as follows,
𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑧) = max
𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝑥1,𝐴𝑃,𝑎′
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉2(𝑎′, 𝑧′), (1.10)
𝑠.𝑡. 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑝1𝑥1 − 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝐴𝑃, (1.11)
𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)− (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑃 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′, (1.12)
0 ≤ 𝐴𝑃 ≤ 𝑝1𝑥1, 𝑎′ ≥ 0.
where equation 1.11 is the inter-temporal budget constraint and inequality 1.12 is the working
capital constraint.
We are now ready to define the recursive competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 The recursive competitive equilibrium consists of interest rate 𝑅, wage rate
𝑤, intermediate goods price 𝑝1 and interest rate of trade credit 𝑟𝑡𝑐, value functions of en-
trepreneurs 𝑉1(𝑎, 𝑧) and 𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑧), policy functions of entrepreneurs 𝑐1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑐2(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧),
𝑘2(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑎′1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑎′2(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑙1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑙2(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑥1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝐴𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑧), consumption and
labor supply of households {𝑐ℎ, ℎ} and distributions of entrepreneurs Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) and Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧),
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such that,
1. Given prices, value functions and policy functions solve the optimization problems of
entrepreneurs 1.7 and 1.10.
2. Given prices, consumption and labor supply solve the households optimization problem
1.6.
3. Labor market clears
∫︁
𝑙1(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) +
∫︁
𝑙2(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧) = 𝑁 · ℎ.
4. Inter-temporal debt market clears,
∫︁
(𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝑎) · 𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) +
∫︁
(𝑘2(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝑎) · 𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0.
5. Intermediate goods market and trade credit market clear,
∫︁
𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) =
∫︁
𝑥1(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧),∫︁
𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) =
∫︁
𝐴𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧).
6. The stationary distributions evolve according to the following law of motion,
Φ1(𝑎
′, 𝑧′) =
∫︁
I𝑎′=𝑎′1(𝑎,𝑧)𝜋(𝑧
′|𝑧)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧),
Φ2(𝑎
′, 𝑧′) =
∫︁
I𝑎′=𝑎′2(𝑎,𝑧)𝜋(𝑧
′|𝑧)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧).
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1.4.1 Some properties of the equilibrium
In the following propositions, we characterize 1) the state of being financially constrained,
2) the choice of extending and using trade credit, and 3) the relationship between the state
of being constrained and the choice of trade credit.
The first proposition characterizes the state of being financially constrained.
Proposition 1 There exist functions 𝑔1(𝑧) and 𝑔2(𝑧) such that,
1. For intermediate goods entrepreneurs with wealth 𝑎 and productivity 𝑧, working capital
constraint is not binding if 𝑎 > 𝑔1(𝑧) and it is binding if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑔1(𝑧).
2. For final goods entrepreneurs with wealth 𝑎 and productivity 𝑧, working capital con-
straint is not binding if 𝑎 > 𝑔2(𝑧) and it is binding if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑔2(𝑧).
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A.2.1. It says that the state
of being constrained follows a cut-off rule. For an entrepreneur with a given productivity
𝑧, she moves from being constrained to being unconstrained when 𝑎 increases. This is an
intuitive result. An increase in wealth 𝑎 leads to a larger bank loan limit and thus relaxes the
working capital constraint. For any 𝑧, there exists an optimal production scale because the
production function is decreasing return to scale. The entrepreneur becomes unconstrained
when 𝑎 is large enough so that the optimal scale of production can be achieved with the
available bank loan.
In the second proposition, we analysis the decision of trade credit extension and usage.
Proposition 2 There exist functions ℎ1(𝑧) and ℎ2(𝑧) such that,
1. For any intermediate entrepreneurs with wealth 𝑎 and productivity 𝑧, 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)
if 𝑎 > ℎ1(𝑧), 𝐴𝑅 = 0 if 𝑎 < ℎ1(𝑧), and 𝐴𝑅 ∈ (0, 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)) if 𝑎 = ℎ1(𝑧).
2. For any final goods entrepreneurs with wealth 𝑎 and productivity 𝑧, 𝐴𝑃 = 0 if 𝑎 > ℎ2(𝑧),
𝐴𝑃 = 𝑝1𝑥1 if 𝑎 < ℎ2(𝑧), and 𝐴𝑃 ∈ (0, 𝑝1𝑥1) if 𝑎 = ℎ2(𝑧).
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The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A.2.2. To understand the choice of
trade credit extension for intermediate goods entrepreneurs, consider the first order condition
with respect to AR,
𝑟𝑡𝑐 = 𝜆(1− 𝛾2) + 𝜏1 − 𝜏2. (1.13)
In it, 𝜆 is the Lagrangian multiplier on working capital constraint representing the shadow
price of bank loans, and 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 are the Lagrangian multipliers of two accounts receivable
constraints (𝐴𝑅 ≥ 0 and 𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) respectively). The Lagrangian multiplier of
working capital constraint, 𝜆, represents the shadow price of bank loan.
The marginal cost of extending trade credit is 𝜆(1 − 𝛾2), which is the shadow price of
bank loan multiplied by loss of bank loan 1 − 𝛾2. When wealth of the entrepreneur is very
low and thus shadow price of bank loans is very high, marginal cost is higher than marginal
benefit of extending trade credit, which is the interest rate of trade credit 𝑟𝑡𝑐. In this case the
entrepreneur is unwilling to extend trade credit. This can be seen in equation 1.13 – when
𝜆 is high, we have 𝜏1 > 0, hence 𝐴𝑅 = 0 following the complementary slackness condition.
The entrepreneur will extend trade credit if and only if shadow price of bank loan is low
enough, i.e. her wealth level is high enough.
A similar analysis can be applied to the use of trade credit for final goods entrepreneurs.
The third proposition describes the relationship between choices of trade credit and being
financial constrained.
Proposition 3 The following properties hold if 𝑟𝑡𝑐 > 0,
1. If 𝛾2 ∈ [0, 1], for any 𝑧, ℎ1(𝑧) < 𝑔1(𝑧).
2. For any 𝑧, ℎ2(𝑧) < 𝑔2(𝑧).
The proofs of the proposition can be found in Appendix A.2.3. The first part of the
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above proposition says that, all unconstrained intermediate goods entrepreneurs will extend
trade credit. If accounts receivable can be used as collateral to obtain bank loan, some of
the constrained entrepreneurs will extend trade credit. The second part of the propositions
says that, for final goods entrepreneurs, if they are financially unconstrained, they will not
borrow from their supplier through trade credit. For constrained final goods entrepreneurs,
they will only use trade credit if marginal benefit exceeds the interest rate of trade credit.
Hence only the very productive final goods entrepreneurs use trade credit.
1.5 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the stationary equilibrium to match key moments of the U.S.
data. One period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data.
1.5.1 Calibration strategy and result
The household utility function is of GHH form (see Greenwood et al., 1988). We pick 𝜃 = 0.5,
which gives a Frisch elasticity of 2. This value is well within standard macro estimation (see
Chetty et al., 2011; Keane and Rogerson, 2012). Another parameter in the utility function
is 𝜓, representing disutility from providing one unit of labor. We calibrate 𝜓 such that 30
percent of households time is spent on working, i.e. ℎ = 0.3. Entrepreneurs’ instantaneous
utility function is log-form. We calibrate the discount rate 𝛽 of entrepreneurs to match an
annual interest rate of 4 percent. Since the share of entrepreneurs in the U.S. data is around
10 percent, we pick 𝑁 = 18 so that the share of entrepreneurs in the model matches that
number.
These are two sectoral production function in the model. We assume that capital to
labor ratio in the two sectors are the same. We then fix the relative capital share 𝛼 to be
1/3. Consequently, the relative labor share is 2/3. Following Yi (2003), the intermediate
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goods share 𝜒 is fixed to be 2/3. Depreciation rate 𝛿 is chosen to be 0.025 so that the annual
depreciation rate of capital is equal to 10 percent. The Poisson death rate 𝜋 is fixed at 10
percent, following Buera et al. (2011).
We assume that scale parameters in the two sectors are the same, i.e. 𝜇1 = 𝜇2. The
productivity distribution 𝐺(𝑧) is assumed to be Pareto with scale parameter 1 and tail
parameter 𝜈. Following Buera et al. (2011), we calibrate 𝜇1(𝜇2) and 𝜈 to match the top 5
percentile earnings share and top 10 percentile employment share, respectively. Lastly, we
pick 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, the collateral constraint on wealth 𝑎′ and accounts receivable 𝐴𝑅, such that
the model delivers the ratio of credit market liability to nonfinancial assets and the ratio of
accounts receivable to gross value added in the data. See Table 1.3 for a summary of the
calibrated parameters, their value, targets, and calibration results. The algorithm to solve
the stationary equilibrium can be found in Appendix A.3.1.
How we compute the model moment of credit market liability deserves some discussion
here. In our model, credit market liability consists of both inter-temporal and intra-temporal
debt. It is clear that the aggregate inter-temporal debt is
∫︁ 1
0
max(𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝑎, 0)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) +
∫︁ 1
0
max(𝑘2(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝑎, 0)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧). (1.14)
The size of intra-temporal debt of intermediate goods entrepreneurs is 𝑝1𝑦1(𝑎, 𝑧)+𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧),
where 𝑦1(𝑎, 𝑧) = 𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑙1(𝑎, 𝑧)). It covers output and the amount of trade credit
extended. The intra-temporal debt of final goods entrepreneurs is output minus trade credit
used 𝑦2(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝐴𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑧).
Given that in equilibrium,
∫︀ 1
0
𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) =
∫︀ 1
0
𝐴𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧), it follows that
the aggregate intra-temporal debt is
∫︁ 1
0
𝑝1𝑦1(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧) +
∫︁ 1
0
𝑦2(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ2(𝑎, 𝑧). (1.15)
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Credit market liability in the model is therefore the sum of inter-temporal debt 1.14 and
intra-temporal debt 1.15.
1.5.2 Discussions of the calibrated model
Heterogeneous entrepreneurs and their choice of trade credit As discussed in
section 1.4.1, choices of extending and using trade credit depend on wealth and productivity
of entrepreneurs. In particular, we know that given productivity, the usage of trade credit
decreases with wealth while the extension of trade credit increases with wealth.
We take the calibrated model and compare trade credit choices of entrepreneurs with
different level of wealth and productivity. We divide entrepreneurs into four groups based
on their productivity and wealth: low wealth low productivity, low wealth high productivity,
high wealth low productivity, and high wealth high productivity.
Trade credit choices for these four groups are presented in Table 1.4. Choice of trade
credit extension of intermediate goods entrepreneurs is presented in the first row of the
table. Two low productivity groups extend all of their output as trade credit. On the
contrary, two high productivity groups extend only a fraction of their output as trade credit.
Furthermore, conditional on being high productivity, low wealth and high wealth groups
extend approximately the same fraction of output as trade credit. This is a result of the
high collateral value of accounts receivable in the calibration (𝛾2 = 0.95).
The four groups of entrepreneurs show very different patterns when it comes to the using
of trade credit. For the group with high wealth and low productivity, there is no need for
trade credit, therefore its accounts payable to output ratio is 0. The accounts payable to
output ratio increases to 29.8 percent for the low productivity and low wealth group, an
indication that due to low wealth level, some of the low productivity entrepreneurs need
additional financing from trade credit. The accounts payable to output ratio increases even
more for the two groups with high productivity – 47.9 percent if wealth level is low and 53.0
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percent if wealth level is high.
Interest rate of trade credit One prominent empirical characteristics of trade credit
is its high interest rate. As an example, Petersen and Rajan (1997) documents that the
effective annual interest rate is around 43 percent for one of the most commonly used trade
credit contracts in retail businesses. Costello (2014) calculates that the annual interest rate
of trade credit is between 12 percent to 16 percent by comparing gross profit margin of firms
before and after using trade credit. In our calibrated model, interest rate of trade credit is
2.7 percent quarterly, yielding an annual interest rate of 11.8 percent, which is very close to
the calculation in Costello (2014).
The fact that our model generates a high trade credit interest rate is not surprising. Ac-
cording to Proposition 3 and Table 1.4, only very productive and constrained entrepreneurs
use trade credit. The interest rate of trade credit therefore reflects marginal productivity of
the most productive group of final goods entrepreneurs.
Nature of trade credit: Redistribution and creation of credit Trade credit in
nature is a financial institution that alleviates the efficiency loss from financial frictions. It
plays this role through two channels: 1) it redistributes unused credit from unconstrained
intermediate goods entrepreneurs to constrained final goods entrepreneurs, and 2) it creates
credit through accounts receivable financing and increases collective access to trade for all
entrepreneurs.
With the calibrated model, we decompose total trade credit, 𝐴𝑅 =
∫︀
𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧),
into two parts by their nature: credit redistribution (𝐴𝑅𝑟) and credit creation (𝐴𝑅𝑐). The
credit creation part 𝐴𝑅𝑐 is the amount of trade credit that are used by intermediate goods
entrepreneurs as collateral to obtain bank loans. More formally, it is defined as
𝐴𝑅
𝑐
=
1
𝛾2
∫︁
𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑦1(𝑎, 𝑧) + (1 + 𝑟
𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝛾1𝑎′)𝑑Φ1(𝑎, 𝑧). (1.16)
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In it, 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑦1(𝑎, 𝑧) + (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝛾1𝑎′) is the amount of bank loan that interme-
diate goods entrepreneurs receive by using accounts receivable as collateral. Dividing that
by 𝛾2, collateral constraint of accounts receivable, yields the size of trade credit that is used
as collateral. Consequently, the rest of the accounts receivable is a pure credit redistribution,
i.e. 𝐴𝑅𝑟 = 𝐴𝑅− 𝐴𝑅𝑐.
The decomposition exercise using our calibrated model shows that the credit creation
part consists of 87 percent of the aggregate trade credit in the economy while the rest 13
percent is pure credit redistribution.
1.6 Engineering the 2007-09 financial crisis
In this section, we use the calibrated model to study the 2007-09 financial crisis. To this
end, we engineer a financial shock by reducing the collateral constraint parameters 𝛾1 and 𝛾2
such that the model delivers the drop in the ratio of credit market liability and trade credit
to nonfinancial assets of the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector during the 2007-09 financial
crisis.
To simulate the model, we assume that the collateral parameters 𝛾1,𝑡 and 𝛾2,𝑡 are hit by
a common shock 𝜌𝑡. That is, 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡𝛾𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, in which 𝛾𝑖 takes the parameter value
at steady state. Our simulation results suggest that the following 𝜌𝑡 process yields the best
fit of data: {𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜌3, 𝜌4} = {0.975, 0.95, 0.925, 0.9}, 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡−1 + 0.014 for 𝑡 = 5, ..., 10, and
𝜌𝑡 = 1 for 𝑡 ≥ 11.
We plot the simulation result in Figure 1.8. In the left panel, we plot credit market
liability to capital stock ratio in the data (dotted line) and in the model (solid line). In the
right panel, we plot trade credit to capital stock ratio in the data (dotted line) and in the
model (solid line). From peak to trough following the 2007-09 financial crisis, credit market
liability to capital stock ratio dropped by around 10 percent and trade credit to capital stock
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ratio dropped by around 13 percent in the data. As shown in the figure, the simulated model
matches the magnitude of the drop in the data quite well. It delivers a 11 percent drop in
credit market liability to capital stock ratio and a 12.5 percent drop in trade credit to capital
stock ratio.
1.6.1 Aggregate dynamics after the financial crisis
How does our model perform in terms of capturing aggregate dynamics of the economy during
the 2007-09 financial crisis? In this section, we presents aggregate dynamics of the model
economy following the shock process 𝜌𝑡. The algorithm to solve the transitional dynamics
can be found in Appendix A.3.2.
In the face of a tightening borrowing constraints during the financial crisis, constrained
entrepreneurs are forced to reduced the scale of their production. This leads to a drop in
hours, capital, and output. In addition, prices of input goods drop during crisis. As a result,
unconstrained entrepreneurs, who are on average less productivity than constrained ones,
increase their production scale. This reallocation of resources from productive entrepreneurs
to less productive ones results in a lower aggregate TFP, which exacerbate the decline in
aggregate output and input.
Figure 1.8 shows aggregate dynamics of the economy following the financial crisis. In
the model, output drops by 6 percent, while in the data output shows a 6 percent deviation
below trend (see the upper left panel of Figure 1.8). Aggregate dynamics in hours, capital
stock, and TFP are presented in the other three panels. The model displays approximately
a 8 percent drop in total hours, a 2 percent drop in aggregate TFP, and a 1 percent drop
in total capital stock. Compared to data, the model generates a higher drop in hours and a
lower drop in TFP. In general, it performs rather well to match the dynamics in the data.
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1.7 The aggregate implications of trade credit
In this section, we construct a counterfactual economy in which bank credit is the only source
of financing. By comparing the benchmark to the counterfactual economy in steady state
and during financial shocks, we attempt to understand the aggregate implications of trade
credit.
1.7.1 A counterfactual economy
The counterfactual economy has the same economic environment as the benchmark. The only
difference is the missing of trade credit. In the counterfactual economy, limited enforcibility
of bank loans leads to a set of working capital constraints 1.2 and 1.3 (see section 1.3.2).
The stationary equilibrium of the counterfactual economy is defined as follows,
Definition 2 The recursive competitive equilibrium without trade credit consists of inter-
est rate ?˜?, wage rate ?˜?, and intermediate goods price 𝑝1, value functions of entrepreneurs
𝑉1(𝑎, 𝑧) and 𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑧), policy functions of entrepreneurs 𝑐1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑐2(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑘2(𝑎, 𝑧),
?˜?′1(𝑎, 𝑧), ?˜?′2(𝑎, 𝑧), ?˜?1(𝑎, 𝑧), ?˜?2(𝑎, 𝑧), ?˜?1(𝑎, 𝑧), consumption and labor supply of households
{𝑐ℎ, ℎ˜} and distributions of entrepreneurs Φ˜1(𝑎, 𝑧) and Φ˜2(𝑎, 𝑧), such that,
1. Given prices, value functions and policy functions solve the optimization problem of
entrepreneurs.
𝑉1(𝑎, 𝑧) = max
𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝑎′
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1(𝑎′, 𝑧′)
𝑠.𝑡. 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙,
𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′, 𝑎′ ≥ 0.
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𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑧) = max
𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝑥1,𝑎′
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉2(𝑎′, 𝑧′),
𝑠.𝑡. 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑝1𝑥1,
𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑥1) ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′, 𝑎′ ≥ 0.
2. Given prices, consumption and labor supply solve households optimization problem 1.6.
3. Labor market clears,
∫︁
?˜?1(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ˜1(𝑎, 𝑧) +
∫︁
?˜?2(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ˜2(𝑎, 𝑧) = 𝑁 · ℎ˜.
4. Capital market clears,
∫︁
(𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝑎) · 𝑑Φ˜1(𝑎, 𝑧) +
∫︁
(𝑘2(𝑎, 𝑧)− 𝑎) · 𝑑Φ˜2(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0.
5. Intermediate goods market clears,
∫︁
𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘1(𝑎, 𝑧), ?˜?1(𝑎, 𝑧))𝑑Φ˜1(𝑎, 𝑧) =
∫︁
?˜?1(𝑎, 𝑧)𝑑Φ˜2(𝑎, 𝑧).
6. The stationary distributions evolve according to,
Φ˜1(𝑎
′, 𝑧′) =
∫︁
I𝑎′=?˜?′1(𝑎,𝑧)𝜋(𝑧
′|𝑧)𝑑Φ˜1(𝑎, 𝑧),
Φ˜2(𝑎
′, 𝑧′) =
∫︁
I𝑎′=?˜?′2(𝑎,𝑧)𝜋(𝑧
′|𝑧)𝑑Φ˜2(𝑎, 𝑧).
1.7.2 The impact of trade credit in steady state
To see the role of trade credit in steady state, we take the calibrated parameters in the
benchmark economy (see Table 1.3) and feed them into the counterfactual. In particular,
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we set 𝛾1 = 𝛾1, making collateral constraint of entrepreneurs’ wealth to be the same across
two economies.
We solve the above parameterized counterfactual economy numerically. In Table 1.5,
we present the percentage difference of the counterfactual economy from the benchmark in
aggregate and sectoral output, hours, capital, and TFP. As shown in the table, compared to
the benchmark, aggregate output of the counterfactual economy is 23.9 percent lower, which
can be decomposed into a 15.3 percent lower capital stock, a 24.4 percent lower labor, and
a 8.4 percent lower aggregate TFP.
Why is output higher in the benchmark economy? In short, the existence of trade credit
alleviates borrowing constraints of entrepreneurs. Therefore resources are allocated more
efficiently in the benchmark, leading to a higher aggregate output level. Our computation
shows that in the benchmark economy, when weighted by output, 82 percent of intermediate
entrepreneurs are constrained and 79 percent of the final goods entrepreneurs are constrained.
As a comparison, in the counterfactual economy, the fraction of constrained entrepreneurs
is 85 percent and 86 percent in the intermediate goods and final goods sector, respectively.
A further examination of sectoral differences between the two economies provides a clearer
understanding of the role of trade credit. As shown in the last column of Table 1.5, aggre-
gate TFP of the counterfactual economy is 8.4 percent lower than that of the benchmark,
indicating a higher level of resource misallocation. Furthermore, the difference in aggregate
TFP is almost completely explained by the different in TFP of the final goods sector (7.5
percent). This is not surprising since trade credit relaxes borrowing constraint of final goods
entrepreneurs, thus leading to a more efficient allocation of resources in that sector. On the
contrary, difference in TFP of the intermediate goods sector is very small (0.9 percent). This
is due to a smaller impact that trade credit has on the borrowing constraint of intermediate
goods entrepreneurs. To see this, notice that in our calibration collateral constraint of ac-
counts receivable is very high (𝛾2 = 0.95). Therefore, although there is loss in bank credit
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when extending trade credit, it is almost offset completely by an increased access to bank
loan through accounts receivable financing.
Although trade credit has a very small impact on TFP of intermediate goods sector,
its impact on output of that sector is large. As shown in Table 1.5, intermediate goods
output, measured by its quantity, of the counterfactual economy is 26.4 percent lower than
that of the benchmark. This effect on output works mainly through general equilibrium
forces. Higher demand of intermediate input goods from final goods sector increases the
price of intermediate goods, which essentially makes all intermediate goods entrepreneurs
more productive.
1.7.3 The impact of trade credit during 2007-09 financial crisis
So far we have established the role of trade credit in steady state: it relaxes the borrowing
constraint and increases aggregate output. In this section, we ask: what is the role played
by trade credit during the 2007-09 financial crisis? To answer this question, we again turn
to the counterfactual economy without trade credit. More specifically, we introduce into the
counterfactual economy the same financial shock as in the benchmark economy and study
dynamics of that economy following the shock.
Before conducting the experiment, we first make sure that the benchmark and the coun-
terfactual economy are comparable to each other. In particular, we want to make sure that
the fraction of constrained entrepreneurs in these two economies are at the same level, be-
cause the effect of a financial shock crucially depends on the fraction of entrepreneurs whose
production scale are constrained by their access to financial resources.
To this end, we recalibrate the counterfactual economy so that its aggregate output
is at the same level as the benchmark. In particular, we need to increase 𝛾1, such that
𝛾1 = 1.43𝛾1 = 0.4. Under this calibration, the rest of the model moments in the coun-
terfactual economy are very close to those in the benchmark. In addition, the fraction of
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constrained entrepreneurs are at a very similar level as the benchmark. In steady state
of the benchmark economy, around 82 percent of intermediate goods entrepreneurs and 79
percent of final goods entrepreneurs are constrained. The numbers are very similar in the
recalibrated counterfactual economy: around 81 percent of entrepreneurs are constrained in
each sector.
We then hit the recalibrated counterfactual economy with the same financial shock 𝜌𝑡
as in the benchmark model (see section 1.6). More formally, we feed in the recalibrated
counterfactual model a sequence of collateral constraint 𝛾1,𝑡 such that 𝛾1,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡𝛾1 and compare
the aggregate dynamics of the recalibrated counterfactual economy with the benchmark
economy.
In Figure 1.8, we plot aggregate dynamics of the recalibrated counterfactual economy
following the financial shock 𝜌𝑡 in red dashed lines. In each figure, we also plot the corre-
sponding aggregate dynamics of the benchmark economy following the same financial shock
𝜌𝑡 in blue solid line. Notice that the blue solid lines in Figure 1.8 are identical to those
in Figure 1.8. The recession is milder in the counterfactual economy – the drop in output,
hours, TFP, and capital are all smaller in the counterfactual economy. In particular, the
drop in output is around 1.4 percentage point smaller in the recalibrated counterfactual
economy, which accounts for approximately 23 percent of the total decline in output in the
benchmark. Based on these observations, we draw the conclusion that the existence of trade
credit in the benchmark economy amplifies the financial shock.
1.7.4 Mechanisms behind the amplification effect
In this section, we explore mechanisms behind the amplification effect of trade credit in
section 1.7.3. Since we have established that the two economies are comparable in terms of
aggregate output and fraction of constrained entrepreneurs in steady state, a nature starting
point of exploration is thus the dynamics of trade credit.
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During crisis, entrepreneurs become more constrained and the collateral value of trade
credit drop. As a result, on the one hand, intermediate goods entrepreneurs are less willing
to extend trade credit. On the other hand, final goods entrepreneurs would like to use more
trade credit to finance production. The shift in marginal willingness to extend and use trade
credit leads to a spike in the trade credit interest rate. As shown in the left panel of Figure
1.8, trade credit interest rate more than triples during the crisis. It jumps from a pre-crisis
level of 2.7 percent to as high as 8.3 percent. Accompanying the interest rate spike is a huge
drop in the amount of trade credit relative to output (see the right panel of Figure 1.8).
These changes in trade credit indicate that financial shock brings more damage in the
benchmark economy through the following channels.
First of all, on the aggregate level, a drop in trade credit leads to a drop in available
collateral, thus exacerbates the drop in bank credit. We find that under the same 𝜌𝑡 shock,
the drop in bank credit is much larger in the benchmark economy.
Second, from the steady state analysis in section 1.7.2, we know the existence of trade
credit leads to better allocation of resources. During crisis, this reallocation channel is
hindered. This can be seen from a huge drop in the quantity of trade credit in the economy.
In addition, the increase in trade credit interest rate indicates that productivity of the
marginal final goods entrepreneur who uses trade credit increases. In other words, part of
the entrepreneurs who use trade credit before crisis no longer use trade credit during crisis
because it becomes more expensive.
Lastly, highly productive entrepreneurs are affected disproportionately more than un-
constrained ones when bank credit shrinks, because they are the ones that are financially
constrained. Compared to bank credit, the negative impact of a drop in trade credit is more
disproportionately borne by the productive entrepreneurs. To see this, remember that as
shown in Proposition 3, only the most productive and constrained final goods entrepreneurs
use trade credit. Thus they are the ones that are directly affected by the drop in trade credit.
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1.7.5 Trade credit and the U.S. business cycles
In this section, we extend our study beyond the 2007-09 financial crisis into U.S. business
cycles in general. More specifically, we attempt to answer two questions using the model.
First, what can we learn about the driving forces of U.S. business cycles? Second, does trade
credit amplify business cycle fluctuations in general?
Figure 1.8 shows the cyclical property of trade credit. Trade credit exhibits a strong
pro-cyclical pattern – the correlation between gross value added and trade credit is 0.61. It
is also more volatile than gross value added – the standard deviation of trade credit is 0.05
compared to a standard deviation of 0.02 for gross value added.
Driving forces of the business cycles We consider two most widely used types of
shock that generates the U.S. business cycle – TFP shock and financial shock. In order to
understand the driving forces behind the U.S. business cycle, we ask whether these two types
of shocks can generate model dynamics that are consistent with data.
The two upper panels in Figure 1.8 plot the dynamics of trade credit and output in
the benchmark model following a negative and a positive financial shock to the collateral
constraints. In essence, there are the same type of 𝜌𝑡 shock that is used to generate the
2007-09 financial crisis in section 1.6. In both cases, as shown in the figure, after a financial
shock, the percentage drop in trade credit is almost twice as high as the percentage drop in
output.
The lower two panels of Figure 1.8 plot the dynamics of trade credit and output following
a sectoral neutral TFP shock 𝜌𝑡, such that 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡𝐴𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2. Interestingly, the percent
drop in output and trade credit are of the similar magnitude following TFP shocks. Why
is this the case? Take the negative TFP shock experiment as an example. Admittedly, in
the face of a negative TFP shock, both intermediate goods and final goods entrepreneurs
become less productive and therefore less constrained. This leads to a decreasing marginal
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willingness to borrow trade credit and an increasing marginal willingness to lend trade credit.
However, these shifts do not seem to be quantitatively important. In fact, the trade credit
interest rate under TFP shocks does not experience a significant change, which indicates
that role played by trade credit in reallocating resources is not affected.
Therefore, given that the standard deviation of trade credit is more than twice as high
as that of output, we infer that a sectoral neutral TFP can not be the sole source of the
business cycles. Financial shocks must have contributed to the business cycle fluctuation.
Does trade credit amplify the business cycles? One important result of our analysis
is that, in the face of a financial crisis, disruptions in trade credit amplify the magnitude
of financial shocks. It is then nature to ask whether the existence of trade credit amplifies
fluctuation of U.S. business cycles.
Our model shows that financial shocks are amplified in the benchmark model with trade
credit (see the two upper panels of Figure 1.8). The mechanisms of the amplification effect are
discussed previously in section 1.7.4. As shown in the lower panels of Figure 1.8, however, we
find that following TFP shocks, dynamics in the benchmark and the counterfactual economy
are almost indistinguishable. Further analysis shows that the percentage drop in trade credit
is of a similar magnitude as that in output. In addition, the change in trade credit interest
rate is very small. These facts show that the role of trade credit in the economy is not
affected by TFP shocks. As a result, the amplification effect is missing in this case.
We have established that financial shocks are indispensable for the model to match the
business cycle pattern of trade credit. The fact that trade credit amplifies financial shocks
lead us to conclude that, through the lenses of our model, trade credit amplifies the U.S.
business cycle fluctuations.
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1.8 Conclusion
At the present time, production is becoming increasingly specialized. Generally, production
of final goods takes place in several stages, with each stage operated by a different firm.
Therefore, transactions of intermediate-input goods are carried across firm boundaries and
need to be financed. This leads to potential misallocation of intermediate goods (see Jones,
2011). One way to restore this misallocation is to internalize transaction of intermediate
inputs through vertically integration of firms. In this paper, we show that trade credit
– lending input goods – serves a similar role as vertical integration to alleviate resource
misallocation.
Following previous researches on the topic, we posit that the existence of trade credit is
due to a certain comparative advantage of input goods suppliers over banks in lending to their
customers. In this paper, we find that, the extent to which input goods suppliers can utilize
this superior lending "technology" depends crucially on their own financial conditions. This
technology is more efficiently used during credit booms and is hindered by financial crisis,
which contributes to the aggregate volatility of the economy over credit cycles.
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Figure 1.1: Changes in the characteristics of newly opened credit line facilities
Notes: We compute the characteristics of the newly opened credit line facilities of each year as the average
of all credit line facilities that are opened in that year. The solid lines in these figures are credit line
facilities that require accounts receivable as collateral. The dashed lines are credit line facilities that require
other types of assets as collateral. The dotted lines are unsecured credit line facilities. The time series are
normalized such that they are 1 in year 2006.
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Figure 1.2: Flow of goods and credit
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Figure 1.3: Trade credit and being financially constrained: A graphic illustration
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Figure 1.4: Changes in credit market liability and trade credit during the financial crisis
Notes: The data used in above figures are taken for the US nonfinancial corporate sector. Among them,
credit market liability is taken from Flow of Funds Table L.103 line 23. Trade credit is calculated as the the
average of accounts payable (line 30 of Flow of Funds Table L.103) and accounts receivable (line 15 of Flow
of Funds Table L.103). Capital stock is constructed as the sum of equipment (line 46 of Flow of Funds Table
B.103), IPP (line 47 of Flow of Funds Table B.103), and nonresidential structural capital (line 51 of Flow of
Funds Table B.103), all valued at historical prices. Both credit market liability and trade credit to capital
stock ratio are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600 and the percentage derivation from trend is
plotted in the figures. The corresponding model moments are normalized to be 0 at 𝑡 = 0.
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Figure 1.5: Aggregate dynamics of the economy during the financial crisis
Notes: The data used in above figures are taken for the US nonfinancial corporate sector. Among them,
output (gross value added) is taken from NIPA Table 1.14 line 17. Data for hours worked is an index taken
from Bureau of Labor Statistics Productivity and Cost database (BLS code PRS88003033). Data for capital
stock is constructed in the same way as Figure 1.8. TFP is then constructed as a Solow-type residual using
output, hours, and capital stock.
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate dynamics after the financial crisis: Benchmark vs. counterfactual
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Figure 1.7: Dynamics of trade credit
49
corr = 0.61
s.d. of gross value added = 0.02
s.d. of trade credit = 0.05
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Figure 1.8: Cyclical property of trade credit
Notes: The data is for taken the nonfinancial corporate sector. Gross value added is taken from NIPA Table
1.14 line 17. Trade credit is computed as the average of accounts receivable (line 15 of Flow of Funds Table
L.103) and accounts payable (line 30 of Flow of Funds Table L.103). Both time series are HP-filtered with
a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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Figure 1.9: Dynamics of trade credit and output after a financial and a TFP shock
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Figure 1.10: Dynamics of output after a financial and a TFP shock
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Table 1.1: Trade credit and being financially constrained
Panel A: Net AR/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financially Constrained based on Payout Ratio -6.198***
(-29.86)
Financially Constrained Based on S&P Rating -5.766***
(-18.22)
Financially Constrained Based on Size -11.49***
(-40.85)
Financially Constrained Based on Size -17.07***
(-38.33)
Dependent variable Net AR/S Net AR/S Net AR/S Net AR/S
Sample Compustat Compustat Compustat Compustat+SSBF
N 26036 26036 26036 34705
AR2 0.130 0.113 0.183 0.219
Panel B: AP/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financially Constrained based on Payout Ratio 6.552***
(34.05)
Financially Constrained Based on S&P Rating 6.964***
(23.65)
Financially Constrained Based on Size 10.05***
(38.05)
Financially Constrained Based on Size 12.30***
(28.85)
Dependent variable AP/S AP/S AP/S AP/S
Sample Compustat Compustat Compustat Compustat+SSBF
N 26036 26036 26036 34705
AR2 0.137 0.120 0.173 0.161
Panel C: AR/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financially Constrained based on Payout Ratio 0.354***
(3.00)
Financially Constrained Based on S&P Rating 1.198***
(6.40)
Financially Constrained Based on Size -1.435***
(-9.92)
Financially Constrained Based on Size -4.765***
(-21.26)
Dependent variable AR/S AR/S AR/S AR/S
Sample Compustat Compustat Compustat Compustat+SSBF
N 26036 26036 26036 34705
AR2 0.150 0.151 0.154 0.288
Notes: Our sample includes all but wholesale, retail, and financial and insurance firms
in the Compustat and the SSBF data set for the fiscal year 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003.
All regressions include two-digit SIC industry-year fixed effects. Column (4) of every
panel includes two dummy variables indicating whether the firms is a corporation and a
Compustat firm, respectively. The dependent variables are winsorized at top and bottom
5% for each year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 1.2: Effects of bank health on trade credit extension
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis X Unhealthy -1.274* -1.502** -1.545** -1.837**
(0.681) (0.696) (0.714) (0.718)
Crisis 0.446 0.0672 0.243 2.680
(0.483) (0.537) (1.423) (6.087)
AP to sales ratio 0.381*** 0.382*** 0.382*** 0.382***
(0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0292)
Dependent variable AR/S AR/S AR/S AR/S
Crisis X Credit rating FE N Y Y Y
Crisis X Firm size bin FE N N Y Y
Crisis X SIC FE N N N Y
N 15275 15275 15275 15275
AR2 0.171 0.171 0.172 0.176
Notes: The dependent variables in these regressions are AR/Sales (percent). The sample include
quarterly data of 1219 Compustat firms from 2007Q1 to 2009Q4. All regressions include a set of
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table 1.3: Summary of calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source Data Model
𝜃 inverse of Frisch elasticity 1/2 standard – –
𝛼 capital share in production function 1/3 capital share of 1/3 – –
𝜒 intermediate goods share 2/3 Yi (2003) – –
𝜋 Possion death rate 0.1 Buera et al. (2011) – –
𝑁 measure of workers 18 share of entrepreneur 10% 10%
𝜓 disutility from working 1.9 hours 0.3 0.3
𝛿 depreciation rate 0.025 annual 10% depreciation rate 10% 10%
𝛽 discount rate 0.95 annual 4% interest rate 0.4 0.4
𝜇1, 𝜇2 scale parameter 0.85 top 5 percentile earning share 0.3 0.3
𝜈 Pareto tail 4.0 top 10 percentile employment share 0.69 0.69
𝛾1 collateral value of wealth 0.28 credit market liability to nonfinancial assets 0.36 0.36
𝛾2 collateral value of AR 0.95 trade receivable to gross value added 0.31 0.31
Notes: The data moment for credit market liability to nonfinancial asset and accounts receivable to
gross value added ratio is computed for the nonfinancial corporate sector, averaged over 4 quarters
in year 2006. The credit market liability is taken from Flow of Funds Table L.103 line 23. The
nonfinancial asset level data is taken from Flow of Funds Table B.103 line 2. The trade receivable
data is taken from Flow of Funds Table L.103 line 15. Gross value added is taken from NIPA Table
1.14 line 17.
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Table 1.4: Trade credit extension and usage by wealth and productivity of entrepreneurs
low wealth low wealth high wealth high wealth
low productivity high productivity low productivity high productivity
AR to output ratio (%) 100.0 79.9 100.0 79.7
AP to output ratio (%) 29.8 47.9 0.0 53.0
Notes: An entrepreneur is defined to be low wealth (productivity) if she belongs to the bottom
50 percentile in the wealth (productivity) distribution of her own sector. The accounts receivable
(payable) to output ratio for each group of entrepreneurs is defined as the sum of accounts receivable
(payable) divided by the sum of output of all entrepreneurs in that group.
Table 1.5: Percent difference of the counterfactual relative to the benchmark economy
output capital labor input goods TFP
Intermediate sector -26.4 -23.8 -32.2 – -0.9
Final sector -23.9 -0.2 -10.6 -26.4 -7.5
Aggregate -23.9 -15.3 -24.4 – -8.4
Notes: This table displays the percent difference of the counterfactual economy relative to the
benchmark economy. A negative number in the table suggest that aggregate statistics of the coun-
terfactual economy is lower than that of the benchmark economy.
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Chapter 2
Financial Development beyond the
Formal Financial Market
2.1 Introduction
A well-developed financial market is crucial to the economic development (see Levine, 2005
for a review of the literature). It is difficult, however, to evaluate the quantitative importance
of finance on economic development due to the existence of informal financial activities,
which is large relative to the size of formal financial market, but because of its nature,
very difficult to measure. Economists have long postulated that informal financial activities
plays an important role in developing countries. More specifically, if informal lending, such as
borrowing from relatives, friends, or suppliers, can substitute for the lack of a well-functioning
formal financial sector, finance might not be an important obstacle to economic growth.
In this paper, we try to quantify the role of informal financial institutions in determining
the huge differences in cross-country income.
Using a cross-country firm-level dataset, we document two facts about informal financing.
First, on the aggregate level, there is a positive correlation between the size of formal and
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informal financing. In fact, firms in more developed countries borrow more from the formal
financial market, as well as from informal channels. Second, financially constrained firms
in countries with a better formal financial market can borrow more from informal channels
compared to their constrained counterparts in countries with a less developed formal financial
market. These facts indicate that finance might play a more important role in creating the
huge cross-country income differences, once the informal financing activities are taken into
account.
We build a quantitative model to provide an estimation of the importance of informal
financing. Here we restrict our focus to one particular informal financial activity – trade
credit. We explore the fact trade credit is relatively easier to measure, compared to other
types of informal financing activities, since it appears on the balance sheet of firms according
to the accounting rules in many countries. The result shows that, when only taking into
account of the formal financial market, improving the quality of the formal financial market
in China to the level of the U.S., would lead to a gain of aggregate output of 17%. However,
when taking into account of both informal and formal financial market, an improvement
of quality of the financial market in China to the level of the U.S. would lead to a gain of
aggregate output of 23%.
In the model, this is a continuum of intermediate goods entrepreneurs who produces
differentiable intermediate goods using capital, labor, and a composite of all intermediate
input goods. Each intermediate goods entrepreneur is a supplier for all the other intermediate
goods entrepreneurs and at the same time, demand the intermediate goods produced by the
other entrepreneurs. Financial friction arises in the model due to a moral hazard problem
of the entrepreneurs to default and divert bank loans. In order to introduce the existence of
trade credit, we make two crucial assumptions. First, suppliers have a better technology to
enforce the trade credit loan than banks over bank loans. Second, while banks have access
to deep pockets, the lenders of trade credit can be financially constrained. In equilibrium,
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the substitutability of trade credit to the lack of access to bank credit crucially depends
on how constrained the lenders of trade credit are. As the access to bank credit improves,
the suppliers are more willing to lend trade credit to their customers. This will lead to an
increase in the substitutability between trade credit and bank credit.
2.1.1 Literature review
This paper belongs to the following strands of literature.
First, it contributes to the understanding of the financial aspect of firm growth in coun-
tries with less developed formal financial sector. In Allen et al. (2005), the authors shows
that despite that fact that the formal financial market favors state-owned firms in China,
private firms outperform state-owned firms through lending in the informal financial sector.
Similarly, Tsai (2001) points out the importance of the informal financial sector in help firm
growth in China. Ayyagari et al. (2010) shows instead that firms with access to formal credit
(bank loans) grow faster than firms that only utilize informal financing. Recently, Degryse
et al. (2013) studies the relationship between informal and formal financing for firms with
different sizes. Similar to Degryse et al. (2013) and Ayyagari et al. (2010), this paper focuses
on the relationship between informal and formal financing and its impact on firm growth.
In addition, we contribute to the literature by showing how the substitutability (or comple-
mentarities) between informal and formal financing correlates with the quality of the formal
financial market. More specifically, we show that although financially constrained firm in
countries with a less developed financial market benefit from lending through informal chan-
nels, their constrained counterpart in countries with a highly developed financial market
benefit more.
Second, our paper is one of a few papers that model the coexistence of formal and infor-
mal financing. We build up on the insights from the previous literature that the efficiency of
the financial market is determined fundamentally by the legal, regulatory, and tax system of
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the economy (see Beck and Levine, 2003 and Levine, 2005). Perhaps what is mostly related
to our paper is Madestam (2014), in which the author captures the key trade-off between in-
formal and formal financing as the following: First, informal lenders can better monitor their
borrowers than formal lenders, and second, informal lenders might be financially constrained
themselves, unlike formal lenders who have access to a deep pocket. In Madestam (2014),
the substitutability between the informal and formal lending depends on the monopolistic
power of the formal lender. Differing from Madestam (2014), in our paper, the degree of
such substitutability is determined by the informal lenders’ access to the formal financial
market.
Third, this paper belongs to the strand of literature that quantifies the impact of financial
friction on productivity loss. In a seminal paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) documents
that the resource misallocation among firms can account for a large fraction of productivity
difference between the U.S. and China. Other papers have shown that financial friction is
an important reason behind the resource misallocation (see Buera et al., 2015b for a review
of these papers). Our paper expands this literature by incorporating the formal financial
market into the framework. Jones (2011) points out at the loss from misallocation can be
amplified by the input-output structure, more specifically, by the misallocation of input
goods. Following the insights of Jones (2011), we further elaborate in this paper that the
choice of trade credit – how input goods are bought and sold – is crucial in understanding
how input goods are misallocated among firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following: In section 2.2, we provide empirical
evidence that motivates the paper. Section 2.3 explains the model. In section 2.4, we define
the problem of the entrepreneurs and the recursive competitive equilibrium. In section 2.5,
we calibrate the model and perform quantitative analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Empirical evidence
In this section, we provide empirical evidence on the cross-country difference in forma and
informal financing. We organize the empirical findings in two parts. In section 2.2.2 we
document cross-country patterns on informal and formal financing at the aggregate level;
while in section 2.2.3, we present these patterns at the firm level.
2.2.1 Data
For the empirical findings in section 2.2.2, we take data from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey (WBES) standardized dataset (2006-2014). We get the relevant information for 109
countries by taking an average over all the firms in each country. In section 2.2.3, we use
firm-level data from four different sources. In section 2.2.3.1, we use the WBES firm-level
data for 109 countries to document the cross-country difference in the substitutability of
informal for formal financing. Then in section 2.2.3.2, we use firm level data on China and
U.S. firms to look into the same issue. To this end, we use the Chinese Industrial Survey
(2005–07) to study the firm behavior in China.1 We use a combination of the Compustat
and Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) to study firms in the U.S..2
2.2.2 Aggregate-level pattern
First we document the relationship between the volume of formal and informal financing.
The aim of this exercise is to give an idea of how the aggregate use of informal financing
changes with the development of the formal financial market. To measure the aggregate use
of trade credit, we use the percent of working capital purchased using trade credit averaged
over all firms in each country. Here we use the average percent of working capital that is
1The Chinese Industrial Survey covers a longer period but the information on trade credit is only available
for 2005, 2006, and 2007.
2See Shao (2016) for a detailed discussion about how to use these two datasets.
60
financed by bank credit as a measurement for the development of formal financial market.
The first pattern we documented using aggregate-level data is presented in Figure 2.1.
In Panel A, we show the correlation between the size of trade credit and bank credit, and in
Panel B, we present the correlation between the size of other informal financing and bank
credit. Both figures show the same pattern: The size of informal financing increases with
the size of bank credit. In other words, firms in countries with a highly developed formal
financial market on aggregate also borrow more from the informal financial market.
2.2.3 Firm-level pattern
In this section, we present evidence of the relationship between informal and formal financing
at the firm level. First we utilize the WBES firm-level data and study two types of informal
financing: trade credit and informal lending from relatives, friends, and moneylenders. Then
we use U.S. and Chinese firm-level data and instead focus on studying only trade credit.
2.2.3.1 The enterprise survey
We run the following regression using enterprise survey data,
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐𝐼_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜒𝑠𝑡 + 𝐼_𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖 × 𝐼_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡,
in which, 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the percent of working capital of firm 𝑖 in sector 𝑠 of year 𝑡 that is financed
by trade credit or other informal financing channels, 𝐼_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 is a dummy indicator
of whether the firm 𝑖 is financially constrained,3 𝜒𝑠𝑡 are a set of sector × year fixed effects,
𝐼_𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖 is a dummy indicator of whether the firm is young (equal or less than 5 years old),
𝐼_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 is a dummy indicator of whether the firms is small (equal less than 10 employees),
and 𝛾𝑖 is a dummy indicator for the firm type: whether it is government-owned, private, or
3A firm is financially constrained if it reports that access to finance is its biggest obstacle of growth.
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foreign.
Clearly, in country 𝑐, compared to financially unconstrained firms, constrained firms
borrowers 𝛽𝑐 percent more working capital in the form of trade credit (or other informal
financing).
In Figure 2.2, we plot 𝛽𝑐 agains the GDP per capita of country 𝑐.4 In Panel A, the
dependent variable is percent of working capital that is financed by trade credit and in Panel
B it is the percent of working capital that is financed by relatives, friends, and moneylenders
etc. In both cases, we see that 𝛽𝑐 increases with the income level of that country. In other
words, financially constrained firms in developed countries can rely more on informal channels
to finance their production than their financially constrained counterparts in developing
countries.
2.2.3.2 China versus the U.S.
We have established so far that the availability of informal financing to the financially disad-
vantaged firms increases with the development of economy and the formal financial market.
In this session, we focus on 1) one particular type of informal financing – trade credit,
and 2) firms in two countries China and U.S., in order to show the difference between the
substitutability of trade credit over the lack of bank credit in these two countries.
We run a regression of the following form,
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐,1𝐼𝑝50 + 𝛽𝑐,2𝐼𝑝75 + 𝛽𝑐,3𝐼𝑝100 + 𝜒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡,
in which 𝑐 ∈ {𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑈.𝑆.} denotes the two countries.
The dependent variable of this regression is the ratio of accounts receivable to sales, the
ratio of accounts payable to sales, and the ratio of net accounts receivable to sales of firm 𝑖
4We only plot countries with a 𝛽𝑐 that is significant at 10% level. The correlation in both figures is also
computed for these countries.
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in sector 𝑠 and year 𝑡. We have three dummy variables 𝐼𝑝50, 𝐼𝑝75, and 𝐼𝑝100, indicating, in
terms of total asset size, whether the firm belongs to the 25th to 50th percentile, 50th to
75th percentile, and 75th to 100th percentile, respectively. Clearly the control group in this
regression are firms that belong to the bottom 25 percentile in terms of total asset, i.e. the
smallest firms. Other control variables include a set of sector-year fixed effects 𝜒𝑠𝑡, and a set
of dummy variables 𝛾𝑖 that controls for firm types.5
The object of interests are the 𝛽𝑐,1, 𝛽𝑐,2, and 𝛽𝑐,3. Since many empirical papers suggest
that small firms are on average more financially constrained than large firms, if trade credit
can substitutes for the lack of access to formal financing, we should see the larger firms
borrow significantly less trade credit and lend significantly more. As shown in Table 2.1,
this is indeed the case for the U.S. firms. Larger firms in the U.S. lend significantly more
trade credit (column 1) and borrows significantly less (column 2). Not surprisingly, in net
terms, large firms lend significantly more than their small counterparts (column 3).
However, this patter does not hold for the Chinese firms. As shown in column (4), smaller
firms do borrow more trade credit, however, they also seem to lend more to their customers
(column 5). In net terms, the difference between small and large firms in terms of the lending
of trade credit is less than one percentage point (column 6).
2.3 Model
Time is discrete with infinite horizon. There is one type of final goods which is used to
for consumption and investment. The final goods is produced by a representative firm
using a continuum of intermediate goods. Each variety of intermediate goods 𝑖 is produced
by an entrepreneur with monopolistic power, using capital, labor, and a composition of
5In the U.S. data, we distinguish between the following firm types: Compustat firm or SSBF firm; and
corporate or non-corporate firm. In the Chinese data, we control for firm types: State-owned, private,
collectively-owned, etc..
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intermediate goods. There is a measure 𝑁 of households in the economy, who are the labor
provider in the economy.
2.3.1 Preference
The household’s preference is time-separable with instantaneous utility function 𝑢ℎ(𝑐ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡) =
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐ℎ𝑡 )−𝜓ℎ𝑡, where 𝜓 represents the disutility from working. The utility of households over
a sequence of consumption 𝑐ℎ = {𝑐ℎ𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 and labor ℎ = {ℎ𝑡}∞𝑡=0 can be written as,
𝑈ℎ(𝑐ℎ, ℎ) =
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡𝑢ℎ(𝑐ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡),
where 𝛽 is the discounting factor.
The preference of intermediate goods entrepreneurs is time-separable with instantaneous
utility function 𝑢𝑒(𝑐𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐𝑡). The expected utility of the entrepreneur over a sequence of
consumption 𝑐 = {𝑐𝑡}∞𝑡=0 can be written as
𝑈 𝑒(𝑐) = E
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡𝑢𝑒(𝑐𝑡),
where the expectation is taking over a stochastic process of productivity {𝑧𝑡}∞𝑡=0, wealth
{𝑎𝑡}∞𝑡=0, and output {𝑦𝑡−1}∞𝑡=0.
2.3.2 Production technology
The final goods firm produce final goods 𝑦 using a composition of intermediate input goods
{𝑦𝑖}1𝑖=0 with the following technology
𝑦 = (
∫︁ 1
0
𝑦𝜌𝑖 𝑑𝑖)
1/𝜌,
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where 𝜌 ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of substitution among the intermediate goods.
The intermediate goods entrepreneur 𝑖 employs capital 𝑘(𝑖), labor 𝑙(𝑖), and intermediate
goods {𝑥𝑗(𝑖)}1𝑗=0 to produce the intermediate goods 𝑖, such that,
𝑦𝑖(𝑖) = 𝐴𝑧𝐹 (𝑘(𝑖), 𝑙(𝑖), ?¯?(𝑖)) = 𝐴𝑧(𝑘(𝑖)
𝛼𝑙(𝑖)1−𝛼)1−𝜒?¯?(𝑖)𝜒,
in which ?¯?(𝑖) = (
∫︀ 1
0
𝑥𝑗(𝑖)
𝜌𝑑𝑗)1/𝜌, 𝐴 is the aggregate TFP of the economy, and 𝑧 the idiosyn-
cratic productivity of the entrepreneur.6
2.3.3 Timing
An intermediate goods entrepreneur 𝑖 enters each period with wealth 𝑎 and last period
output 𝑦. Her idiosyncratic productivity shock 𝑧 is then realized. Notice that since that all
intermediate goods are symmetric in the production of final goods and intermediate goods,
we can simply use her state variables (𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) to represent the identity of intermediate goods
entrepreneur 𝑖. To simplify the notation, we drop the entrepreneur index 𝑖 henceforth in this
paper.
The entrepreneur makes the following choices: First, she provides two prices for her goods
𝑦. One is the price of the goods if it is sold on the spot, which is denoted by 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐. The other
is the price of the goods if it is lent as trade credit, which is denoted by 𝑝𝑡𝑐. Second, she
decides the amount of capital 𝑘 and labor 𝑙 to employ. She also chooses the amount of
intermediate input goods to use {𝑥𝑗}1𝑗=0, and whether or not to borrow them through trade
credit 𝐼 𝑡𝑐 ∈ {0, 1}. She then borrows from the bank to finance working capital and make a
decision of whether or not to default and divert the bank loan. After the default decision is
made, the entrepreneur then starts to produce.
At the beginning of the period, representative final goods producer purchases the inter-
6Note that 𝑥𝑗(𝑖) presents the amount of 𝑗𝑡ℎ goods used by entrepreneur 𝑖. Since entrepreneur 𝑖 has the
monopoly power in producing goods 𝑖, we have 𝑦𝑖(𝑗) = 0 for all 𝑗 ̸= 𝑖.
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mediate goods. The production of the final goods takes one period to finish. At the end
of this period, intermediate goods entrepreneurs and workers consume. Intermediate goods
entrepreneurs also save into the next period 𝑎′. Her current period output is carried out into
the next period as 𝑦′.
2.3.4 Markets
The economy consists of the following markets: capital rental market, labor market, final
goods market, and a continuum of intermediate goods market. The markets of capital, labor
and final goods are perfectly competitive. The market-clearing prices for capital and labor are
𝑟 and 𝑤, respectively. And the price for the final goods is normalized as 1. Each intermediate
goods entrepreneur is the sole provider of its goods in that particular intermediate goods
market. She posts two prices for her goods: 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐 and 𝑝𝑡𝑐. The former is the price when goods
is paid on the spot, and the latter is the price when the goods is lent out as trade credit.
The pricing schedule implies an implicit trade credit interest rate 𝑝
𝑡𝑐
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐
− 1.
2.3.5 Financial frictions
In this section, we discuss the moral hazard problem of the entrepreneurs as well as the
co-existence of bank and trade credit as a result of it.
2.3.5.1 The existence of trade credit
Following Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), we assume that intermediate goods entrepreneurs
can only default and divert bank loans before entering production stage. In other words,
once the entrepreneurs start producing, the moral hazard problem ceases to exist.
Furthermore, we make the following assumptions regarding the comparative advantage
of intermediate goods entrepreneurs in lending trade credit:
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Assumption 1 Intermediate goods entrepreneurs can observe and verify the input goods
transaction in which they are part of.
Assumption 2 Entrepreneurs 𝑖 has access to the market 𝑖 as a seller. She can only enter
the other market 𝑗 ̸= 𝑖 as a buyer.
The above assumptions follow those made in Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) very closely.
In fact, they are simplified, or more abstract versions of the assumptions made in that
paper. The first assumption is that the supplier can observe the input goods purchase but
the bank can not. This is a reasonable assumption because the supplier is one of the two
parties that involve in the input goods transaction. The second assumption indicates that
the entrepreneur does not receive any benefit by diverting the input goods, but they can
fully enjoy the diverted bank loan. In order to benefit from the diversion of input goods, the
entrepreneurs need to sell the input goods in exchange for final goods, but they can not do
that. The underlying assumption is that they are not institutionalized or it is very costly
for them to search for a potential buyer.
Proposition 4 Under assumption 1 and 2, trade credit is essentially a trio-party financing
arrangement, involving the intermediate goods entrepreneurs, the buyer of their goods, and
the bank. In this arrangement, 1) it is secure for the intermediate goods entrepreneurs to
lend their goods as trade credit, and 2) the bank lends against accounts receivable.
The logic of proof goes as the following. The entrepreneur can not benefit from diverting
input goods, therefore they will only purchase input goods from supplier if they would like to
produce. Once they start producing, the moral hazard problem is resolved. Therefore, from
the point of view of the entrepreneur, lending input good is always secured. After lending
the input goods, the account receivable is a perfect collateral to obtain loans from the bank,
because it knows that the account receivable serves as a signal that the input transaction is
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complete. At the same time, when the account receivable is posted as a collateral, the owner
of this liability is transferred from the hand of the supplier to that of the bank. Therefore,
the trade credit will always be paid back by the firm.7
One important feature of this model is that the account receivable serves as collateral to
obtain bank loans. The collateral value of the accounts receivable depends on the fraction
of the asset value that can be recovered by the bank upon the default of the entrepreneurs.
From the perspective of the firm, part of the loss in cash flow due to the trade credit extension
can be offset by the enlarged access to bank credit. In other words, the trade credit in this
model is implicitly and partially financed by the banks.
2.3.5.2 Working capital constraint
Due to the mismatch between the production and the realization of revenue, firms need to
raise loans to cover working capital. Work capital cost includes interest payment of capital,
labor cost, as well as cost for intermediate input goods if entrepreneurs choose to purchase
those on the spot.
To obtain bank loans, entrepreneurs can provide their wealth, which is in the form of
physical capital, as well as accounts receivable as collateral. The bank can recover a fraction
𝜒1 of the wealth and 𝜒2 of the accounts receivable once the entrepreneur threats to default
and renegotiate the loan. The Nash Bargaining problem can be written as the following,
max
𝑥𝑏,𝑥𝑒
(𝑥𝑏 − 𝜒1𝑎− 𝜒2𝐴𝑅)𝛼(𝑥𝑒 − 𝑏)1−𝛼
𝑠.𝑡.
𝑥𝑏 + 𝑥𝑒 = 𝑏 + 𝑎 + 𝐴𝑅,
7In reality, account receivable is one of the most senior loan.
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in which 𝑏 is the size of the bank loan, and {𝑥𝑏, 𝑥𝑒} are the bargaining outcome for the bank
and the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur defaults, the payoff for the bank is 𝜒1𝑎 + 𝜒2𝐴𝑅.
The payoff of the entrepreneur is 𝑏, the size of the bank loan that she can divert. However,
if they reach an agreement, the sum of their payoffs will be 𝑏 + 𝑎 + 𝐴𝑅. Solving the above
bargaining problem gives a payoff schedule as following,
𝑥𝑏 = (𝛼 + (1− 𝛼)𝜒1)𝑎 + (𝛼 + (1− 𝛼)𝜒2)𝐴𝑅, 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑥𝑒 = 𝑏 + (1− 𝛼)(1− 𝜒1)𝑎 + (1− 𝛼)(1− 𝜒2)𝐴𝑅.
The bank loan contact that takes away the incentive of the entrepreneurs to default in
the first place has to satisfy the following condition:
𝑎 + 𝐴𝑅 ≥ 𝑥𝑒.
This leads to the following constraint on the bank loan limit,
𝑏 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅,
in which 𝛾1 = 1− (1− 𝛼)(1− 𝜒1) and 𝛾2 = 1− (1− 𝛼)(1− 𝜒2).
Now we are ready to write down the working capital constraint,
𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 : 𝑟𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅, (2.1)
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 : 𝑟𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 +
∫︁
𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑑𝑗 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅. (2.2)
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2.3.5.3 Inverse demand function
Next we define the inverse demand function for the intermediate goods entrepreneurs. Notice
that a demand for the intermediate input goods comes from three types of agents: 1) the
final goods producer, 2) the intermediate goods entrepreneur who wants to use trade credit,
and 3) the intermediate goods entrepreneurs who do not use trade credit. We derive the
demand from them one by one.
Final goods producer First there is the demand from the final good producer. Since we
assume that final goods producer always purchase the intermediate input goods on the spot,
therefore the pricing schedule she faces is {𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑗 }1𝑗=0. The optimization problem of the final
goods producer reads,
max 𝑝𝑦 −
∫︁
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑗 𝑑𝑗 𝑠.𝑡.
𝑦 = (
∫︁ 1
0
𝑦𝜌𝑗 𝑑𝑗)
1/𝜌, (2.3)
in which 𝑦 is the final goods output, and 𝑝 is the price of final goods.
The FOC w.r.t. 𝑦𝑗 gives an inverse demand function for goods 𝑗 from the final goods
producer.
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑦(
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑗
𝑝
)
1
𝜌−1 . (2.4)
Taking 2.4 back to 2.3,
𝑦 = (
∫︁ 1
0
𝑦𝜌(
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖
𝑝
)
𝜌
𝜌−1𝑑𝑖)
1
𝜌 ,
which leads to
𝑝 = (
∫︁ 1
0
𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑐 𝜌
𝜌−1
𝑖 𝑑𝑖)
𝜌−1
𝜌 .
As discussed in section 2.3.4, we normalize the price of final goods to be 1. Therefore, it
holds that (
∫︀ 1
0
𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑐 𝜌
𝜌−1
𝑖 𝑑𝑖)
𝜌−1
𝜌 = 1.
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Intermediate goods entrepreneurs who do not use trade credit In order to derive
the inverse demand function from this type of entrepreneurs, we need to first analysis their
problem. Let 𝑉 𝑛𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) be the value function of the entrepreneur who decides to purchase
the input goods on spot and whose state variables are (𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧).8
𝑉 𝑛𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) = max
𝑝𝑡𝑐,𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑎′,𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝑥𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑉 (𝑎′, 𝑦′, 𝑧′) 𝑠.𝑡.
𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 −
∫︁
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑖,
𝑟𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 +
∫︁
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑥𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑐,
𝑦′ = 𝐴𝑧𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙, (
∫︁
𝑥𝜌𝑖 𝑑𝑖)
1/𝜌)).
We derive FOC w.r.t. 𝑥𝑖 as the following,
𝑥𝑖 : −1
𝑐
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽E𝑉𝑦′𝐴𝑧𝐹?¯??¯?1−𝜌𝑥𝑖𝜌−1 − 𝜇𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖 = 0,
where 𝜇 is the Lagrangian multiplier on the working capital constraint and ?¯? = (
∫︀
𝑥𝜌𝑖 𝑑𝑖)
1/𝜌.
Given any two goods 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗, the above equation leads to 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑗
= ( 𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑗
)𝜌−1. Furthermore, we can
show that entrepreneur’s demand for goods 𝑥𝑖 can be written as the following,
𝑥𝑖 = ?¯?(
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖
(
∫︀ 1
0
𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑐 𝜌
𝜌−1
𝑗 𝑑𝑗)
𝜌−1
𝜌
)
1
𝜌−1 = ?¯?𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑐 1
𝜌−1
𝑖 ,
in which the second equation holds since we normalize the price of the final goods to be 1,
i.e. (
∫︀ 1
0
𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑐 𝜌
𝜌−1
𝑗 𝑑𝑗)
𝜌−1
𝜌 = 1.
In addition, we can show that the cost of using input goods
∫︀
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑖 is equal to ?¯?.
8Notice that this problem is missing three constraints: 1) the inverse demand function that link 𝑦𝑡𝑐 to
𝑝𝑡𝑐, 2) the inverse demand function that links 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 to 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐, and 3) the constraint that 𝑦𝑡𝑐 + 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 = 𝑦. These
three constraints are irrelevant for the analysis here. Therefore they are omitted.
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Intermediate goods entrepreneurs who use trade credit Similar, for those en-
trepreneurs who use trade credit to finance their production, their problem can be written
as,9
𝑉 𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) = max
𝑝𝑡𝑐,𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑎′,𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝑥𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑉 (𝑎′, 𝑦′, 𝑧′) 𝑠.𝑡.
𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 −
∫︁
𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑖,
𝑟𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑥𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑐,
𝑦′ = 𝐴𝑧𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙, (
∫︁
𝑥𝜌𝑖 𝑑𝑖)
1/𝜌)).
From the FOC w.r.t. 𝑥𝑖, we can derive the inverse demand function as,
𝑥𝑖 = ?¯?(
𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑖
(
∫︀ 1
0
𝑝
𝑡𝑐 𝜌
𝜌−1
𝑗 𝑑𝑗)
𝜌−1
𝜌
)
1
𝜌−1 = ?¯?(
𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑡𝑐
)
1
𝜌−1 ,
where 𝑝𝑡𝑐 = (
∫︀ 1
0
𝑝
𝑡𝑐 𝜌
𝜌−1
𝑗 𝑑𝑗)
𝜌−1
𝜌 . And the cost of purchase input goods {𝑥𝑗}1𝑗=0 with trade credit
can be written as ∫︁
𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 𝑝
𝑡𝑐?¯?.
Taking stock By providing a pricing schedule {𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐, 𝑝𝑡𝑐}, the intermediate goods en-
trepreneur is faced with the following inverse demand function,
𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 = 𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐
1
𝜌−1 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑦𝑡𝑐 = 𝑄𝑡𝑐(
𝑝𝑡𝑐
𝑝𝑡𝑐
)
1
𝜌−1 .
In the first equation, 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 is the demand of her goods from the final goods producer and
the intermediate goods producers who do not use trade credit, and 𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐 is the sum of final
9Similarly, this problem is missing three constraints.
72
goods and of all ?¯?, the composite of intermediate input goods used by these entrepreneurs.
In the second equation, 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 is the demand for her goods from intermediate goods producers
who use trade credit. Similarly, 𝑄𝑡𝑐 is the sum of the composition composite intermediate
input goods ?¯? used by these entrepreneurs who borrow through trade credit. A mathematical
formula for 𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐 and 𝑄𝑡𝑐 can be found in Definition 3.
2.4 Recursive competitive equilibrium
In this section, we first present the problem of household and entrepreneurs in the recursive
form, and then define the recursive competitive equilibrium.
2.4.1 Households
The state variable of household is her wealth 𝑎, and her problem can be written as,
𝑉 ℎ(𝑎) = max
𝑎′
𝑢ℎ(𝑐, ℎ) + 𝛽𝑉 ℎ(𝑎′) 𝑠.𝑡. (2.5)
𝑐 + 𝑎′ = 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑤ℎ.
2.4.2 Intermediate goods entrepreneurs
The intermediate goods entrepreneurs enter each period with wealth 𝑎, output carried over
from the previous period 𝑦, and realized productivity shock 𝑧, they choose whether or not
use trade credit 𝐼 𝑡𝑐 ∈ {0, 1}, the price of her goods 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐 if they are sold on the spot, the price
of her goods 𝑝𝑡𝑐 if they are sold through trade credit, the production scale 𝑘, 𝑙, and ?¯?, this
period consumption 𝑐, and next period wealth 𝑎′. Their problem can be written recursively
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as,
𝑉 𝑒(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) = max
𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝐼𝑡𝑐,𝑎′,?¯?,𝑦𝑡𝑐,𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐
𝑢𝑒(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉 𝑒(𝑎′, 𝑦′, 𝑧′), (2.6)
𝑠.𝑡.
𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − (1− 𝐼 𝑡𝑐)?¯?− 𝐼 𝑡𝑐𝑝𝑡𝑐?¯?,
𝑦′ = 𝐴𝑧𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙, ?¯?),
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑡𝑐 = 𝑄𝑡𝑐(𝑝
𝑡𝑐
𝑝𝑡𝑐
)
1
𝜌−1 ≤ 𝑦,
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 = 𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐 1𝜌−1 ≤ 𝑦,
𝑦𝑡𝑐 + 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐 = 𝑦,
𝑟𝑘 + 𝑤𝑙 + (1− 𝐼 𝑡𝑐)?¯? ≤ 𝛾1𝑎 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐.
Now we are ready to define the recursive competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3 The recursive competitive equilibrium consists of a set of prices {𝑝𝑡𝑐, 𝑤, 𝑟},
aggregate demand {𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐, 𝑄𝑡𝑐}, value function of the entrepreneurs 𝑉 (𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), policy func-
tions 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑘(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑙(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝐼 𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), ?¯?(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑦𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑦𝑛𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑝𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧),
𝑝𝑛𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) and 𝑎′(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), asset holding of the households 𝑎ℎ, value function of the house-
holds 𝑉 ℎ(𝑎), policy functions 𝑐ℎ(𝑎), 𝑙ℎ(𝑎) and 𝑎ℎ′(𝑎), and CDF function for the distribution
of state variables Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧), such that,
1. Given 𝑟 and 𝑤, the value function and policy functions solve the household’s problem
2.5.
2. Given 𝑟, 𝑤,𝑄𝑡𝑐 and𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐, the value function and policy functions solve the entrepreneur’s
problem 2.6.
3. Markets clear
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(a) Capital market:
∫︁
𝑘(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) =
∫︁
𝑎𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) + 𝑁 · 𝑎ℎ.
(b) Labor market: ∫︁
𝑙(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) = 𝑁 · 𝑙ℎ(𝑎ℎ).
(c) Aggregate demand {𝑄𝑡𝑐, 𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐} are:
𝑄𝑡𝑐 =
∫︁
𝐼𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)?¯?(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)⏟  ⏞  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
,
and
𝑄𝑛𝑡𝑐 = 𝑁 · 𝑐ℎ(𝑎ℎ) +
∫︁
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) + 𝛿𝐾⏟  ⏞  
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
+
∫︁
(1− 𝐼𝑡𝑐(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧))?¯?(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧)⏟  ⏞  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
,
where
𝐾 = 𝑁 · 𝑎ℎ +
∫︁
𝑎𝑑Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧).
4. The CDF function Φ(𝑎, 𝑦, 𝑧) is stationary.
2.5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we first calibrate the model to match the data moments of the U.S. and China
in section 2.5.1. In section 2.5.2, we use the calibrated model to examine the importance of
trade credit in explaining the income difference between these two countries. Although in
the empirical section 2.2, we study informal financing activities in general, in this section,
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due to data limitation, we will focus on studying one type of informal financing – trade
credit. We notice two things from studying the WBES data: First, in terms of empirical
pattern, trade credit is qualitatively no different than the other type of informal financing,
and second, trade credit is about 4 times as large as the other informal financing.
2.5.1 Calibration strategy and results
Each period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. We first calibrate our
model to match the U.S. aggregate and firm-level moments.
The U.S. The household utility function is 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐ℎ𝑡 )−𝜓ℎ𝑡, in which 𝜓 indicates the disutility
from working. We calibrate 𝜓 such that in equilibrium, household’s working hour ℎ is equal
to 0.3. The discounting factor 𝛽 is calibrated such that the annual risk-free interest rate is
0.04. Since the share of entrepreneurs in the U.S. data is around 10 percent, we pick 𝑁 = 9
so that the share of entrepreneurs in the model matches that.
There are three crucial parameters in the production functions. In the intermediate
goods production function, we pick 𝛼 = 1/3 to match the share of capital return. The
share of intermediate input goods 𝜒 is set to be 0.43, following Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh
(2016). The elasticity of substitution between intermediate input goods, which appears both
in the intermediate goods production and final goods production function, is governed by
parameter 𝜌. We set 𝜌 = 3
4
, so that the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods is 4, which is common in the literature and the same as in Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh
(2016). The depreciation rate 𝛿 is chosen to be 0.025 so that the annual depreciation rate of
capital is equal to 10 percent. The stochastic process of idiosyncratic shock 𝑧 is parameterized
following Buera et al. (2011): a Poisson death rate of 𝜋 = 0.1 and a new draw of productivity
𝑧 from a Pareto distribution with tail parameter 𝜇, which is calibrated to match the top 10
percentile employment share. The two important parameters that govern the performance
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of financial market, 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, are calibrated to match the ratio of total debt to asset, and
the ratio of trade credit to total asset.
China We then take the calibrated parameters as shown above, and recalibrate a subset
of them to match data moments of Chinese manufacturing firms, which are computed using
the Chinese industrial survey for the year 2006. The first data moment of target is the top 10
percentile share in employment. According to Buera et al. (2011), we know that in the U.S.,
the top 10 percentile firms employ about 69% of the total labor force in the manufacturing
sector. In China, this number at 57%, which is significantly lower. This is consistent with
finding in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The second data moment is the total debt to asset ratio,
which measures the indebtedness of the firms. And the third data moment is the ratio of
trade credit to total asset, which measures the reliance of firms on trade credit in financing
their production.10
A summary of the calibration strategy and results can be found in Table 2.2
2.5.2 The quantitative importance of trade credit
The question that we are after in this section is: How important is finance, and especially
informal financing such as trade credit in explaining the cross-country productivity and
income differences.
The benchmark To answer this question, we first look at the benchmark model (section
2.3) and its calibrated version (section 2.5.1). A comparison between the calibrated parame-
ters of China and the U.S. suggests that both the collateral value of wealth (physical capital)
as well as accounts receivable are lower in China than in the U.S.. In other words, through
10It is more nature to use the ratio of trade credit to total sales, or the ratio of trade credit over cost of
goods sold to measure firms’ reliance on trade credit. But here I use total asset instead because it is more
comparable across the two datasets we have for the U.S. and China.
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the lenses of our model, a lower 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 can be seen as a result of a worse contract enforce-
ment environment in China (see section 2.3.5.1). It naturally leads to a lower leverage ratio
in China and firms are more constrained in equilibrium. As a result, even if they have a
better monitoring technology in lending input goods to their customers, they can not afford
to do so in such an environment. Keeping other parameters fixed, an increase in 𝛾1 and 𝛾2
of the Chinese economy to that of the U.S. level leads to an increase in aggregate output of
23%.
The counterfactual We have established so far that the difference in the financial de-
velopment between the U.S. and China contributes to the aggregate productivity difference
between these two countries. The next question is then, how important is the role of trade
credit (informal financing)?
In order to answer this question, we consider a counterfactual economy, in which there
is only the formal financial market. We recalibrate the model such that the counterfactual
economy can match the data moments in the U.S. and China, except the those related
to trade credit. In particular, to match the total debt to asset ratio in the economy, we
would have to increase the parameter value of 𝛾1 to 0.72 for the U.S. and to 0.59 for China.
We consider this calibrated version of the counterfactual economy as what is used by most
previous researches. In this economy, we only consider what the financial friction presented
in the formal financial market. If we improve the quality of China’s formal financial market
to that of the U.S. level, i.e. increase 𝛾1 to 0.72 for China, the total gain in aggregate
productivity and output level is 17%. Taking into consideration that there is an 23% increase
in productivity and output in the benchmark model if the quality of Chinese informal and
formal financial market both improve to the level of the U.S., our exercise shows that 7% of
that can be attributed to the informal market it self.
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2.6 Conclusion
One puzzle about the three decades of stellar economic growth in China is the role of finance.
While the financial institution in China has been widely regarded as one of the weakest link
in the Chinese economy, the private sector firms, albeit suffering from financial repressions,
have been growing rapidly, out-pacing their state-owned counterparts. Many suggests that
one of the reasons to explain this puzzle is although private firms have limited access to the
formal financial market, they can borrow through informal channels, such as from relatives,
friends, and suppliers (see Allen et al. (2005)). This view coincides with findings from
previous literature that informal financial institutions can somehow substitute the lack of
formal financing in developing countries, therefore mitigating the loss from financial frictions.
The findings in our paper question this view. In our paper, the quality of both formal and
informal financial market are determined by the quality of fundamental contract enforcement
in an economy. Informal financial market channels fundings to firms that are on average more
constrained by their access to the formal financial market. This particular role of informal
financing is enhanced with the quality of the formal financial market. Informal financing
might have contributed to growth of private firms in China, but its effects would have been
much larger if those firms were in the United States.
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Panel B: Other informal financing
AGO
ALB
ARG
ARM
ATG
AZE BDI
BEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
BHS
BIH
BLR
BLZ
BOL
BRABRB BTN
BWA
CAF
CHL
CHN
CMR
COD
COL
CPV
CRI
CZE
DMA
DOM
ECU
EST
ETH
GAB
GEO
GHA
GRD
GTM
HND
HRV
HUN
IDN IND
IRQ
JAM
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
KNA
LAO
LBR
LCA
LKA
LSO
LTU
LVA
MDA
MDG
MEX
MKD
MLI
MNE
MNG
MOZ
MRT
MUS
MWI
NAM
NER
NPL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRY
ROU
RUS
RWA
SDN
SEN
SLE
SLV
SRB
SUR
SVK
SVN
SWE
TGO
TJK
TTO
TUR
TZA
UGA
UKR
URY
UZB
VCT
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
corr=.12
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g
 c
a
p
it
a
l 
fi
n
a
n
ce
d
b
y
 f
ri
e
n
d
s,
 r
e
la
ti
v
e
s,
 a
n
d
 m
o
n
e
y
le
n
d
e
rs
 e
tc
.
0 10 20 30
Percent of working capital financed by bank credit
Figure 2.1: Informal financing and formal financing: Aggregate pattern
Notes: This figure shows the correlation between the percent of working capital that is financed by bank
credit (x axis) and percent of working capital that is financed by trade credit (y axis) for 109 countries. Each
point in the figure represents one country.
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Panel A: Trade credit
LBR
MWI
MLI UGA
NPL
SDN
PHL
MAR
IRQ
CHN
COL
AZE
CRI
SRB
VEN
URY
PAN
ROU
RUS
POL
SVK
SVN
ISR
corr=.27
−10
0
10
20
30
b
e
ta
 h
a
t
7 8 9 10
log (GDP per capita)
Panel B: Other informal financing
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Figure 2.2: The availability of informal financing to financially constrained firms increases
with economic development
Notes: This figure shows the correlation between the percent of working capital that is financed by bank
credit (x axis) and percent of working capital that is financed by trade credit (y axis) for 109 countries. Each
point in the figure represents one country.
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Table 2.1: Trade credit and firm size: U.S. versus China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
25th to 50th percentile 6.827*** -8.051*** 14.88*** 3.267*** 2.316*** 0.951***
(0.217) (0.365) (0.386) (0.0478) (0.0432) (0.0493)
50th to 75th percentile 7.391*** -15.66*** 23.05*** 4.585*** 3.799*** 0.786***
(0.237) (0.399) (0.422) (0.0484) (0.0438) (0.0499)
75th to 100th percentile 6.525*** -17.85*** 24.37*** 5.086*** 4.917*** 0.169***
(0.244) (0.411) (0.434) (0.0508) (0.0460) (0.0524)
Dependent variable AR/S AP/S Net AR/S AR/S AP/S Net AR/S
Country U.S. U.S. U.S. China China China
N 34840 34840 34840 705312 705312 705312
AR2 0.287 0.177 0.238 0.113 0.0774 0.0245
Notes: The dependent variable for the regressions are the ratio of accounts receivable to sales in
column (1) and (4), the ratio of accounts payable to sales in column (2) and (5), and the ratio of net
accounts receivable to sales in column (3) and (6). Column (1)-(3) use data for Chinese firms and
column (4)-(6) use data for the U.S. firms. All regressions include a set of sector times year fixed
effects and a set of dummies of firm types.
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Table 2.2: Summary of calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source Data Model
𝛼 capital share in the production function 1/3 capital share of 1/3 – –
𝜌 elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 3/4 Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2016) – –
𝜒 intermediate goods share 0.43 Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2016) – –
𝜋 Poisson death rate 0.1 Buera et al. (2011) – –
𝑁 measure of workers 9 share of entrepreneur 10% 10%
𝜓 disutility from working 2.1 hours 0.3 0.3
𝛿 capital depreciation rate 0.025 annual 10% depreciation rate 10% 10%
𝛽 discount rate 0.99 annual 4% risk-free interest rate 4% 4%
United States
𝜇 Pareto tail 4.1 top 10 percentile employment share 69% 67%
𝛾1 collateral value of wealth 0.51 total debt to asset ratio 65% 63%
𝛾2 collateral value of accounts receivable 0.85 trade credit to total asset 22% 24%
China
𝜇 Pareto tail 3.9 top 10 percentile employment share 57% 55%
𝛾1 collateral value of wealth 0.42 total debt to asset ratio 57% 52%
𝛾2 collateral value of accounts receivable 0.51 trade credit to total asset 9% 11%
Notes: For the U.S. data: The total debt to asset ratio is computed for the manufacturing sector
using total asset and networth data from Table 14b of the corporate return statistics collection for
the year 2006. The trade credit to total asset ratio is computed for the manufacturing sector using
accounts receivable, accounts payable, and total asset from Table 6 of the corporate return statistics
collection for the year 2006. For the China data: All the data moments are generated using the
Chinese Industrial Survey for the year 2006.
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Chapter 3
Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy
in a Panel of Chinese Cities
3.1 Introduction
The process of economic reforms launched in 1978, and gradually extended until current days,
has catapulted China into a stellar growth trajectory that has proven resilient. Because a
variety of new policies and institutions were introduced simultaneously, even today it is
difficult to pinpoint which of them were crucial. This paper aims at contributing to a better
understanding of the policy roots of China’s success by focusing on a major component of its
industrial policy. It also provides new evidence in the debate about the effect of place-based
policies.
We exploit the variation across cities and years in the establishment of different types
of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to estimate the effects of SEZ on economic development.
SEZ are a salient component of the reform process for a variety of reasons. First, they have
been a centerpiece of the gradualist Chinese development strategy based on the learning-
through-experimentation principle. Second, they have fostered an uneven development across
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geographic areas and sectors. Last but not least important, their effects are easier to measure
than those of other reforms, as they took the form of well-defined changes in the legal status
staggered across different Chinese cities. The first SEZ were introduced as experiments in
market allocation in geographically restricted areas along the coast. SEZ enjoyed special
rules applying to labor markets, foreign direct investments, firms’ ownership, and export
controls. Another important difference from the rest of the country is that local political
leaders were granted substantial autonomy and could shape key aspects of industrial policy.
After the success of the early experiments, SEZ were extended first to other cities along
the coast and then, starting in the early 1990s, to inland regions. The establishment of
new zones has continued until today. For instance, in September 2013 the government of Li
Keqiang has launched the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone, which grants the Pudong area
full liberalization of foreign trade and partial capital market liberalization.
We use a panel of 276 cities over the period 1988-2010.1 Our econometric strategy is
a difference-in-difference estimation controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity at the city
level. We also control for province-specific shocks by using province×time fixed effects. We
first regress (the logarithm of) GDP or GDP per capita on a reform indicator that switches
on (i.e., takes the unit value) in the year after a city has received SEZ status, controlling
for city characteristics such as land area. In our baseline specification, the introduction
of a SEZ is associated with a permanent increase in the city’s GDP level of about 12%.
The effect on GDP per capita is about 9%. The result is robust to controlling for local
government spending. To account for gradual effects of the reform, we also consider more
flexible specifications where the effect of the reform is allowed to vary, both parametrically
and non-parametrically, as a function of the time elapsed since the start of the treatment.
We find an increasing cumulative effect of the policy treatment that flattens out after about
1More precisely, we use data on prefecture-level cities, which are administrative units below provinces
and above counties. See Section 3.3 for details.
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ten years; the long-term effect of a SEZ is estimated to be a differential increase of about
20% in the GDP level. We also study the channels through which GDP and GDP per
capita increased as cities were granted SEZ status. SEZ attract larger populations, more
investments in physical and human capital, and experience stronger increases in total factor
productivity (TFP).
A common objection to place-based industrial policy is that it may induce a concentration
of economic activity in some areas by drawing resources away from other locations. We
find no evidence of such beggar-thy-neighbor effects on GDP. To detect potential cross-city
spillovers, we investigate how the performance of cities varies with their distance from SEZ
in other cities. The identifying assumption is that the spillover intensity decays with the
distance from the SEZ. Distance is measured in three alternative ways: geodesic distance,
driving time on the current roads network, and the computed shortest path through the
physical geography. In all specifications, SEZ appear to generate positive (often highly
significant) spillovers on nearby cities. We also compute measures of exposure to other zones
by creating a sum over GDP in other cities with a SEZ, weighted by the inverse of distance
to those cities. We again find some evidence of positive spillovers, especially strong in inland
provinces, albeit often imprecisely estimated. We then investigate whether SEZ lead to a
reallocation from areas that are further away from the zone to areas in the proximity of the
zone. We consider various rings of up to 400 kilometer around the zone. Spillovers typically
decline with distance. Interestingly, we find no negative spillovers even at these medium
distances. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effect of SEZ is driven
exclusively by direct transfers and political connections of the cities involved. This could not
explain why cities close to SEZ benefited from the policy.
Our analysis is subject to two caveats. First, the assignment of cities to treatment and
control groups may not be random. The Chinese government might have selected cities based
on some prior knowledge that the conditions for industrial development might be especially
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favorable (picking winners), or to the opposite, in order to curb regional inequality. The
narrative suggests that a picking-the-winner strategy may have been especially important
in the first stage of the reforms, when all SEZ were chosen along the coast and close to
potential trading partners and investors such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Ideally, one would
like to have instruments to isolate exogenous sources of variation in the reform treatment, but
finding valid instruments is difficult in practice. We mitigate the concern with endogeneity
through three complementary strategies. First, we restrict the sample to cities located in
inland provinces where the selection of the zones was largely based on a rigid administrative
criterion, i.e., being a provincial capital. Second, we augment the regressions with indicators
for the immediate pre-reform years to capture differential trends. Third, we control for
flexible differential trends depending on the initial conditions of the different cities. This is
potentially important, since the cities hosting SEZ are on average more densely populated
and more developed than those that did not host SEZ. The results are reassuring: the effect
of SEZ is robust in the restricted sample, differentials before the actual establishment of the
zone are insignificant, and allowing for differential trends based on the initial development
or population density does not significantly affect the coefficients of interest.
The second caveat concerns data quality. One might worry that local statistics may be
manipulated strategically by local officers in order to create the impression that an SEZ was
successful so as to attract government support. In addition, while city-level nominal GDP
data are available, city-level price deflators are more problematic (and only available for fewer
cities/years). In our main specification, we use only nominal variables. The inclusion of city
fixed effects removes any bias arising from time-invariant price level differences. Inflation
differences across provinces are absorbed by the interaction between time and province fixed
effects. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that different cities within the same province
may experience different inflation rates. This would be a problem for our strategy if the SEZ
status triggers systematically higher inflation rates, as in this case part of our estimated
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effect would be due to inflation. To address this concern, we first document that, in the
more restricted sample for which we have data on prices at the city level, treated cities
do not appear to have experienced higher inflation than did cities without SEZ. Next, we
complement our analysis with alternative proxies of GDP that do not depend on prices:
light intensity measured by satellites and electricity consumption. The results confirm the
existence of robust significant effects of SEZ.
3.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the large international literature studying the effect of place-based
policy, comprehensively reviewed by the recent papers of Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Kline
and Moretti (2014a), and Neumark and Simpson (2015). In developed countries, place-
based policies often target the development of lagging regions. China’s SEZ incorporate
both efficiency and equity motivations together with the additional target of experimenting
with market reforms. On the efficiency side, SEZ pursued the reduction of pre-existing
distortions and the exploitation of agglomeration effects. On the equity side, the expansion
since 1992 toward inland cities promoted the development of poorer Chinese regions.2
In line with the results of our paper, the literature finds positive effects of place-based
policies in a number of instances. Criscuolo et al. (2012) use firm level data to study an
investment subsidy program in the U.K. and find positive effects on employment, investment,
and net entry. However, contrary to our study, they find no effect on TFP. Busso et al.
(2013) compare locations selected for special treatment, such as tax-credits and subsidies
for disadvantaged neighborhoods, with similar locations that were rejected or treated in a
second round. They conclude that the policy had significant positive effects on employment
and wages, while the efficiency costs were relatively small. Kline and Moretti (2014b) study
2Akinci and Crittle (2008) provide a cross-country comparison specifically focusing on different types of
special economic zones and their role for development.
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the long-run effects of place-based policies by focusing on a subsidy program in the U.S. that
supported lagging regions. They find positive direct effects on productivity. Martin et al.
(2011a) in contrast do not find positive effects from subsidies to Local Productive Systems
in France.
Some papers try to assess, as we do, whether place-based policies generate spillovers –
either positive or negative – to non-treated areas. The evidence is mixed. Criscuolo et al.
(2012) aggregate their observations to larger geographical units that incorporate neighboring
non-treated areas. They find that the positive treatment effect is not reduced by this aggrega-
tion, suggesting that there were no negative spillovers through reallocation from non-treated
to treated firms within the same area. This is similar to our finding that SEZ had a positive
effect on the prefecture area around the urban core. Furthermore, we also find some evidence
of positive cross-city spillovers. Neumark and Kolko (2010) find insignificant employment
spillovers of California’s enterprise zones and Martin et al. (2011a) obtain a similar result for
France. One economic rationale for place-based policy is to foster local agglomeration forces.
Kline and Moretti (2014b) find no aggregate gains through agglomeration forces, because
local gains are offset by losses elsewhere. Greenstone et al. (2010) estimate the effect of large
plant openings on incumbent firms’ TFP. They find that these agglomeration spillovers are
positive but vary substantially across different cases. Briant et al. (2015) and Devereux et al.
(2007) also find evidence of heterogeneous effects of place-based policies.
We are not the first to study the effects of China’s SEZ. Most of the earlier studies,
arguably due to data constraints, rely on comparisons of the cross-sectional variation in
economic performance rather than on a difference-in-difference methodology. jin Wei (1993)
uses city-level data for a sample of coastal cities where special policies were introduced in
1984, and documents that cities hosting SEZ have a significantly higher average growth rate
during the early reform period, while other types of preferential policies do not produce the
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same effects.3 Since his sample ends in 1990, when only a small subset of the cities had been
granted the status of SEZ, his identification relies on the cross-sectional comparison between
early reformers – a small and arguably selected group – and cities that were never granted
the SEZ status at the time of his study. Wei’s pioneer study is extended by Démurger
et al. (2002) and Jones et al. (2003), who also document differences in growth rates between
treated and non-treated cities. Different from these articles, our study exploits the staggered
establishment of SEZ across cities. This allows us to estimate the treatment effect controlling
for time-invariant heterogeneity (city fixed effects) and time-varying province-level shocks.
A recent study by Wang (2013) also uses a panel of Chinese cities and finds, using a
difference-in-difference approach similar to ours, positive effects of SEZ on foreign direct
investments (FDI), exports, and the output of foreign enterprises. The effects on other
outcome variables (which do not comprise GDP) are smaller and less robust. Our findings
are complementary to Wang (2013) insofar as we focus on GDP and GDP per capita, a
comprehensive measure for the development of the local economy, while her study focuses
on intermediate targets of the policy. An important difference for our analysis is that we
distinguish between state-level and province-level SEZ (see below for a detailed motivation
for this choice). Without drawing such a distinction, the introduction of SEZ would yield
no statistically significant effect on GDP in our sample. Other studies focus on different
economic outcomes. For example, Cheng and Kwan (2000) show that provinces hosting SEZ
attract significantly more FDI than do other provinces. Head and Ries (1996) analyze the
location decision of international firms in Chinese cities and find that SEZ have a positive
effect that is amplified by agglomeration economies.
A number of studies look at firm-level data. Schminke and Biesebroeck (2013) estimate
the effect of being located inside SEZ on firms’ productivity and export behavior. They find
3jin Wei (1993) uses two samples: the first has 434 cities but only a limited time variation from 1988-1990.
The second sample includes fewer cities (74) and covers the period 1980-1990.
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that firms in SEZ export more, have higher output per worker and higher capital intensity,
but no higher TFP once selection is controlled for. Their control group consists of firms
outside of the SEZ in the same industry and in the same broadly defined regions (west,
central and coastal). Our finding of positive effects of SEZ on TFP hinges on a comparison
of the average performance of firms before and after the onset of a SEZ. Lu et al. (2015)
compare firms that are located inside of SEZ with firms across the zone boundary and find
positive effects. Similarly, Zheng et al. (2015) study local spillover effects of SEZ in eight
Chinese cities using firm-level data for the period 1998–2007. They find positive spillover
effects of SEZ on productivity and consumption in the area surrounding the SEZ. This result
is consistent with our finding that there are positive effects of SEZ on the periphery around
the urban core. Finally, Brooks et al. (2015) study the role of collusion in industrial clusters
and find that collusion is particularly strong in SEZ.
Our study also relates more generally to a large literature on liberalization and industrial
policy, including specific applications to the Chinese reform process.4 Rodrik (2006) argues
that government policies creating distortions in favor of more advanced industries played an
important role in the success of Chinese reforms. Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and Rodrik
(2004) argue that, through experimentation, the state can generate information about the
potential of different sectors. Brandt and Zhu (2010) find that rising TFP in the private
sector was an important driver of China’s growth. Our findings are broadly consistent with
these views. Finally, our study has some similarity in both the methodology and motivation
with Aghion et al. studying the effect of industrial policy (the demise of the License Raj) in
India. Similar to our study, they exploit the fact that the reforms were staggered across time
and sectors. However, different from our study, they emphasize the interaction between the
reform and state-level characteristics of the labor market. Moreover, they study an episode of
pure liberalization (delicensing), while China’s industrial policy also entails proactive policy
4See Perkins (1988), Naughton (2007), Rawski and Brandt (2008), and Xu (2011).
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elements (tax credits, subsidies, etc.).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the historical and
institutional background of the Chinese industrial policy. Section 3.3 describes the data
sources and the sample. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical strategy and the main results.
Section 3.5 decomposes the effects of the SEZ into factor accumulation and total factor
productivity. Section 3.6 discusses the spillover effects of the policy. Section 3.7 performs a
variety of robustness checks. Section 3.8 concludes. The Online Appendix contains additional
tables, figures and details on the data.
3.2 Institutional Features of SEZ
Since its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China relied on rigid economic
planning. The two decades preceding Mao’s death in 1976 were characterized by a volatile
economic performance and by an intense social turmoil.5 The reformist political leadership
that won the battle for Mao’s succession in 1978, led by Deng Xiaoping, faced the desper-
ate need for measures to restore social cohesion and revitalize the economy. There were,
however, no existing blueprints showing how to proceed. Learning-through-experimentation
then became the guiding principle of economic reforms. As Deng put it: “one has to grope
for stepping-stones as he crosses the river.” The first policy breakthrough happened in ru-
ral areas, where the Household Responsibility System entitled farmers, after fulfilling their
procurement quota, to the rest of their agricultural output. However, the leadership soon
realized that reforms had to be extended to urban China, and that industrialization neces-
sitated opening up China to foreign investments.
The idea of SEZ was per se no Chinese innovation. China’s SEZ inherited some essential
characteristics of the Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which had already been established
5For more detailed analyses of the economic growth of China before and after the start of economic
reforms, see Cheremukhin et al. (2015), Song et al. (2011), and Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014).
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in over 80 countries by 1980 (Naughton, 2007; Vogel, 2011). Like EPZ, SEZ were designed
to circumvent the complex rules of import and export. China’s SEZ were special in the
sense that they also bore the responsibility of policy innovation and experimentation. They
were the laboratories for the market economy (Vogel, 2011). The local officials of the zones
were implicitly encouraged to be innovative in designing economic policies and institutions.
Successful innovations were retained and extended to later waves of development zones (man
Yeung et al., 2009).
3.2.1 The Timeline of SEZ
In the year 1980, four cities in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Shantou, and Xiamen, were granted the SEZ status.6 The success of the experiment was
remarkable: between 1980 and 1984 Shenzhen grew at an annual rate of 54%, and in 1984
the four SEZ alone attracted 26% of China’s total FDI. In addition, the zones had developed
a set of well-functioning markets for labor, land, capital, transportation, and technology
(Zeng, 2010).
The establishment of SEZ met the resistance of the conservative fraction of the Commu-
nist Party’s (CCP) central committee that viewed renting China’s land to foreign companies
and allowing them to exploit China’s cheap labor as unacceptable. However, the success of
the experiment strengthened the reformist fraction in the CCP and softened the conservative
opposition. In 1984, 14 coastal cities were granted the right to build Economic and Techno-
logical Development Zones (ETDZ). The ETDZ shared most of the policies and privileges
granted earlier to the initial four SEZ.
During January and February of 1992, Deng made a celebrated tour to southern China,
6The SEZ status implied tax deductions, special tariffs for import and export, and exemptions from the
regulations on foreign exchange and land use. Foreign firms that resided inside of the SEZ first enjoyed two
years of tax holiday, then three years of a low tax rate of 7.5%, and after the initial five years a tax rate of
15%. Outside of the zones, the tax rate for foreign firms was 33% and for state-owned firms 55% (see jin
Wei, 1993).
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including stops at the SEZ of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, to mark the end of a period of polit-
ical instability and to restate the commitment of the CCP to the reform process. Shortly
afterwards, a new SEZ called Pudong New Area was established in Shanghai. In May, the
CCP announced the plan to grant the five inland cities along the Yangtze River, nine border
cities, and all thirty of the provincial capital the same privileges as the SEZ (Fewsmith,
2001). Following the instruction, several ETDZ and High-tech Industry Development Zones
(HIDZ) were approved during 1992-1993 and 2000-2002, all located in inland provinces.
In the first decade of the XXIst Century, the introduction of SEZ spread quickly across
China. By 2005, the system of state-level development zones comprised 54 ETDZ, 53 HIDZ,
15 Bonded Zones (BZ) and 60 Export Processing Zones (EPZ).7 In the year 2005, the
54 ETDZ accounted for 4.49% of the national GDP and for 14.93% of national export
(of Commerce, 2006). Establishing a development zone became a common strategy for the
local government to attract FDI and foster local economic growth. Through shuffling local
officials across different regions, the governments diffused the knowledge and experiences
accumulated in the early zones to help develop new SEZ (Xu, 2011). Figure 3.8 shows that
by 2010 SEZ had been established throughout the country.
3.2.2 Different Types of the Special Economic Zones
To summarize the discussion above, there exist five types of state-level SEZ: Comprehensive
SEZ (CSEZ, a label we coin to distinguish the early zones from the general notion of SEZ),
ETDZ, HIDZ, BZ, EPZ, and in addition Border Economic Cooperation Zones (BECZ).
They all share preferential treatment in terms of tax deduction, custom duty deduction,
reduced land-use price, flexibility in signing labor contract and financing. However, they are
administered by different authorities: the CSEZ, ETDZ and HIDZ are directed by the State
Council (the HIDZ being co-directed by the Ministry of Science and Technology); BZ and
7See section 3.2.2 for details on the difference between the zones.
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EPZ are directed by customs; BECZ were directed by the State Council until 2007, and are
now under the control of the Ministry of Commerce.
In addition, the zones differ in their stated mission. The goal of the CSEZ and of the
ETDZ is to attract FDI and to boost export activity. They are also explicitly encouraged
to design and experiment with new institutions and policies. The goal of HIDZ is to foster
domestic high-tech industries. The BZ are free-trade zones located in coastal port cities or
border cities where import and export can be expedited at a higher speed. The function
of EPZ is to import raw materials from abroad, process them, and export the final goods
without entering the real territory of China. Many of the EPZ are established within pre-
existing ETDZ and HIDZ. The BECZ intend to take advantage of the location of the border
cities to foster trade with other countries.
Aside from de jure changes, the central government is likely to have supported SEZ
by assigning capable local leaders and providing administrative support. Because of data
limitations (in particular, we have no data for transfers from the central government to
cities), in the baseline regressions we simply regard any such complementary measure as
part of the treatment. However, in the robustness analysis of Section 3.7.2 we attempt to
separate the effects of government spending and road infrastructure, for which we have data.
Together with state-level SEZ, China saw the proliferation of a variety of development
zones under the authority of provinces.8 There are some important differences between
state-level and province-level SEZ. The state council explicitly requests that “the policies
given to the province-level development zones should not be comparable to those given to
the state-level ones, ” in order to prevent excessive competition between the zones and the
waste of land resources (of Taxation, 2004).9 The political autonomy of the province-level
8Online Appendix Table A1 lists the number of state-level and province-level development zones and
their average share of industrial output in three coastal provinces hosting a large share of SEZ. The data are
from WEFore (2010) for the year 2009. All three provinces have a larger number of province-level than of
state-level zones (a ratio of 7:1). However, the state-level zones account for a far larger share of industrial
output.
9Such competition is also a concern in other countries. See for example Ossa (2015) for a general equi-
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zones is also much more limited. Finally, many province-level zones target specific industries
whose selection depends on the capture of local interests. Overall, province-level SEZ are
a patchwork of different policies rather than a coherent policy instrument. This causes a
severe measurement error problem. In our analysis below, we find that province-level zones
have an insignificant effect on economic development.
3.3 Data
The main data source is the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), that publishes
the China City Statistical Yearbooks including GDP, electricity consumption, population,
education, investment, foreign direct investment, government spending, government income,
and land area. In addition, we use the light intensity data from weather satellites as a proxy
for GDP. More detailed information about the data sources is provided in the appendix.
The main unit of analysis is a prefecture-level city, an administrative division ranking
below a province and above a county in China’s administrative structure. A prefecture-level
city comprises a core urban area and a surrounding periphery that may include rural areas,
other smaller cities, towns and villages. The NBS reports separate statistics for the core and
the periphery of each prefecture-level city. In our baseline we use the larger definition of
the prefecture-level city that includes the core and the periphery, but we have also done the
analysis when restricting to the urban core. One advantage of considering the larger area
as opposed to focusing on the urban core is that border changes are less frequent for the
former.10 Henceforth, unless an ambiguity arises, we refer to a prefecture-level city as a city.
The sample period is 1988-2010. At instances, city borders were changed by adminis-
trative reforms. While this was less frequent for the borders for the broad definition of a
librium analysis of subsidy competition in the U.S.
10Although we can track border changes (of the core and the periphery) over time by controlling for land
area as reported in the statistical yearbooks, they are less of a concern when considering the larger area.
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city (including the periphery) than for the urban cores, it is important to take the changes
of borders into account. This information on changes in the land area is reported in the
China City Statistical Yearbooks. We focus on 276 cities, excluding from our analysis the
four cities in which CSEZ were introduced before 1988, as well as Hainan, where the en-
tire province received the status of SEZ in 1988. We drop two city-year observations where
a county-level city was promoted to a prefecture-level city which implied that it incorpo-
rated the periphery, but the associated border change occurs with a one-year delay in some
variables. Furthermore, we exclude Tibet, where we have data for only one city, and the
province-level municipalities, including Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, because
our set of province-time fixed effects would absorb all variation in GDP.
3.3.1 Main Variables
We start by listing the outcome variables that are used as the dependent variables in the
regression analysis. Unless stated otherwise, the variables from the yearbooks are for the
city area that combines the urban core and the periphery.
∙ log𝐺𝐷𝑃 and log (𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐿) are, respectively, the (logarithm of) GDP and of GDP per
capita at the city level. Population measures are constructed based on the census and
the statistical yearbooks.
∙ log𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the electricity consumption and is available for the same set of cities
as GDP but only for their urban cores. It measures the use of electricity for household
consumption and industrial production.
∙ log𝐿𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 is the average light intensity. In the data provided by the National Geo-
graphical Data Center, light intensity is measured on approximately each square km
(pixel) on a discrete scale from 0-63. We use digital maps from 2010 to aggregate the
light intensity of the pixels to administrative units. We use the maps of urban cores,
97
which corresponds to the level at which the electricity data are available.11 When using
log𝐿𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, we must restrict the sample to the period 1992-2010 for which the light data
are available.
∙ log (𝐾/𝐿) is the physical capital per capita. The physical capital stock is constructed
by applying the perpetual inventory method to the investment data for the period
1988-2010, assuming an annual depreciation rate of 8%. For some cities, we collect
the investment data from the New China in 60 Years Provincial Statistical Collection
for the earlier period 1978-1987. The province-specific investment deflator is from the
New China in 60 Years Statistical Collection.
∙ log𝐿 is the population size (a proxy for the labor force). Population data is available
from the census and, annually, from the China City Statistical Yearbooks. The census
data is more comprehensive (in particular, it includes non-hukou population), but it
is only available every ten years. Therefore, we construct the observations between
two editions of the census based on the growth rate from the China City Statistical
Yearbooks.12
∙ log ℎ is the average human capital, constructed using average educational attainment
of the population over the age of 6. The educational attainment data comes from the
China Population Census.
∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑇𝐹𝑃 is total factor productivity, constructed with an estimated production func-
tion and physical capital, human capital, and population of each city.
Next, we discuss the construction of the explanatory variables. The main variables of
interest are indicators for the presence of SEZ. For each of the different types of SEZ we
11Note that, unlike for GDP, we can hold the area of the urban core constant when measuring light
intensity based on the 2010 maps. The concerns due to border changes therefore do not apply here.
12A detailed description of this process can be found in Online Appendix B.2.
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construct a dummy, 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 (where 𝑖 denotes the city, and 𝑡 denotes the year), which
switches on (i.e., takes the unit value) in the year after the establishment of a zone and
retains the unit value in all following years. Formally, we define the reform indicator based
on the establishment of a zone as
𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 𝑡
0 otherwise.
,
where 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 is the year in which the zone was established in city 𝑖 and 𝑡 is the
current year. In our baseline specification we will focus on the first state-level zone that was
established in city 𝑖. Note that for cities that never host a zone 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 0 for all 𝑡.
We also construct separate dummies for each lag from the reform year, as discussed in more
detail in the empirical sections.
3.3.2 Control Variables
We use two main control variables from the China City Statistical Yearbooks. First, the
geographic size of the city, to which we refer as land area measured in square kilometers.
This variable is available annually and varies over time, reflecting changes in the legal city
boundaries. Second, in some specifications, we control for population size.
In order to assess spillover effects that may depend on distance or transport costs between
cities, we calculate a variety of different measures related to distance or driving time between
cities. First, we calculate the geodesic distance in kilometers between all pairs of cities in
our sample. Second, we calculate the driving time on the current road infrastructure using
Google maps. Third, we use topographical features such as the slope of the terrain and use
shortest path algorithms to construct transport cost measures.
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3.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of the dependent variables and of the main control
variables.13 We have over 5000 observations for GDP from an unbalanced panel of 276 cities
from 1988 to 2010. Our policy variable, the establishment of SEZ, is illustrated in Figure 3.8.
This figure shows the time evolution of the shares of cities hosting the different types of zones
in the balanced sample. The figure also shows the share of cities that have any state-level
zone. The two most important types of zones are HIDZ and ETDZ with shares reaching 26%
and 22% in 2010, respectively. Two types of zones existed before the start of our sample: the
CSEZ, established in 1980, and a few early ETDZ, established in 1984. ETDZ and HIDZ are
altogether the most frequent zone types. We also consider Export Processing Zones (EPZ)
and other less frequent types of zones (e.g., BZ and BECZ), introduced in cities that already
hosted either ETDZ or HIDZ.
We report the mean values of city characteristics separately for reformers and non-
reformers in Table 3.2. We distinguish three broad categories, with breakdown by coastal
and inland cities: cities that received the first SEZ before 1988, cities that received the first
SEZ in 1988 or later, and cities that never hosted a SEZ in the sample. As the table shows,
cities hosting a SEZ were larger in terms of population and richer in terms of GDP per capita.
They also tended to have more universities relative to other cities. Government spending
over GDP was instead higher in non-reformers. Our empirical specification controls for city
fixed effects filtering out the effect of time-invariant heterogeneity. However, one might be
concerned about pre-treatment differences having differential effects on growth or on the ef-
fectiveness of the policy treatment. Our strategies to address these challenges are explained
in detail in Sections 3.4 and 3.7.
13For the dependent variable we show the statistics for real GDP based on provincial price deflators, but
in the empirical analysis we use nominal GDP because the province-year fixed effects absorb price changes
at the province level. See also the next section.
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3.3.4 Price Deflators
The China City Statistical Yearbooks report nominal GDP for the period 1988-2010. Since
Chinese price data are regarded as somewhat unreliable (see, for example, Young, 2003),
we opt to use nominal data. Time-invariant differences in price levels across cities and
time-varying inflation differences across provinces are absorbed, respectively, by city and
province×time fixed effects. This approach would be problematic if inflation rates differed
significantly across cities within each province. The main concern is that the SEZ treatment
might systematically increase local inflation. We check if there are differences in inflation
rates between treated and non-treated cities in those years for which real GDP data are
available from the NBS. More precisely, we compute an implicit city-level deflator using the
data on nominal and real GDP, and compare it between cities with and without a SEZ. We
find that, within each province, cities with a SEZ did not have higher inflation.14 As an
alternative strategy that avoids relying on prices altogether, we use electricity consumption
(in GWh) and light intensity as proxies for the level of economic activity.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.4.1 Motivation
In this section, we discuss the econometric strategy and the main results. We use a difference-
in-difference estimator exploiting the variation in economic policy across a panel of cities and
over 23 years following the establishment of SEZ.
Although the focus of the paper is empirical, and we do not present a formal model, it
is useful to motivate and interpret our analysis in the light of spatial equilibrium models
14The real GDP index of cities is available from the NBS for the period 1996-2010. For this period, cities
with a SEZ had an average yearly inflation rate of 1.8%, while cities without a SEZ had an average of 2.3%.
The difference is not statistically significant. We also run a panel regression of prices on the reform indicator
and control for city and province-year fixed effects. The estimate is -0.008 and insignificant.
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such as Greenstone et al. (2010) and Redding (2012). Greenstone et al. (2010) construct
a model economy comprising many locations where firms produce using labor, capital, and
land. Firms are perfectly mobile, and their profits are equalized in equilibrium. Workers
are only partially mobile due to idiosyncratic preferences for certain locations, such that
utility is equalized across location but wages are not. Local productivity spillovers imply
that total factor productivity depends on the pool of labor that works and lives in a given
location. Their framework can be applied to our environment by interpreting the onset of a
SEZ as a policy shock that reduces firms’ costs in the treated locations. This induces firms to
relocate or expand their activity within the SEZ. Agglomeration externalities and technology
transfer from foreign firms (or from more productive Chinese firms that relocate to the SEZ)
may increase total factor productivity. The (possibly gradual) inflow of firms is limited
by congestion externalities, as new firms bid up the prices for local factors such as land
and labor. The higher costs offset the initial increase in profits, providing an equilibrating
mechanism. The dynamic adjustment eventually comes to a halt when firms’ profits and
workers’ utility are equalized across locations. In the new spatial equilibrium, total factor
productivity, the stock of capital and labor, and ultimately the GDP are permanently higher
in the SEZ.
Guided by this model, we investigate, first, if the onset of a SEZ triggers an increase in
GDP and GDP per capita relative to other cities. In a world of perfect capital and labor
mobility, we should expect a permanent increase in TFP, factor accumulation, and GDP
while labor productivity (GDP per capita) should eventually be equalized across locations.
To the opposite, in a world with no labor mobility GDP per capita would also be permanently
higher in treated cities. In China, labor is not immobile but migration is subject to frictions
such as the hukou system. Thus, we test whether the onset of a SEZ affects both GDP (and
its components) and GDP per capita. We defer the analysis of the effect of the policy on
factor accumulation and TFP to Section 3.5 below.
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3.4.2 Baseline Specification
In this section, we run regressions whose dependent variables are the logarithms of either
GDP or GDP per capita. When we run regressions for GDP, we do not control for changes
in labor since these are part of the outcome variable. When we run regressions using GDP
per capita as the dependent variable, we do control for population to account for decreasing
returns to labor.15
The main explanatory variables are reform indicators switching on in the year after part
of a city’s territory is granted the status of a state-level SEZ.16 All regressions control for
city fixed effects and province-time interaction dummies. Standard errors are clustered at
the city level. More formally, we run regressions of the form
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3.1)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 is the logarithm of nominal GDP or nominal GDP per capita, 𝜑𝑖 is a city fixed
effect, 𝛾𝑡𝑝 is a province-time fixed effect, and 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 is an indicator switching on, for
each city, in the year after a state-level SEZ is established. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying
control variables and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a normal error term. City fixed effects absorb time-invariant
heterogeneity in city characteristics like initial development or geographical location. Thus,
the effects of reforms are identified across city-time within each province. Province-time
fixed effects control for time-varying province-specific shocks that can play a confounding
role. In particular, they absorb cross-province inflation differentials.
The econometric specification in (3.1) restricts the treatment effect to a shift in the after-
reform GDP (GDP per capita) level path; namely, in reformed cities the GDP per capita
level (or trend) is allowed to shift whenever the reform indicator switches on. Below, we
15In an earlier version, we also show results for GDP per capita if one does not control for population.
The results are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 3.3.
16We also construct a similar separate dummy variable for province-level reforms. Note that including the
year of the reform in the dummy does not alter the baseline results significantly.
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explore more flexible econometric specifications allowing for trend breaks and distributed
lags.
The estimated coefficients are shown in Table 3.3. In column (1), we include no additional
control variable except for the city fixed effects and province-time dummies. The coefficient of
the state-level SEZ is positive and highly significant. Becoming the host of a SEZ increases
the average GDP of the treated city by about 15.6% in post-reform years. In contrast,
the effect of province-level reforms is small and insignificant. In column (2) we include
the logarithm of the city’s land area as a control. This variable controls for changes in
city borders, which are relatively frequent in China and would change GDP mechanically.17
Increases in land area appear to be positively associated with aggregate GDP. The estimated
effect of the SEZ decreases to about 11.6% but remains highly significant.
In column (3) we show the results of regressions where GDP per capita is the outcome
variable and where we control for the logarithm of population.18 The estimated effect of
the reform is 9.27%.19 This suggests that part of the increase in GDP is due to labor
reallocation (something we document more explicitly in Section 3.5 below). In columns (4)–
(6) we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of inland provinces.20 This sub-sample involves
a less discretionary selection of individual cities. To mitigate concerns about the selection
further, we exclude cities that were granted the status of SEZ in spite of not being provincial
capitals. Thus, the restricted inland sample only contains provincial capitals (treatment
group) and cities that were never granted the SEZ status (control group). Columns (4)–(6)
17In the robustness section 3.7.5 we discuss the results when instead of controlling for land area we allow
for structural breaks in the city fixed effects when there are border changes.
18The coefficient on population size is negative, suggesting that an increase in the population size due,
e.g., to immigration, has a negative effect on labor productivity.
19This specification in column (3) is equivalent to controlling for the logarithm of population density and
land area. In Section 3.7.5 we investigate the role of density in more detail, and we also discuss the concern
that population and population density could be endogenous. The results are robust to using lagged variables
and alternative ways of controlling for border changes.
20In the sub-sample of inland cities, 44 cities were granted SEZ status. Of these, 18 were provincial
capitals.
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in Table 3.3 show that the results are robust to restricting the sample to inland provinces.21
The coefficient of interest is positive and significant, and even larger than in the full sample.
3.4.3 Pre-Reform Trends
A concern with the results of Table 3.3 is that cities hosting SEZ might already have been
on a higher-growth trajectory – or might even have been selected precisely because of their
promise of success. The focus on inland capitals alleviates such concerns. However, the
year in which capitals were assigned to the treatment group may not be random. Moreover,
provincial capitals may be a special group per se.
We address this point through a variety of strategies. First, we investigate whether the
performance of treated cities was different from that of other cities in the same province in
the years shortly pre-dating the reform. Table 3.4 is the analogue of Table 3.3, reporting
the results of regressions where we add four pre-reform indicators taking on the unit value,
respectively, in the year of reform and one, two and three years before the reform.22 If cities
were granted the status of SEZ due to their promising pre-reform trends, these coefficients
ought to be positive and significant. In contrast, we find the estimated coefficient of the pre-
reform dummies to be mostly negative and insignificant. In column (5) the indicators for the
reform year and for one year before the reform are marginally significant but negative. The
treatment effect in the full sample continues to be positive and significant (columns (1)-(3)).
In the inland sample the estimate is positive and significant in column (4), and it is positive
21Arguably, inland capitals are per se a special group. Since the selection of treated cities was based on
an administrative criterion (rather than on unknown, possibly heterogeneous criteria), we can better control
for features making capital cities different from the control group. In Section 3.4.4 we allow cities to have
year fixed effects that depend on such city characteristics, and we find that the results are similar.
22We also explored longer lags. The lags for five years prior to the reform are never significant in the
full sample. In the inland sample some of the earlier lags become significantly negative but only in the
specification in column (4) that does not control for changes in land area. Note that lags longer than three
years are identified out of a significantly smaller set of reforming cities (since many cities were granted the
SEZ status in the early 1990’s, and our sample starts in 1988). For instance, in the full (inland) sample the
first three lags are identified out of 75 (31) cities, while the fifth lag would only be identified out of 31 (18)
cities.
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but insignificant in columns (5)-(6). In summary, the results of Table 3.4 are reassuring and
suggest that treated cities did not show higher economic performance already before the
reform.23
Second, we consider a more flexible specification allowing treated cities to have different
time trends from the non-reformers. This addresses the potential worry that in our baseline
specification the positive effect of SEZ might arise spuriously due to the omission of pre-
existing trends. The new specification allows the GDP of cities that are hosting a SEZ
to have a linear time trend that differs from the control group’s trend already before the
reform. In some specifications, we even allow this trend to undergo a structural break at
the time when the reform indicator switches on. More formally, we consider the following
specification:
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡𝑝 + 𝛼1𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 [(𝑡− 1987)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖] (3.2)
+ 𝛼3 [max {0, (𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡}] + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,
where, as above, 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 is an indicator switching on in the first year after the reform.
Moreover,
∙ 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a dummy identifying cities that were reformed at any time. 𝑡 ≥ 1988
denotes the year of the observation. Therefore, 𝛼2 captures the steepness of a linear
trend specific to reformers, i.e., how many percentage points the growth rate differs
between reformers and non-reformers.
∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 is the year in which the first SEZ was introduced in city 𝑖 (if a city never
became a SEZ, then we let𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 0). The interaction [(𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡]
23Note also that the earliest zones (for example the CSEZ) introduced before 1989, likely the most selected
group, are either excluded or exhibit no time-variation in the policy indicators in our sample period. Thus,
they play no role in the identification of the treatment effect.
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allows a differential trend (i.e., a trend break) starting as of the introduction of the
first SEZ. The coefficient 𝛼3 measures the steepness of such a trend break.
∙ 𝛼1 captures a level shift as in the baseline specification of Equation (3.1).
The results for the full and restricted (inland) samples are shown in Table 3.5, columns
(1)–(4) and (5)–(8), respectively. The results are robust to using GDP per capita as the
dependent variable and controlling for population. Columns (1) and (5) of Table 3.5 re-
produce columns (2) and (5) of Table 3.3 for comparison. In the regressions of columns
(2) and (6) we add a linear trend specific to reformers. The estimated coefficient ?ˆ?2 (time
trend of reformers (state-level)) is statistically significant in both the full and the restricted
sample. Interestingly, the coefficient ?ˆ?1 continues to be highly significant in the full sample,
although much of the effect is now absorbed by the trend. However, it becomes insignificant
in the restricted sample. The trend in columns (2) and (6) does not distinguish pre- and
post-reform periods. Thus, in columns (3) and (7) we allow a structural break in the trend
of reformed cities, by including max {0, (𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡} in the regres-
sion. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient ?ˆ?1 remains almost unchanged in the full sample
and increases in the restricted sample. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the pre-reform
trend, ?ˆ?2, decreases and becomes insignificant in both samples. The post-reform trend, ?ˆ?3, is
positive but insignificant in the full sample and positive and significant in the inland sample.
Altogether, the statistical specification studied so far suggests that the baseline model with
a GDP level shift performs better than one allowing for a trend break implying a permanent
GDP divergence between the treatment and control groups.
The specification of columns (2)–(3) and (6)–(7) – allowing for permanently diverging
paths – may be too extreme. We consider, then, an alternative specification allowing SEZ
to have a non-linear effect of the SEZ relative to the pre-reform trend. To avoid an over-
parameterization, we omit the level shift, and we estimate the following alternative econo-
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metric specification:24
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡𝑝 + 𝛼2 [(𝑡− 1987)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖] (3.3)
+ 𝛼3 [max {0, (𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡}]
+𝛼4 [max {0, (𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖)× 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡}]2 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.
The regression results from this specification are provided in columns (4) and (8). In
both cases, we find that ?ˆ?3 > 0 and ?ˆ?4 < 0, implying that the SEZ are associated with an
acceleration of growth in the immediate post-reform years, but that the acceleration dies off
in subsequent years. The coefficients are both individually and jointly statistically significant
in the full sample, while the square term is negative but insignificant in the inland sample.25
In summary, this specification suggests that the effect of SEZ is a significant gradual increase
in the GDP level, rather than a permanent increase in growth (i.e., a linear trend break of
the treated cities after the reforms).26
3.4.4 Heterogeneous City Characteristics
In the previous section, we allow different trends between treated cities and non-reformers.
An alternative strategy is to control for differential trends associated with the initial charac-
teristics of cities. This is an important check, since Table 3.2 shows that cities hosting a SEZ
were more populated and had a higher initial development measured by GDP per capita than
other cities. One might worry that the heterogeneity in these initial characteristics might
be the actual driver of economic performance over time, and that our baseline specification
24It would be possible to also include the term 𝛼1𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 to this specification. However, it is very
difficult to identify separately all the effects in such a highly parameterized model. Therefore, we omit this
term, and regard the current specification as a non-nested alternative to Equation (3.2).
25?^?3 and ?^?4 are jointly significant at 5% in the full sample and at 10% in the inland sample.
26Clearly, the quadratic model is not a correct specification itself, since it would imply a negative long-run
effect of SEZ. Given the short sample, the data only capture the increasing part of the quadratic relation.
See Section 3.4.5 for a more general specification.
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might spuriously attribute those effects to the establishment of SEZ.
To address this concern, we interact each year dummy with the log difference between
certain city characteristics and their respective median values in the year they were first
measured. We do this for the city characteristics GDP per capita, population, population
density, and number of universities and include the interactions together in the regressions.27
This allows the flexible growth path to depend on cities’ initial characteristics and assumes
this interaction to be log-linear.28
The results are shown in Panel A of Table 3.6. The coefficients of interest are similar
to Table 3.3 in the full sample and larger in the inland sample. In both cases, they remain
highly significant. In Panel B, we provide the results from an alternative specification where
the year dummies are interacted with a set of indicators for whether a city has a GDP per
capita, population, population density, number of universities, respectively, that is above the
median in the year in which that variable first appears in the yearbooks for that city. The
four sets of interaction effects are then included together in the regressions. The results of
Panel A and Panel B are relatively similar.29
In summary, the effects of SEZ are robust to controlling in a flexible way for differential
trends associated with heterogeneous initial conditions.
27We calculate for each year the median of the variables across all cities. When we restrict the regression
sample to inland provinces, then we calculate the difference relative to the median in this restricted sample.
Since our sample is an unbalanced panel, the year in which cities appear in our sample can vary. However,
the results are robust to restricting the sample to a balanced panel of 172 cities. The sample size is reduced
here because of missing data for the number of universities, but the results are also robust to excluding the
interactions with the initial number of universities and thus using the larger sample.
28Consider for example a city 𝑖 that enters our sample in 1988, and whose GDP p.c. is reported in the
yearbook. The interaction effect between a year dummy (for example 1995) and the log difference between
GDP p.c. in 1988 and the median in that year then is
𝐷1995 × [log(𝐺𝐷𝑃1988,𝑖)− log(𝐺𝐷𝑃1988,𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛)] .
The estimate on this interaction would capture how much higher GDP p.c. is in 1995 for city 𝑖 when the
log difference changes by some percentage. Therefore, cities with median initial characteristics have a time
path as given by the main year dummies, and the interactions with initial characteristics allow differential
relative paths for cities above or below the median.
29The difference between Panel A and B in the sample size is due to cities with zero universities in the
first year, such that the log difference in Panel A is not defined.
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3.4.5 Event Study
In this section, we perform a non-parametric analysis of the effects of the reform with the aid
of a model that imposes no functional form restrictions on post- (and pre-) reform effects.
All effects are captured by separate lag- or lead-specific dummies. More formally, we run
the following regression:
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡,𝑝 +
𝐽𝐹∑︁
𝑛=−𝐽𝐵
𝛼𝑛𝐼
𝑛
𝑖𝑡{(𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖) = 𝑛}+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3.4)
where positive values of 𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 measure how many years before year 𝑡 city 𝑖
became the host of a SEZ. Negative values measure how many years ahead of 𝑡 city 𝑖 will be
reformed. Note that this specification allows us to identify some of the lagged effects out of
reforms that took place before 1988. For instance, a city that hosted its first SEZ in 1984 will
have variation for all leads ranging from 4 to 26 years. In our baseline specification, instead,
such a city would display no within variation, and the reform indicator would be collinear
with the city fixed effect. In our sample, the maximum number of post-reform leads, 𝐽𝐹 ,
is 26, corresponding to cities which hosted their first SEZ in 1984. We also construct these
indicators for the year of reform and the three years prior to the reform (i.e. 𝐽𝐵 = 3), so
we can test whether reforming cities already had a significantly different performance prior
to the establishment of the first zone.30 The omitted categories (for which all indicators are
zero) are never-reforming cities and reformed cities more than three years before the reform.
The controls include the logarithm of land area and the usual set of fixed effects.
The results for GDP are displayed in Figure 3.8. The results for GDP per capita are
shown in Figure 3.8 and will be discussed in Section 3.5 where we decompose the effect.
The graphs show the lead and lagged effects of the treatment n years after the reform (for
30For the same reasons described in the discussion of Table 3.4, we do not include more pre-reform
indicators. When we include also indicators for four and five years prior to the reform, these indicators are
marginally significant, but identified by only 27 observations.
110
instance, n=10 measures the effect ten years after the introduction of a SEZ). The upper
graph in Figure 3.8 shows the effect on GDP in the full sample. This specification confirms
the results of the previous section. In particular, there is a break in the GDP path a year
after the reform, followed by a temporarily higher growth rate that levels off after about ten
years. The size of the effect is comparable to that in the previous section. There is only
some marginal, statistically insignificant evidence of a higher GDP growth in the three years
before the reform, indicating a possibility for some minor positive selection. Note that the
standard errors increase nineteen years after the establishment of the zone (corresponding
to the vertical line added to each figure). This is due to a significant drop in the number of
observations, since many cities were reformed in 1991 and 1992.31
We estimate the same regression for the restricted sample of inland provinces (excluding
cities which had a reform but are not provincial capitals), see the lower graph in Figure 3.8.
The qualitative pattern and the point estimates are similar, although the estimation is less
precise.32
3.4.6 Different Types of SEZ
In this section, we attempt to disentangle the effects of the different types of state-level SEZ.
To this aim, we create separate post-reform indicators for each of the three most important
(and most common) SEZ: ETDZ, HIDZ, and EPZ. In addition, we create a single dummy
for other types of state-level SEZ. Appendix Table A2 has the same structure as Table 3.3
but replaces the indicator for any state-level zone with the four separate indicators for each
type of state-level SEZ. ETDZ and HIDZ individually appear to have a significant effect on
31When the cities reformed in 1991 and 1992 reach the year 2010, the subsequent number of cities that
identify the individual coefficients drops from 54 to 9. The vertical dashed line in the figure marks this drop.
32The reforms in the inland provinces started almost a decade later than in the coastal provinces. The
post-reform effects are therefore estimated for a shorter period and based on fewer observations. In separate
regressions not shown here, we find that if residuals are clustered at the province×years of reform (instead of
city) level, the effects after nine years are mostly statistically significant and positive in the inland sample.
Two of the pre-reform indicators are also significant but negative.
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the level of GDP. In the full sample, the effects of ETDZ and – to some degree – also HIDZ
are relatively similar to those of the first zone in Table 3.3. The point estimates on ETDZ
and HIDZ in the inland sample are relatively similar to the full sample, but less precisely
estimated. The effects of ETDZ and HIDZ in the inland sample tend to be lower than for the
first zone reported in Table 3.3. EPZ are insignificant in both samples, while OtherTypes
are mostly significant and have particularly large estimates in the inland sample.33 Overall,
the disaggregation highlights the relative importance of the ETDZ and HIDZ, which are the
two largest and most comprehensive types of zones in our sample, as well as those most
explicitly emphasizing technology.
Since the effects of any zone has been shown to build up gradually during about ten
years and then level off, we investigate whether the same pattern holds true for the individual
types of zones. Since the pre- and post-reform effects of different types of zones often overlap
(treated cities often had multiple zones of different kinds), the approach in Section 3.4.5 is
demanding. Nevertheless, the resulting picture is reasonably clear. Figure B.4, which can be
found in the appendix, plots the coefficients of the different types of zones (estimated in the
same regression) over the years since the reform. The first panel shows that the pattern for
ETDZ looks remarkably similar to that of Figure 3.8 (first zone reformed). The second panel
shows that HIDZ also display a concave pattern, although the effect appears to decline after
lag 13. EPZ and OtherTypes show a more mixed picture (the two lower panels in Figure
B.4).34 The standard errors are large and the effects are estimated imprecisely. In summary,
most development effects appear to stem from ETDZ and HIDZ.35
33It should be noted that the estimates on OtherTypes are based on few observations. 14 cities have a
zone type other than ETDZ, HIDZ, or EPZ, but in 11 of these the zone this is in conjunction with an ETDZ
or HIDZ.
34The stark drop in OtherTypes is identified by only one observation. EPZ were established after 2000 and
often inside an existing zone. Furthermore, the EPZ may have gained importance after the WTO accession
in 2001, which could explain their upward trend (though insignificant).
35Recall that some zone types like ETDZ and HIDZ may target cities with certain characteristics such
as having universities. This could raise concerns about selection and we address this in a similar fashion
as in Section 3.4.4. When we include the interactions of year fixed effects with initial characteristics (GDP
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3.5 Decomposing the Effects of SEZ
In this section, we investigate the channels through which the SEZ promote economic devel-
opment by decomposing the effects on physical capital per capita, average human capital,
population, and TFP. To construct TFP, we assume the aggregate technology to be de-
scribed by a Cobb-Douglas production function in physical capital and efficiency units of
labor (raw labor × average human capital). We use the local population size as a proxy for
raw labor and the average years of schooling to measure human capital (see appendix for
details). The aggregate production function is estimated using an OLS estimator from the
panel of observations of output, capital, population, and average educational attainment of
the population, including city fixed effects and province-time fixed effects.36 We then use
the estimated parameters to compute (the logarithm of) TFP as the residual component.37
In panel A of Table 3.7, we display the results of baseline difference-in-difference regres-
sions analogous to those in Table 3.3, where, respectively, GDP per capita, capital-labor
ratio, population, and human capital are used as the dependent variables. In both the full
sample (column (1)) and the inland sample (column (5)), becoming the host of a state-level
p.c., population, density, and number of universities), then the estimates on these zone types are relatively
similar. The two exceptions are that in column (5) ETDZ becomes significant while HIDZ loses significance
and that in column (6) ETDZ becomes significant.
36The estimation of production functions can suffer from simultaneity bias, because profit-maximizing
firms choose inputs after knowing the realization of productivity shocks, and selection bias, related to exit
and survival of firms. In the firm-level literature, it is common to use the correction proposed by Olley and
Pakes (1996). For example, Brandt et al. (2012) find that the TFP growth of Chinese firms is underestimated
when the endogeneity bias is uncontrolled for. Martin et al. (2011) estimate a Cobb-Douglas production
function using firm level data. They find that after controlling for simultaneity bias, TFP is still very close
to the one obtained using a simple OLS estimation. Since we use aggregate data, we follow the traditional
approach and use an OLS estimator. This is related to the growth accounting literature including Hall and
Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005). See also Hsieh and Moretti (2015) for an application to city-level data.
37More formally, we let
log 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?^?× 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (ℎ𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡)− 𝛾𝑝𝑡 − ?^?𝑖, (3.5)
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is GDP, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is physical capital stock, ℎ𝑖𝑡 is human capital, and 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is population; ?^? and 𝛽 are the
estimated coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas production function; 𝛾𝑝𝑡 is the estimated province-year dummy,
and ?^?𝑖 is the estimated city fixed effect capturing, respectively, province-level common trends and city-level
time-invariant components of productivity. 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 measures the city×time variation in TFP.
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SEZ is associated with a significant and positive increase in the GDP per capita. This result
is identical to that of columns (3) and (6) in Table 3.3. Columns (2) and (6) show that
the establishment of SEZ is associated with an increase in the capital-labor ratio by 13.1%
and 33.9% for the full and inland sample, respectively, both effects being highly significant.
Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) suggest that the SEZ have no significant effect on population
and the human capital measure in the China City Statistical Yearbook data. However, both
effects are positive and significant when one restricts the analysis to more precise popula-
tion data from the decennial census, as is shown in panel B in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6).
Population increases by 9.7% and 11.1% after the establishment of a SEZ in the full and the
inland sample, respectively,38 while the average years of schooling of the population above 6
increase by 0.18 years in the full sample and 0.36 years in the inland sample.39 The increase
in human capital can be explained by either selective immigration (i.e., cities with a SEZ
attract more educated immigrants) or by stronger incentives for locals to accumulate human
capital. Despite the higher population, GDP per capita increases after the introduction of a
SEZ because GDP increases more than population. This is shown for the census sample in
columns (1) and (3) in panel B.
The estimated effect of SEZ on TFP is shown in panel C of Table 3.7. In the specification
of columns (1) and (4), TFP is estimated without imposing any restriction on the parameters
of a Cobb-Douglas production function. The unconstrained estimation of the production
function yields output elasticities of capital and labor of 0.3 and 0.6, respectively. In columns
(2) and (5), we impose constant returns to scale, obtaining elasticities of 0.35 and 0.65. Since
there is some evidence that the labor share has been declining in China (see en Bai and Qian,
38The difference is likely due to non-hukou population which is captured in the census data but not in the
yearbook data. Since in panel A we compute population for the years in between the census based on the
growth rate in the yearbooks, the annual variation does not fully reflect non-hukou migrants and is subject
to measurement error. See also robustness section 3.7.4, where we discuss the use of census data.
39Ideally, we would prefer to use the educational attainment of the working population (age 25-64). How-
ever, this is not available in the census. In Appendix Table A4 we break down the result by different
educational levels. The most salient effect is the increase in the share of college graduates.
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2010), in columns (3) and (6) we estimate the production function separately for pre- and
post-1995 subperiods.40 In all specifications of the full sample, the SEZ have a positive and
significant effect on TFP (columns (1)-(3)). As shown in columns (4)-(6), the estimated
effects on TFP in the inland sample are positive but insignificant, except in column (6),
where TFP is estimated separately for pre- and post-1995 sub-samples.
Figure 3.8 shows the effect of SEZ on GDP per capita, capital-labor ratio, human capital,
and TFP, respectively, as an event study. The effects on GDP per capita and on the capital-
labor ratio are concave over time. Both paths feature a break one year after the reform.
In particular, the effects of SEZ on GDP per capita and on the capital-labor ratio become
statistically significant around seven years after the reform. There appears to be some
concavity in the effect on TFP as well, although less clearly and not statistically significant
in the individual years. Human capital appears to be higher in cities with SEZ (in this case,
some effects are already detected prior to the reform).
3.6 Spillovers
In this section we study whether the effects of SEZ spill over to other locations. SEZ
could have negative spillovers on other cities if the policy attracts investments and workers
away of other areas (beggar-thy-neighbor effect). Positive spillovers could accrue from the
diffusion of knowledge and an increase in market access. Investigating the spillover effects
of the SEZ is important to assess the overall effect of SEZ on economic development. The
existing literature on spillover effects on non-treated locations is ambiguous (see Neumark
and Simpson (2015) for an overview of the evidence).
In order to estimate the spillovers of SEZ on other cities, we make the identifying as-
sumption that spillovers – either positive or negative – are decreasing in the distance from
40The result is similar when we split the sample into a pre- and post-2000 period.
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SEZ.41 This assumption is motivated by the evidence documented in the previous literature
that distance plays a crucial role for spillovers. For example, Jaffe et al. (1993) and Keller
(2002) find that spillover of knowledge significantly decreases with geographic distance.42
We consider various alternative measures of geographical distance (as described below) in
order to test the robustness of our results. To estimate the spillovers based on these distance
measures, we first assume that the spillovers decay log linearly in distance from the closest
SEZ. We then use a non-parametric approach based on various distance bands and more
comprehensive measures of exposure to other cities’ SEZ. As provincial borders may act as
barriers, we also compare our results when restricting to spillovers within provincial borders.
It is important to note that all of these variables are time-varying because they depend on
the introduction of SEZ in other cities. Thus, identification hinges on this time variation.
Note also that we always include the cities’ own policy indicator for SEZ in the regression.
This allows us to test whether the own reform effect changes when we allow for spillovers
from other cities.
3.6.1 Measures of Distance and Transportation Costs Between Cities
Our first and simplest measure of distance between cities is the geodesic kilometer distance
between all the city centers in our sample. This measure does not take into account geograph-
ical barriers between cities or transportation infrastructure. The second measure of distance
is the driving time between cities derived from Google Maps.43 The advantage of this mea-
41This is consistent, among others, with Rosenthal and Strange (2004). Geographic distance (or trans-
portation costs) plays also a central role in the literature on trade and economic geography (Fujita et al.,
1999). An alternative measure of distance is used by Bloom et al. (2013) who argue that cross-firm spillovers
depend on the distance in technology and product markets. Neumark and Kolko (2010) also use the identi-
fication assumption that the effect of place-based policy on non-targeted areas differs in the distance to the
treated areas.
42Jaffe et al. (1993) find that patent citations are highly spatially clustered, which implies that there is
a distance decay in the knowledge diffusion. Keller (2002) finds that the benefit of technology spillover is
halved with a distance of 1200 kilometers.
43We use the tool traveltime3 in Stata that accesses the Google maps. Since only a limited number of
queries can be submitted and there are more than 75’000 routes, we measured the distance of each bilateral
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sure is that it captures how well cities are connected through road infrastructure, which is
likely to be an important determinant of the interactions between them. The drawback is
that it focuses on road transportation and that it is based on the current transportation
network, which is potentially endogenous to the zone locations.
The third set of distance measures is based on the topography of the Chinese terrain.
This has the important advantage of being entirely based on exogenous factors. We have
detailed information on slope and land cover that allows us to construct a local measure of
transportation costs on 10 × 10 kilometer cells throughout China. We then use a shortest-
path algorithm in ArcGIS to find the shortest route between cities through this cost surface
and we measure the total cost along this route.44 Since we must make a number of assump-
tions for how to map slope into transportation costs, we investigate the robustness of the
result to alternative ways to compute this measure. The first mapping of terrain slope to
driving speeds is based on a scale that relates slope to driving speed in the US and has 10
different levels (AASHTO, 2001). The second mapping is based on a similar scale for China
and has 7 different levels. In a further variation of this approach, we use a higher resolution
for the transport cost cells (3 km instead of 10 km), and we exclude larger water bodies.
All measures based on topography are normalized so that they have the same median as the
driving times according to the Google maps. This is to facilitate comparisons between the
different specifications.45
3.6.2 Results on Spillover Effects Across Cities
We use three complementary empirical strategies.
connection in only one direction and imposed symmetry.
44The tool in ArcGIS is cost distance and is an implementation of the Dijkstra algorithm. See for example
Alder (2015) for a description of this method and the data.
45We assume that all distance measures have a linear relationship with effective transport costs. While
this is only an approximation, it facilitates the comparison across the various distance measures.
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Distance to closest SEZ Our first approach to estimate SEZ spillovers is based on the
distance of each city from the closest city hosting a SEZ (excluding zones in the own city).
This variable varies over time; the establishment of a new SEZ that is closer than the previous
ones causes a reduction in this measure. Our regression equation is as follows:
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,
where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the distance to the closest city that has a state-level SEZ in year
𝑡. The distance to the next SEZ is an inverse measure of the spillover intensity. Therefore,
if spillovers were negative, we would expect 𝜆 > 0. On the contrary, the results in Panel
A of Table 3.8 suggest that there are positive spillovers, since a longer distance to the next
SEZ is associated with a lower GDP, controlling for land area and the usual fixed effects.
The spillovers are especially large in the inland sample. Remarkably, the reform effect of the
own SEZ, 𝛼, remains large and significant.
Indicator for SEZ within radius Our second approach is to include a binary indicator
for having a zone within a given radius. We report the results for a 150 kilometer radius (or
for the equivalent in driving time).46 The regression equation is
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,
where 𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the indicator for having another city with a SEZ within the
specific radius. If spillovers were negative, we would expect 𝜇 < 0. Instead, we typically find
positive estimates of 𝜇. Panel B of Table 3.8 reports the results for a radius in kilometers
and minutes in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The remaining columns use the distance
46This is approximately the median distance to the next SEZ. The results are similar for a radius of 100.
The coefficients vary more when we use a variety of different radii between 20 and 900 km, but we never
find significant negative spillover effects. In robustness checks, we also computed the distance to the closest
zone in the same province, and the results are qualitatively similar.
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measures based on topography, which are normalized such that their median is equal to the
median travel time in minutes. All estimates are positive, although the estimated coefficients
are sometimes insignificant.
We also perform a similar analysis where, instead of one indicator for 150 kilometers, we
simultaneously include multiple indicators for various rings (excluding the own zone): 0-50,
50-100, 100-200, and 200-400. These indicators take on the value 1 if there is at least one
zone within the corresponding ring. The omitted group consists of cities for which the closest
SEZ is more than 400 kilometers (or the corresponding alternative distance measures based
on driving time or topography) away. The results are shown in Appendix Table A5. Most of
the indicators have a positive coefficient, and in some cases they are statistically significant.
We only observe negative coefficients for the geodesic distance beyond 50 kilometers, but
the estimates are relatively small and insignificant. For all other distance measures, we find
positive effects that tend to be larger and more significant for zones that are closer. This
analysis suggests that the positive spillover effects of the zones on cities within a radius of up
to 100 kilometers is not driven by reallocation from areas between 100 and 400 kilometers.
Exposure measure Our final spillover measure is inspired by Briant et al. (2015) and
mimics the idea of a market access measure such as47
𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
∑︁
𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)
. (3.6)
47Such measures of market access or market potential appear in models of trade and economic geography,
see for example Fujita et al. (1999).
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We adjust this measure by summing only over cities that have a SEZ in that year.48 Our
measure of exposure to other cities with SEZ is therefore given by
𝐵𝑖𝑡 =
∑︁
𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)
I{𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑗,𝑡 = 1},
where I{𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑗,𝑡 = 1} is an indicator function for cities that have a SEZ (are reformed)
at time 𝑡. This measure allows us to capture the exposure by taking into account both the
economic size of other cities with SEZ and the distance from them.
This exposure measure varies over time because of the introduction of SEZ in other cities,
but also because of GDP growth in these cities. The latter channel implies the risk that
this measure may confound the effect of other zones with growth in market access.49 In
order to control for growth in neighboring cities in general, we therefore also control for the
logarithm of market access, which is measured across all cities in our sample as shown in
Equation (3.6). The regression equation then becomes
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼_𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉 ln(𝐵𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂 ln(𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.
We would typically expect a positive coefficient on market access and, in the presence of
negative spillover effects, a negative coefficient on the exposure to other SEZ, hence 𝜉 < 0
and 𝜂 > 0. The results are shown in Appendix Table A6. The coefficients on exposure are
always positive but not significant. The measure of market access shows a negative estimate
in the full sample and a positive estimate in the inland sample. However, it is generally
insignificant except for column (1). The result is broadly consistent with the one from the
48Briant et al. (2015) weigh by population instead of GDP. The results are robust to using population.
49For example, if several cities in the close neighborhood experience GDP growth but only one of them has
a SEZ, then this measure of exposure may partly capture the general increase in market access. Although
we control for province-time interactions in all of our regressions and therefore absorb much of the regional
growth trends, this measure gives higher weight to close neighbors and hence may capture spatial trends at
the local level.
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two previous specifications, and it indicates that there is no evidence of negative spillovers.
The comparison to the market access measure in fact suggests that proximity to a reformed
city is more beneficial than higher market access in general. Interestingly, the effect of the
own zone remains large and significant in all specifications.
The analysis of potential spillover effects based on various distance measures and identi-
fication strategies suggests the existence of positive spillovers across cities. Although these
effects are not always significant, the fact that we never find significant negative effects
provides strong evidence against the presence of negative spillovers.
3.6.3 Spillovers Over Time
In Section 3.4.5, we observed that the effect of SEZ on the own city tends to flatten out over
time (see Figure 3.8). One possible explanation for this pattern could be that the effect of
the SEZ spills over to other cities as time goes by. In this section we investigate how the
spillover effects evolve over time. The two upper graphs in Figure 3.8 show the estimates of
a regression where the spans of the own SEZ are included in a regression together with the
spans of the first zone that is established within 150 minutes driving time. The two lower
graphs show the results from an analogous specification with a 150 kilometer radius. The
point estimates on the spans for the neighboring zone generally become significant at the 5%
level when a 150 minutes driving time radius is used, but not (or only marginally so) when
a 150 kilometer radius is used. In both cases the patterns suggest that the spillover effects
become stronger during the first ten years. The diffusion of positive spillovers could reduce
the difference between treated and neighboring cities, which can potentially explain why the
effect of the own zone flattens out over the years.
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3.6.4 Decomposition of Spillover Effects
In this section, we decompose spillovers into investment, TFP, and population spillovers.
Negative investment spillovers would indicate that the SEZ attract investments at the ex-
pense of neighboring cities. Positive investment spillovers would instead arise if firms choose
to locate geographically close to their suppliers and customers. This would lead to higher
investments in cities located near to growing SEZ. A similar argument applies to population
and TFP. If innovative firms are attracted by the SEZ, this could yield a negative selection
in nearby cities and lower TFP. Conversely, technological diffusion could induce positive
spillovers. This could in turn trigger more investments in nearby cities.
Appendix Table A7 shows that the spillover effects on investment are insignificant in
the full sample (columns (1)–(4)). The point estimates are small and – depending on the
distance measure – either positive or negative. In the inland sample (columns (5)–(8)), the
spillovers tend to be more significant and are always positive (since the effect of distance
is negative). Appendix Table A8 shows that the spillovers in TFP are in all cases positive
and mostly significant.50 The coefficient on the indicator of a city’s own SEZ remains stable.
Appendix Table A9 shows that the effect of SEZ on population in nearby cities is positive,
but usually not significant.51
One possible channel for productivity spillovers is foreign direct investment (see Gorod-
nichenko et al., 2014), an explicit target of SEZ. Appendix Table A10 shows that the onset
of SEZ increases the FDI flows to the cities hosting SEZ, consistent with the results of Wang
(2013). The spillover effect on neighboring cities is positive but insignificant. There is no
evidence that SEZ have negative spillover effects on FDI in other cities.52
50Here TFP is constructed using the full-sample unrestricted production function estimation. The other
two measures of TFP give similar results.
51When we restrict the sample to the years when we have better population data from the census, then
the signs of the coefficients vary and they are never significant.
52Different from us, Wang (2013) finds some evidence of negative FDI spillovers in neighboring cities. A
potential explanation for the difference in the results is that she does not distinguish between state-level and
province-level zones and only considers the spillover effect of FDI on neighboring cities.
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3.6.5 Spillover Effects in the Periphery of Cities
We have so far investigated cross-city spillover effects. Our data additionally allow us to
explore the effect of SEZ on neighboring non-urban areas. Our baseline specification focuses
on the entire area of cities, which include an urban core (where all state-level SEZ in our
sample were established) and the periphery around the urban core. To investigate whether
and how SEZ affect economic activity in the area surrounding the center, we re-run our
baseline regressions of Section 3.4.2, using two distinct geographical definitions of GDP as
the dependent variables. First, we use the logarithm of GDP of the urban core only as the
dependent variable (see Appendix Table A11, Panel A).53 Then, we use the logarithm of
GDP of the periphery only, i.e. excluding the urban core (Appendix Table A11, Panel B).
The effects for the urban core are comparable in magnitude to those obtained above for
the combined area. Moreover, the results hold up when we consider only the periphery. In
summary, there is no evidence that SEZ impoverished neighboring non-core city areas.54
3.7 Robustness
In this section we perform a number of robustness exercises.
3.7.1 Satellite Light as an Alternative Measure of GDP
Chinese price data are generally regarded as problematic, especially at the local level. Our
empirical methodology has the advantage of not relying on any price deflator. Differences in
53The strategy of estimating the effects at different levels of aggregation in order to verify the presence
of spillovers from the treated location to neighboring areas is also applied in Criscuolo et al. (2012) in their
analysis of place-based policies in the UK.
54The positive effect may be due to firms active in SEZ setting up facilities in the periphery. To the extent
to which firms do not benefit from special exemptions for the activities performed outside of the SEZ, we
regard this as as a spillover. However, one might conjecture that firms located inside the SEZ can benefit
from special treatment even if they locate some facilities in neighboring areas. We could not find any precise
information in this regard.
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price levels are filtered out by city fixed effects, whereas province × year fixed effects filter
out cross-province inflation differentials. Yet, one might worry that within each province
cities might experience different inflation rates. In particular, our estimated treatment effect
would be biased upwards if the establishment of a SEZ causes systematically higher inflation.
The existing price data do not suggest any such pattern. However, one might also worry
that the local authorities over-report the nominal GDP in cities hosting SEZ, in order to
meet the expectation of the central government regarding their success.
To address this issue, in this section we use light intensity measured by weather satellites
as a proxy for GDP. A number of recent papers have argued that nighttime light intensity
measured by weather satellites is a good proxy for GDP.55 Most economic activities such
as production, transport, and consumption produce light as a by-product. Therefore, light
intensity is positively correlated with the intensity of local economic activity. We calculate
the average light intensity within the geographical boundaries of the urban cores and use this
as a proxy for economic activity. The light data has the advantage that it can be measured
within the same administrative boundaries over time. We can use digital maps from 2010 to
calculate the light statistics for all years. The change in administrative borders – which are
relatively frequent for urban cores – are therefore not a concern.56 A drawback of the light
data is that it is only available from 1992 on.
In column (1) of Table 3.9 we re-run our baseline regression with the logarithm of the
average light intensity as the dependent variable. The estimate suggests that SEZ have a
55Elvidge et al. (1997) are among the first to discuss the relationship between light and economic activity.
See also Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and the literature cited there on the use
of light to measure economic activity. Ma et al. (2012) and Halg (2012) discuss the use of light data for
Chinese cities. See also the Online Appendix for further details on the data source.
56When there are no data constraints due to border changes, then the urban core is a reasonable unit
of analysis, since the SEZ in our sample were located in the urban cores. The analysis using light data
exploits this advantage, but we have also done the analysis for the larger definition of a city that includes
the periphery, which is the unit that the baseline GDP results are based on. The effects of SEZ at that level
are smaller and insignificant. We have no explanation for the difference in the result between urban core and
the area that includes the periphery. It appears to be specific to the light data, since such large differences
were not observed for other data.
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positive and significant effect on economic activity as measured by light intensity. However,
the point estimate of about 5% is lower than what we observed in the baseline regressions
using GDP as the dependent variable. The point estimate for the inland sample is similar
in magnitude, albeit statistically insignificant. The lower point estimate could be due to the
sample period starting in 1992, because only one-third of the (first) SEZ were established
after that year. Moreover, even for later reformers we lose annual observations that would
be useful for a precise estimation of the within-city effect of the establishment of a SEZ.57
We also check the robustness of our results by using electricity consumption as a proxy
of economic activity (see, Rawski, 2001). Data on electricity consumption by households
and firms are reported in the same statistical yearbooks as GDP and are available only
for the urban core. In column (3) of Table 3.9 we re-run our baseline regression using the
logarithm of electricity consumption as the dependent variable. The result shows that the
establishment of a SEZ is associated with a 15.7% increase in electricity consumption.58
3.7.2 Controlling for Local Government Spending and Road Infras-
tructure
One might conjecture that the establishment of a SEZ may be associated with additional
transfers from the central or the provincial government. SEZ may also have triggered gov-
ernment investments in infrastructure. Although one might regard both transfers and in-
vestments in infrastructure as being part of the place-based policy, one may be interested in
57This loss of precision is confirmed by the observation that if we run the baseline regression of Section 3.4.2
with GDP as the dependent variable for the post-1992 period we obtain a positive (0.043) but statistically
insignificant point estimate.
58However, we find no significant effect in the inland sample. We suspect that this is due to the poor
quality of electricity data in this subsample, for which we have no explanation. We calculated the correlation
between GDP and electricity separately in four sub-samples: inland reformers, inland non-reformers, coastal
reformers and coastal non-reformers. The correlation is high and significant in all subsamples except for that
of inland reformers, where the elasticity of GDP with respect to electricity is very low (0.02) and statistically
insignificant. Interestingly, the correlation between GDP and satellite light intensity is instead consistent and
significant across the four sub-samples, suggesting that the source of the problem is not the GDP statistics
but rather the electricity data.
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estimating the net effects after controlling for them.
While we have no information on transfers, we observe the area of finished roads in the
urban cores in each year, which is an important component of infrastructure investments.
Furthermore, we observe the overall expenditures of the local government for a subset of
the years in our sample. Finally, we can also control for government income and hence the
deficit of the local government. These measures can be used as a proxy for the contribution
of public investments to GDP. The disadvantage of including these variables is twofold.
First, we lose some observations. Second, causation could run in the opposite direction:
government expenditure might have increased because the GDP expansion caused by the
SEZ increased the tax revenue accruing to the local authorities. We have therefore also used
one-year lags of government spending and income. The estimates reported below are for the
contemporaneous years, but the results are relatively similar when using lags.
Table 3.10 shows that the reform effects are robust to the inclusion of controls for local
road infrastructure (columns (1) and (4)) and government expenditure (columns (2) and
(5)). The results are also robust to controlling for the log difference between government
spending and government income – a proxy for the deficits of local governments (columns (3)
and (6)). The effect of the reform remains positive and highly significant in both samples.
3.7.3 Earlier GDP Data
Our main analysis focuses on the period 1988-2010, for which the NBS provides a sample
of cities that allows us to also track border changes over the years.59 This approach entails
the cost of losing variation in the reform variable, since some SEZ were established before
1988. We re-estimate our baseline specification for a subset of cities for which GDP is
59It is important to note here that the city size could vary over time, and there were changes in the
administrative system. The yearbooks allow us to match the city names over the years and control for these
border changes by including land area as an explanatory variable.
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also available for earlier years.60 In this case, we cannot control for changes in land area,
government spending, and population as these data are missing for the earlier years. The
reform effect estimated with this subsample is a 16.8% increase in the level of GDP in the
full sample, and the estimated coefficient is highly significant. This estimate is similar to our
baseline results reported in Table 3.3. In the inland sample, the estimate is 32.7%, which is
higher than our baseline result.
3.7.4 Population from Census
In our analysis so far, we have combined population data from the census and from the
City Statistical Yearbooks. Using the yearbook data allowed us to calculate the annual
fluctuations for the years between the three censuses (1990, 2000, and 2010). To the best
of our knowledge, the yearbook data cover only the registered population in the city, that
is, people with “hukou.” The existence of a large number of non-resident immigrant workers
in the cities could potentially bias our estimation. To address this issue, we first check the
City Statistical Yearbook data against the population census that in principle should record
the entire resident population at the city level. We find that there is a gap between the
two data sources. In particular, if the census is correct, then the population growth rate is
overestimated by an annual 24 basis points in non-reforming cities, and underestimated by
35 basis points in reforming cities in the city statistics. The observation that the population
is underestimated in the treatment group and overestimated in the control group is not
surprising, as the treatment cities are likely to have attracted many non-hukou workers from
the control group.
By relying on the census data in 1990, 2000, and 2010 and using the yearbook data only
to infer the population growth rates for the years in between, we have already attempted to
address this concern. To further test the robustness of our results, we repeat the baseline,
60Please see the Online Appendix B.2 for more detailed descriptions of the data source.
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regressions of Table 3.3 and restrict our sample to the three census years, using only pop-
ulation census data. Table A3 simply replicates the results in Table 3.3 for the restricted
sample. The estimates are somewhat larger compared to our baseline and they remain signif-
icant. This is the case for all specifications and in both samples. It is important to note that
by restricting the sample to only three years, we lose some time variation in the treatment
effect. However, the baseline results do appear to be robust to using the resident population
data from the census.61
3.7.5 Population and Population Density
Our results suggest that SEZ have a positive effect on both GDP and population, but the
effect on GDP is larger than the effect on population. This is consistent with the increase
in GDP per capita shown in columns (3) and (6) of Tables 3.3 and A3. These specifications
for GDP per capita also control for population in order to account for agglomeration effects,
but this raises the concern that population is endogenous. For instance, an increase in
productivity and wages can induce immigration. The typical instruments proposed in the
literature are time-invariant, and it is difficult to find time-varying instruments that fit in
our difference-in-difference framework.62 To mitigate the concern, we adopt two strategies.
First, we show that the results are robust to a specification where we use the lagged values
instead of current values of population (and its density). The results in the Appendix Table
A12 show that the reform effects on GDP per capita and TFP are robust when we include
61The same holds true for the capital-labor ratio and for TFP (result not shown).
62The literature finds a relatively small endogeneity bias in the coefficient for population density. For
example, Combes and Gobillon (2015) document that the endogeneity bias on the elasticity of density
is between 10% and 20%, sometimes the bias is close to zero and even negative. Combes et al. (2010)
provide a detailed comparison of different identification strategies. In particular, they note how difficult
it is to find valid time-varying instruments (most attempts in the existing literature have resulted in weak
instrumentation). An example for time-invariant instruments is given in Ciccone and Hall (1996), who study
the effect of density by using historical population as an instrument. Combes et al. (2008), Duranton and
Puga (2004), and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) provide a more general discussion of spatial concentration and
productivity. An example of an analysis of agglomeration forces in China is Combes et al. (2013), who use
Chinese household survey data.
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population or population density together with land area with one period lag. The results
are also robust to using the lagged population (and its density) as an instrument for current
population (and its density).63
Second, we explore other specifications where we do not control for population (so, the
results are gross of agglomeration effects). Column (2) in the baseline regression of Table
3.3 already shows that the results are robust to a specification that includes changes in city
areas but not in population. However, one might worry that a specification where the effect
of border changes is log linear in land area is overly restrictive. Changes in land areas reflect
changes in borders, and the effects are likely to be heterogeneous across cities. To address
this concern, we propose a specification that controls for border changes in a more flexible
way by allowing each city’s fixed effect to undergo a structural break whenever the land
area of a city changes in our data - indicating a change in city borders. In other words, we
replace city fixed effects with city-land area fixed effects.64 For instance, if a border change
brings a poorer periphery into the city, this effect is absorbed by the new, and more flexible
fixed effects. The results are shown in Appendix Table A13. Columns (1) – (2) for GDP
show that the point estimates are similar to Table 3.3 both in the full sample and the inland
sample. Columns (3) – (4) show that the estimates are also positive for TFP. In the inland
sample the estimate is also positive but lower than in column (4) of Table 3.7 (Panel C) and
marginally insignificant.
3.7.6 Heterogeneity in the Treatment Effect
The literature on place-based policies suggests that the effectiveness of such policies may
vary with location characteristics such as city size, density, or market access (see Briant
et al., 2015; Devereux et al., 2007). In this section, we include in our baseline specification
63See for example Martin et al. (2011) for a panel analysis where lagged variables are used as instruments.
64An average city then has roughly three different fixed effects over the years because of changes in the
land area variable.
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interaction terms of our reform indicators with indicators for whether initial population,
population density, GDP p.c., and market access were above the median value of reformers.65
Since our sample is unbalanced, we take as the initial year for each city the year in which
the corresponding variable is reported the first time in our sample. The results are shown
in Appendix Table A14. In the full sample there is evidence for interaction effects with
population and population density, but the main effect remains positive and significant.
In the inland sample the interaction effects are stronger and the main effect is reduced
when including the interaction with population and population density. Interestingly, the
interaction effect with initial GDP per capita is negative, suggesting that SEZ in relatively
less developed capital cities were particularly effective in inland provinces.
3.7.7 Placebo Analysis
Our estimation exploits both the time and spatial variation in the establishment of SEZ.
Since the establishment of the SEZ is staggered, but clustered in a few years, there could
be a concern about the extent to which the exact timing of the reform matters for the
identification of the reform effect. Furthermore, we would like to rule out that our reform
indicators pick up shocks unrelated to SEZ that could be present also in other cities. In
order to deal with these concerns, we run three placebo exercises based on the specification
in column (3) of Table 3.3, but assign reform years randomly.
In a first exercise, we assign the actual number of new zone establishments in each year
to a random selection of cities. The resulting placebo distribution is the same as the true
distribution over time, but SEZ are assigned artificially to random cities. We repeat this
exercise 1000 times. We find that in no case are the absolute t values and the R-squared of
the placebo regressions larger than those of the true reform.66 This suggests that the spatial
65We compare the characteristics to reformer cities because for some variables all reformers are above the
median, such that the interaction effect would be collinear with the main effect.
66The mean estimate of the placebo reform is 0.0003, and is never significant and higher than the one of
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distribution of SEZ indeed drives our result.
In a second more demanding placebo test, we assign the random reforms only to reformers,
again holding the distribution of reforms across years constant. However, the timing of the
treatment is scrambled across cities. This allows us to assess the extent to which the time
dimension of the reform matters, because we are only randomizing the year of the reform but
not the treated city. We find that the absolute t-values are higher when using the year of the
true reform than in the placebo regressions in all but 5% of the cases.67 This indicates that
the actual year in which the SEZ were implemented is critical for our results, and supports
our identification strategy based on within-city variation.
Finally, we use the random assignment of reforms from above and include the true reform
year and the placebo reform year in the same regression.68 While the estimate for the true
reform is always significant at 5%, the placebo reforms are significant in only 33% of the
cases. Overall, these placebo exercises strengthen our confidence in the empirical strategy
used. Both the spatial and the temporal variation of the SEZ appear to be important for
the results.
3.7.8 Effects by Year of Reform
In Section 3.4.5 we allowed the effect of SEZ to depend on the number of years since the
reform. However, the reform effect may also depend on the year in which a city received the
SEZ. Late SEZ could for instance imply a less intense treatment, since the Chinese economy
was altogether more liberalized than in earlier periods. In this section we investigate whether
there are significant differences between early and late SEZ. To this aim, we first construct
separate policy indicators for early and late SEZ introductions. We use 1992 as the threshold
the true reform.
67The mean estimate of this placebo reform is 0.0911. In only 13% of the draws does the placebo specifi-
cation yield significant coefficients that are higher than the actual coefficients.
68The assignment of random reform years among reformers implies that a placebo reform year is likely to
coincide with the true reform year. This is the case in 36% of the draws.
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year after which we label SEZ as “late” reforms. Note that 1992 is the median reform year
in our sample. The policy indicators for early and late reforms are then used together in our
baseline regression to replace the single indicator for reform. Table A15 columns (1) and (4)
show the results with the two indicators. Early and late reformers both show positive point
estimates, but the effect of the early reformers is larger and more precisely estimated. This
is true for both the full sample and the inland sample, although the difference is smaller in
the inland sample. This could suggest that earlier reforms had a larger impact, but it could
also be driven by the fact that for earlier reformers the effect had more time to accumulate
over the years since the reform. This seems particularly relevant in light of the patterns we
observe for the flexible reform effects in Section 3.4.5, which suggest that the reform effect
accumulates over about ten years. We then test for this pattern separately for early and
late reformers in order to investigate how reform effects may differ between early and late
reformers.
We parameterize the pattern we found in Section 3.4.5 by allowing a linear increase during
ten years and then a constant effect during all following years.69 Furthermore, we impose
that the linear trend after ten years is equal to the constant effect after ten years. More
precisely, we impose the restriction that 𝛽11−30 = 10 * 𝛽𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑, where 𝛽11−30 is the effect after
ten years and 𝛽𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the coefficient on the linear time trend. We then run this regression
separately for early and late reformers. The results are shown in Table A15 columns (2)–
(3) and columns (5)–(6) for the full sample and the inland sample, respectively. We see
that the pattern in the full sample is relatively similar for early reformers (column (2)) and
late reformers (column (3)), but the coefficients are less precisely estimated for the late
reformers. In the inland sample (columns (5)–(6)) we observe that the coefficients on the
trend are similar but again less precisely estimated for late reformers. We also note that in
69The fully flexible specification with separate indicators for each year is very demanding, and yields
imprecise estimates.
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the inland sample we cannot identify the effect after ten years for the late reformers because
there were no SEZ established in the inland sample within the period 1993–2010. The lower
precision for late reformers is not surprising, since there are fewer observations to identify
the effect until the end of the sample. However, these specifications suggest that the patterns
and broad magnitudes are comparable for early and late reformers.
3.7.9 Alternative Clustering Strategies
In our main analysis we cluster standard errors at the city level, to allow for observations
within a given city to be correlated as well as for heteroskedasticity. Our results are robust to
alternative clustering strategies. First, we cluster the standard errors by province and year
of reform (i.e., the first year in which a city hosts a SEZ). This strategy takes account of the
fact that the introduction of SEZ is highly clustered in time. Many HIDZ were introduced
in 1991–92, and many ETDZ were introduced in 2001–03, implying that different cities in
these years cannot be treated as independent observations. The baseline results (not shown
but available upon request) are essentially unchanged, and in some cases the statistical
significance of the coefficients of interest is even strengthened.
We also run the regressions clustering standard errors at the province level (instead of
province×year of first reform). This strategy is even more demanding, and runs into potential
problems since we have only 28 provinces in the full sample and 18 provinces in the inland
sample, and so the number of clusters is small. The results are robust to even this demanding
approach. The coefficients of interest remain significant, although in the inland sample for
GDP per capita only at 10%.
133
3.8 Conclusion
The place-based industrial policy is a building block of the development strategy pursued
by the Chinese government. According to Naughton (2007): “Bold, fragmented, open to
outside investment, but with a strong role for government: Special Economic Zones typify
much of the Chinese transition process” (p. 410). This paper estimates the effect of SEZ on
local economic performance. The results suggest that the establishment of SEZ has yielded
large positive effects on GDP and GDP per capita for the cities in which these were located.
Although our estimates are smaller than those found by the earlier literature based on cross-
sectional growth regressions (typically on a smaller set of cities and years), the effects are
sizeable and robust. We also find that the SEZ generated positive spillovers to neighboring
areas.
What can we learn from the Chinese experience about the role of economic reform and
industrial policy during the process of development? Existing theoretical and empirical work
suggests that policies and institutions should be appropriate to the stage of development,
and particularly to the stage of the process of technological convergence (Acemoglu et al.;
Konig et al., 2016). The Chinese reform process was characterized by a mixture of elements
of market liberalization and an active role of the government in promoting investment and
technology adoption. Rodrik (2006) argues that the active role of the government was
crucial for China’s development because it supported a fast move towards more modern and
productive sectors which have positive externalities on the whole economy. The results of
our empirical analysis suggest that the industrial policy may have indeed been a catalyst
of the development process. At the same time, the estimated effects are quantitatively not
very large relative to the high growth rates experienced by China in this period.
Our analysis is subject to a number of limitations that we leave to future work to address.
First, cities assigned to SEZ were not randomly allocated. To alleviate concerns for endo-
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geneity, we focus on a subsample of inland cities where the allocation was driven by rigidly
selected criteria, and we compare pre- vs. post-reform trends in treated cities. However,
ideally one would like to have valid instruments for the spatial and time distribution of the
policy intervention. This is very hard to find in the context of Chinese SEZ.
Second, we did not attempt a proper assessment of the welfare effect of SEZ. On the one
hand, this would require a quantification of the budgetary costs of the policy. On the other
hand, the local gains from spillovers through the agglomeration of labor may be partially
offset by losses in other locations that experience an outflow of firms. As pointed out in
Greenstone et al. (2010) and Kline and Moretti (2014a), whether the gains offset the losses
depends on the shape of the agglomeration force.
Third, it would be interesting to disentangle which of the different components of the
policy package had the largest effects. While the reduction in tax wedges must have been
important, there are other channels through which SEZ may affect local and regional out-
comes. As discussed in Kline and Moretti (2014a), place-based policies may also be used to
reduce frictions such as excessive regulation. There may be political constraints that prevent
the central government from implementing a reform nationally, such that a reduction within
a subset of cities may be the best achievable alternative. In this case, firms would again re-
locate towards the SEZ and increase total factor productivity further through a larger labor
pool. The reduction in frictions may also reduce prices, which could explain why prices are
not increasing as much in our data as we may expect based on a simple spatial equilibrium
framework. Another friction that can be relaxed by SEZ is the hukou system that restricts
labor mobility, as SEZ may make it easier for workers to move there.
Finally, although the establishment of SEZ appears to have generated positive spillovers
outside of the areas where they were introduced, we cannot rule out that the industrial
policy drew resources away from locations that are remote and far away from the SEZ. In
spite of these caveats, our results provide the basis for a realistic assessment of the effects
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of industrial policy in China, and some useful new evidence in the debate on place-based
industrial policy in different countries.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Real GDP (mil) 20938.83 30120.88 210 451172.34 5289
Growth of real GDP (%) 13.02 17.71 -52.19 594.78 4736
Real GDP per capita 5228.68 5066.3 220.26 51513.13 5252
Growth of real GDP per capita (%) 10.8 12.12 -75.77 391.7 4969
Land area (sq km) 14059.24 17185.24 137 253356 5335
Growth of land area (%) 16.58 276.78 -59.63 9423.84 5055
Population (mil) 3.85 2.92 0.1 48.51 5306
Growth of population (%) 2.26 16.28 -77.31 347.56 5030
Electricity consumption (GWh) 3.08 4.72 0.01 56.3 5210
Growth of electricity consumption (%) 17.67 198.6 -98.97 13486.34 4914
Mean light intensity 11.74 10.31 0.1 56.04 4730
Growth of mean light intensity per satellite (%) 4.38 14.48 -45.64 117.23 4274
Notes: The table shows the descriptive statistics of our main variables in our sample of 276 cities
in 25 provinces from 1988 to 2010. Real GDP is derived from city-level nominal GDP and provincial
deflators. Land area is the official size of the cities. Population includes registered residents only.
Electricity consumption is by households and firms. Mean light intensity is the average brightness
of pixels in the city.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics (at beginning of sample period) by region and reform year
Region: Coast Inland
Reform year: All < 1988 1988-2010 Never < 1988 1988-2010 Never
Population (1,000 people) 3113.0 5282.5 3913.0 2968.8 - 3381.2 2319.7
Land area (km2) 10266.6 9811.4 8059.6 10247.1 - 10414.4 11384.2
Population density (people/km2) 402.3 561.1 553.9 353.9 - 375.3 344.9
Real GDP (millions) 4870.1 11363.7 7936.9 4215.4 - 5290.5 2515.9
Real GDP p.c. 1777.7 2072.9 2290.0 1722.7 - 1867.1 1441.0
Nominal GDP p.c. 1862.0 2180.9 2408.7 1816.4 - 1945.3 1502.9
Government spending/GDP (%) 8.7 7.5 7.0 8.4 - 9.3 9.6
# of universities (per mil. people) 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.4 - 3.3 1.4
Notes: The table shows the mean values of selected city characteristics at the beginning of our
sample (averaged over 1988 and 1989), separately for reformers before 1988, reformers between 1988
and 2010, and cities that never had a reform. The table also distinguishes inland and coastal cities.
Note that no inland city was reformed before 1988. We restrict the sample to a balanced panel.
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Table 3.3: Baseline regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.156*** 0.116*** 0.0927*** 0.213*** 0.175*** 0.130**
(0.0330) (0.0292) (0.0283) (0.0693) (0.0560) (0.0532)
Province-level SEZ 0.0217 -0.00166 -0.0113 0.0209 -0.0106 -0.00580
(0.0226) (0.0182) (0.0165) (0.0310) (0.0252) (0.0232)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.960 0.975 0.974 0.949 0.972 0.971
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level
(respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any
SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects and the interaction of province-year
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Pre-reform trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3 years before state-level SEZ -0.00836 -0.00322 -0.0129 0.128 -0.104 -0.0109
(0.0327) (0.0284) (0.0299) (0.0972) (0.0932) (0.0801)
2 years before state-level SEZ -0.0286 -0.0190 -0.0278 0.0765 -0.135 -0.0479
(0.0334) (0.0285) (0.0315) (0.0954) (0.0944) (0.0787)
1 year before any state-level SEZ -0.0221 -0.0164 -0.0291 0.0508 -0.165* -0.0836
(0.0342) (0.0287) (0.0322) (0.0984) (0.0968) (0.0821)
Year of state-level SEZ reform -0.00807 -0.00737 -0.0154 0.0689 -0.167* -0.0787
(0.0346) (0.0290) (0.0342) (0.0950) (0.0954) (0.0830)
State-level SEZ (all post-reform years) 0.143*** 0.107*** 0.0758* 0.280*** 0.0551 0.0834
(0.0445) (0.0377) (0.0417) (0.0985) (0.0989) (0.0920)
Province-level SEZ (all post-reform years) 0.0212 -0.00198 -0.0119 0.0227 -0.0134 -0.00684
(0.0228) (0.0183) (0.0167) (0.0314) (0.0256) (0.0234)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.960 0.975 0.974 0.949 0.972 0.971
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level
(respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any
SEZ at that level. Lags are defined as described in the table. All specifications include controls
for land area, city fixed effects, and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are
clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Differential trends for reformers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.116*** 0.0588** 0.0511* 0.175*** 0.0259 0.0738
(0.0292) (0.0278) (0.0286) (0.0560) (0.0627) (0.0607)
Province-level SEZ -0.00166 -0.00112 -0.00200 -0.000637 -0.0106 -0.00913 -0.0135 -0.0143
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0257)
Time trend of reformers (state-level) 0.00711*** 0.00410 0.00433 0.0130** -0.0122 -0.0116
(0.00260) (0.00330) (0.00328) (0.00590) (0.0131) (0.0122)
Post-reform trend (state-level) 0.00470 0.0168** 0.0264* 0.0455**
(0.00403) (0.00658) (0.0145) (0.0202)
Sq. post-reform trend (state-level) -0.000558* -0.000986
(0.000289) (0.000813)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5321 5321 5321 5321 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. The
trend variables are described in Equation (3.2). All specifications include controls for land area, city
fixed effects, and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city
level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.6: Controlling for differential trends
Panel A : Year fixed effects interacted with initial characteristics (relative to median)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.0936*** 0.257*** 0.238*** 0.257***
(0.0389) (0.0370) (0.0341) (0.0685) (0.0908) (0.0680)
Province-level SEZ 0.0273 0.0116 -0.0154 0.0148 0.00248 -0.0180
(0.0215) (0.0181) (0.0162) (0.0345) (0.0281) (0.0269)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4727 4663 4618 2375 2315 2292
Adj. Rsq. 0.968 0.977 0.978 0.959 0.975 0.974
Panel B: Year fixed effects interacted with initial characteristics (dummies for above
median)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.140*** 0.102*** 0.0772** 0.241*** 0.182** 0.187***
(0.0363) (0.0333) (0.0314) (0.0886) (0.0737) (0.0667)
Province-level SEZ 0.0246 -0.00204 -0.0148 0.0197 -0.00532 -0.00683
(0.0217) (0.0180) (0.0164) (0.0321) (0.0270) (0.0237)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.963 0.976 0.976 0.953 0.973 0.971
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level
(respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of
any SEZ at that level. The specifications in Panel A control for year dummies interacted with the
logarithm of population, GDP per capita, population density, and number of universities relative to
the median in the year in which a city enters the sample. The specifications in Panel B control for
year dummies interacted with indicators for population, GDP per capita, population density, and
number of universities being above the median in the year in which a city enters the sample. The
specifications also include city fixed effects and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Decomposition of the reform effect
Panel A : GDP per capita, capital-labor ratio, population, and human capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.0927*** 0.131*** 0.0453 0.00295 0.130** 0.339*** 0.0599 0.00278
(0.0283) (0.0404) (0.0274) (0.00367) (0.0532) (0.0614) (0.0374) (0.00816)
Province-level SEZ -0.0113 -0.00402 0.0187 0.00214 -0.00580 -0.0385 -0.00177 0.00390
(0.0165) (0.0297) (0.0130) (0.00159) (0.0232) (0.0525) (0.0123) (0.00271)
Dependent Variable log(Y/L) log(K/L) log(L) log(h) log(Y/L) log(K/L) log(L) log(h)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5269 4495 5275 4561 2768 2219 2769 2261
Adj. Rsq. 0.974 0.965 0.822 0.961 0.971 0.960 0.883 0.950
Panel B: GDP per capita, population and human capital (census years only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.141*** 0.0965*** 0.182*** 0.175** 0.111*** 0.360***
(0.0374) (0.0359) (0.0485) (0.0720) (0.0368) (0.0807)
Province-level SEZ -0.0259 0.0527** 0.0747** -0.0238 -0.00423 0.102**
(0.0308) (0.0246) (0.0318) (0.0408) (0.0193) (0.0476)
Dependent Variable log(Y/L) log(L) avg. sch. log(Y/L) log(L) avg. sch.
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 694 695 582 366 366 303
Adj. Rsq. 0.984 0.784 0.979 0.984 0.892 0.979
Panel C: Total factor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.0617** 0.0553** 0.137*** 0.0631 0.0471 0.189***
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0346) (0.0455) (0.0446) (0.0527)
Province-level SEZ -0.00370 -0.00395 -0.0144 0.0203 0.0210 0.0336
(0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0212) (0.0259) (0.0268) (0.0291)
Dependent Variable log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP)
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4019 4019 4019 1895 1895 1895
Adj. Rsq. 0.958 0.949 0.992 0.952 0.942 0.992
Notes: State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the
introduction of any SEZ at that level. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP
per capita, capital labor ratio, population, or human capital based on the yearbook data. In Panel B,
the dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP per capita, population, and average schooling years
based on the census data. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the logarithm of TFP. In columns
(1) and (2), TFP is estimated using the whole sample without restrictions on the return to scale.
In columns (3) and (4), they are estimated in the whole sample while imposing the constant return
to scale restriction. In columns (5) and (6), they are estimated in the pre- and post-1995 sample
separately, without imposing the restriction on the return to scale. All specifications include city
fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies, and controls for land area. All regressions
except columns (3) and (7) in Panel A and columns (2) and (5) in Panel B also include controls for
population. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Spillovers across cities
Panel A : Distance to closest SEZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.213*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.193***
(0.0305) (0.0299) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0493) (0.0526) (0.0501) (0.0507)
Province-level SEZ -0.00390 -0.00217 -0.00174 -0.00151 -0.0120 -0.0152 -0.0145 -0.0134
(0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0250)
Log km distance next SEZ -0.0528** -0.111***
(0.0249) (0.0342)
Log driving time next SEZ -0.0816*** -0.124***
(0.0269) (0.0390)
Log transport costs next SEZ (10 cat) -0.0694*** -0.110***
(0.0210) (0.0307)
Log transport costs next SEZ (7 cat) -0.0655*** -0.105***
(0.0210) (0.0309)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5254 5321 5321 5321 2775 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.977 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Panel B: Effect of other SEZ within a 150 distance radius
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.177***
(0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0294) (0.0538) (0.0527) (0.0538) (0.0545)
Province-level SEZ -0.000753 -0.00228 -0.00261 -0.00139 -0.00957 -0.0138 -0.0152 -0.0107
(0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0252)
Neighboring SEZ in 150 radius (distance) 0.0514* 0.0688
(0.0306) (0.0452)
Neighboring SEZ in 150 radius (driving time) 0.102*** 0.102**
(0.0325) (0.0438)
Neighboring SEZ in 150 radius (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.0685* 0.128***
(0.0354) (0.0475)
Neighboring SEZ in 150 radius (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.0286 0.0560
(0.0330) (0.0414)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5321 5321 5321 5321 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. In
Panel A, the additional independent variable is distance to the next zone and is an inverse measure
of spillover intensity, and a negative coefficient therefore implies a positive spillover effect. In Panel
B, the additional independent variable is indicator for other zone in radius and is expected to have
a positive coefficient in the case of positive spillovers. All specifications include controls for land
area, city fixed effects, and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.9: GDP proxied by light and electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-level SEZ 0.0501** 0.0460 0.157*** 0.0389
(0.0254) (0.0537) (0.0555) (0.0722)
Province-level SEZ -0.00754 -0.0322 0.0344 0.0339
(0.0183) (0.0281) (0.0358) (0.0425)
Dependent variable (log) Light Light Electricity Electricity
Controlling for log land area No No Yes Yes
Sample Full Inland Full Inland
N 4730 2570 5207 2718
Adj. Rsq. 0.836 0.817 0.792 0.755
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of light intensity at the city level or the logarithm of
electricity consumption in the urban core of the city. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is
a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All specifications
include city fixed effects and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.10: Controlling for road infrastructure and government spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.146*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.203*** 0.186*** 0.159***
(0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0284) (0.0542) (0.0533) (0.0428)
Province-level SEZ -0.00786 0.00163 -0.00130 -0.0138 0.00201 -0.0140
(0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0236) (0.0261) (0.0241)
Log road area 0.0761*** 0.0433*** 0.0329** 0.0628** 0.0270 0.0128
(0.0215) (0.0161) (0.0150) (0.0302) (0.0220) (0.0158)
Log government spending 0.480*** 0.505*** 0.432*** 0.466***
(0.0573) (0.0602) (0.0628) (0.0483)
Log government spending/income -0.281*** -0.319***
(0.0458) (0.0458)
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4423 2633 2632 2336 1427 1427
Adj. Rsq. 0.978 0.988 0.990 0.975 0.986 0.989
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All
specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies, and controls for
land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Figure 3.1: Location of treated cities in 2010
Notes: The cities in our sample with at least one state-level SEZ in 2010 are marked in black (a
city may have more than one zone). The cities in our sample without a SEZ in 2010 are marked in
grey.
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Figure 3.2: Share of cities with different types of zones
Notes: The figure shows the share of cities which have a state-level SEZ. The figure also shows
the different types of SEZ: Hightech Industrial Development Zones, Economic and Technological
Development Zones, Export Processing Zones, Bonded Zones, Border Economic Cooperation Zones,
and other types. The sample is restricted to 172 cities that are observed in all years between 1988
and 2010.
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Figure 3.3: Reform effects over time
Notes: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone. The solid
and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19
shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number
of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regressions
also control for an indicator for province-level zones, land area, city fixed effects,
and province-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by city.
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Figure 3.4: Decomposition of the reform effects over time
Notes: The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the four dependent variables on indicators
for years before and after the first SEZ was established. TFP is computed using a full-sample
unrestricted production function estimation. The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval.
The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the
number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regressions control for an
indicator for province-level zones, population, land area, city fixed effects, and province-time fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by city.
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Figure 3.5: Spillover over time
Notes: The upper two graphs show the estimates from a regression of the logarithm of nominal
GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone in the own city and zones within 150
minutes driving time. The effect of the time lag since the own reform year (left graph) is included
together with the time lags from the first zone within 150 minutes driving time (right graph). The
lower two graphs show the same when a radius of 150 kilometers is used. The solid and dashed lines
show the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991
reach 2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to
9. The regressions also control for an indicator for province-level zones, land area, city fixed effects,
and province-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by city.
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Appendix
A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 An alternative way of modeling trade credit
In section 1.3.3, we model trade credit as an explicit loan extended from intermediate goods
entrepreneurs to final goods entrepreneurs. However, in reality, trade credit does not involve
explicit loan that changes hands. Instead, extending trade credit means delay of cash flow. In
this section, we show an alternative way of modeling trade credit that is more in accordance
with trade credit in reality.
Consider a different timing setting of the model, in which the trade credit is repaid in the
next period instead of at the end of the current period. Intermediate goods entrepreneurs
enter each period 𝑡 with wealth 𝑎𝑡 and accounts receivable from period 𝐴𝑅𝑡−1. Final goods
entrepreneurs, on the other hand, enter each period 𝑡 with wealth 𝑎𝑡 and accounts payable
𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 from the previous period.
After the productivity is realized, the entrepreneurs choose optimally the input goods 𝑘𝑡,
𝑙𝑡, 𝑥1,𝑡, trade credit 𝐴𝑅𝑡 and 𝐴𝑃𝑡, consumption 𝑐𝑡, and next period wealth 𝑎𝑡+1.
The need for intra-temporal loan are
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑚1,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡+1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑟(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝛿𝑘𝑡 + 𝑤𝑙𝑡,
𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝑚2,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑟(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝛿𝑘𝑡 + 𝑤𝑙𝑡 + 𝑝1𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑃𝑡.
160
Using budget constraint of the two entrepreneurs,
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡+1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
(1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑡 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 − 𝑤𝑙𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅𝑡−1,
𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 : 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝑃𝑡 =
(1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑡 + 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡, 𝑥1,𝑡)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 − 𝑤𝑙𝑡 − 𝑝1𝑥1,𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑃𝑡−1.
we derive the need for intra-temporal loan for intermediate goods entrepreneur is 𝑚1,𝑡 =
𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡) + (1 + 𝑟
𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 and for final goods entrepreneurs 𝑚2,𝑡 = 𝐴2𝑧𝐹2(𝑘𝑡, 𝑙𝑡, 𝑥1,𝑡)−
(1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑃𝑡−1.
A.2 Proofs
In order to prove the propositions, we first lay out the optimization problem of the en-
trepreneurs and derive the FOCs. For each proposition, we prove the first part of each
proposition regarding the intermediate goods entrepreneur. The proof of the second part
regarding the final goods entrepreneurs is very similar and hence is omitted. We assume
that the constraint 𝑎′ ≥ 0 never binds when 𝑎 > 0 and show at the end of the proof that it
is indeed the case.
Intermediate goods entrepreneurs Consider the following problem.
𝑉1(𝑎, 𝑧) = max
𝑐,𝑘,𝑙,𝐴𝑅,𝑎′
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) + 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1(𝑎′, 𝑧′)
𝑠.𝑡. 𝑐 + 𝑎′ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝐴𝑅, (3.7)
𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) + (1 + 𝑟
𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝛾1𝑎′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅, (3.8)
0 ≤ 𝐴𝑅 ≤ 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙), (3.9)
𝑎′ ≥ 0.
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The Lagrangian of the problem can be written as,
ℒ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔((1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 − 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝐴𝑅− 𝑎′)
+𝜇(𝛾1𝑎
′ + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅− 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)𝐴𝑅)
+𝜒1(𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− 𝐴𝑅) + 𝜒2𝐴𝑅
+𝜏𝑎′.
The FOCs are:
𝑘 : 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1,𝑘 =
𝑟 + 𝛿
1− 𝑐𝜇− 𝑐𝜒1 , (3.10)
𝑙 : 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1,𝑙 =
𝑤
1− 𝑐𝜇− 𝑐𝜒1 , (3.11)
𝐴𝑅 :
1
𝑐
𝑟𝑡𝑐 = 𝜇(1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾2) + 𝜒1 − 𝜒2, (3.12)
𝑎′ :
1
𝑐
= 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1,𝑎′ + 𝜇𝛾1 + 𝜏. (3.13)
Together with the Envelop condition 𝑉1,𝑎 = 1𝑐 (1 + 𝑟), we derive the the Euler Equation,
1
𝑐
= 𝛽E𝑧′ [
1
𝑐′
(1 + 𝑟)] + 𝜇𝛾1 + 𝜏. (3.14)
In addition, according to Kuhn-Tucker condition, the Lagrangian multipliers and the
constraints have the following properties,
𝜇 ≥ 0, 𝛾1𝑎′ − 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾2)𝐴𝑅 ≥ 0,
𝜒1 ≥ 0, 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙)− 𝐴𝑅 ≥ 0
𝜒2 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝑅 ≥ 0
𝜏 ≥ 0, 𝑎′ ≥ 0,
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with complementary slackness.
Before proceeding to the proofs of the propositions, we discuss some properties the the
value function and policy function in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Given any 𝑧, 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) is continuous and strictly increase in 𝑎. Given any 𝑧, 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧)
is a nonnegative, continuous, and decreasing function in 𝑎. In particular, 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is strictly
decreasing if 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0.
Proof : Notice that the entrepreneur’s problem is a standard stochastic dynamic problem.
Theorem 9.8 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) implies that 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) is continuous in 𝑎 and 𝑉1(𝑎, 𝑧)
is strictly concave in 𝑎. The envelope condition 𝑉1,𝑎(𝑎, 𝑧) = 1𝑐(𝑎,𝑧)(1 + 𝑟) then implies that
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) strictly increases in 𝑎.
According to the first order condition 3.13 and the non-negativity condition of the La-
grangian multiplier, 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{ 1
𝑐(𝑎,𝑧)
− 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1,𝑎′ , 0}. Notice for any given 𝑧, 𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1,𝑎′
is constant in 𝑎, it follows that 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is continuous since 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) is continuous. The fact
that 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) is strictly increasing in 𝑎 then implies that 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is strictly increasing in 𝑎 if
𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0.
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We prove this proposition by construction. For any given 𝑧, define a set U𝑧 = {𝑎 : 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) =
0}. We first show that U𝑧 is not empty. To see this, consider the unconstraint optimization
problem of the entrepreneur. Since the production function 𝐹1(𝑘, 𝑙) is decreasing return
to scale, the solution to the unconstrained problem exists and is characterized by setting
𝜇 = 0 in the first order conditions 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13. Let (𝑘*, 𝑙*, 𝐴𝑅*) denote the
unconstrained solution. It is easy to see from the first order conditions that 𝑘*, 𝑙*, 𝐴𝑅* all
only depend on 𝑧 but not on 𝑎. Therefore given 𝑧, 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘*, 𝑙*) + (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾2)𝐴𝑅* is
constant. Notice that lim𝑎→∞ 𝑎′(𝑎, 𝑧) = ∞ because otherwise the Envelope condition can
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not hold with 𝑐 = ∞ and 𝑎′ < ∞. Therefore, there exists a 𝑎* such that 𝛾1𝑎′(𝑎*, 𝑧) >
𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘
*, 𝑙*) + (1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾2)𝐴𝑅*. Hence 𝑎* ∈ U𝑧.
It is easy to show the set U𝑧 is an interval and unbounded from above. To see this, take
any given 𝑎 < ?ˆ?, if 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0 then 𝜇(?ˆ?, 𝑧) = 0 since 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is a decreasing function in 𝑎
and is bounded below by 0.
Define 𝑔1(𝑧) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓U𝑧. By the definition of least lower bound, we know that if 𝑎 < 𝑔1(𝑧),
𝑎 /∈ U𝑧, therefore 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0. And since U𝑧 is an interval, it has to be true that for any
𝑎 > 𝑔1(𝑧), 𝑎 ∈ U𝑧, which means that 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The choice of trade credit for intermediate goods entrepreneur is characterized by the first
order condition 3.12.
Together with the properties regarding the Lagrangian multipliers and the complemen-
tary slackness condition, we can derive the following equations,
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜒1(𝑎, 𝑧) = max{0, 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧)(1− 𝛾2 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)},
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜒2(𝑎, 𝑧) = max{0, 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧)(1− 𝛾2 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐)− 𝑟𝑡𝑐}.
Use the Euler equation, we can show that 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) = 1 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝛽E𝑧′𝑉1,𝑎′ . Since
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) is a strictly increasing and continuous function in 𝑎, it is clear that 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is a
decreasing and continuous function in 𝑎. Furthermore, 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is a strictly decreasing
function if 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0.
Consider a function of 𝑎: 𝑞(𝑎) = 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧)(1 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐). It is easy to see that
𝑞(𝑎) = 0 implies 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) = 𝑟𝑡𝑐
1+𝑟𝑡𝑐
> 0. Therefore, there exists an unique 𝑎* such that
𝑐(𝑎*, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎*, 𝑧) = 𝑟
𝑡𝑐
1+𝑟𝑡𝑐
. Define ℎ1(𝑧) = 𝑎*.
For any 𝑎 < ℎ1(𝑧), we know that 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜒2(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0. Since 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) ≥ 0, this means
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that 𝜒2(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0. Using the complementary slackness condition, this means 𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0.
Similarly, for any 𝑎 > ℎ1(𝑧), 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜒1(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0, therefore 𝜒1(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0. It then follows that
𝐴𝑅(𝑎, 𝑧) = 𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘(𝑎, 𝑧), 𝑙(𝑎, 𝑧)).
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For any given 𝑧 such that 𝜇(𝑔1(𝑧), 𝑧) = 0, we know that 𝑐(𝑔1(𝑧), 𝑧)𝜒1(𝑔1(𝑧), 𝑧) = 𝑟𝑡𝑐 >
0. Since 𝛾2 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) is strictly decreasing and continuous in 𝑎, there
exists ?ˆ? < 𝑔(𝑧) such that 𝑟𝑡𝑐 − 𝑐(?ˆ?, 𝑧)𝜇(?ˆ?, 𝑧)(1 − 𝛾2 + 𝑟𝑡𝑐) > 0, therefore 𝐴𝑅(?ˆ?, 𝑧) =
𝑝1𝐴1𝑧𝐹1(𝑘(?ˆ?, 𝑧), 𝑙(?ˆ?, 𝑧)). Notice 𝑟𝑡𝑐−𝑐(ℎ1(𝑧), 𝑧)𝜇(ℎ1(𝑧), 𝑧)(1−𝛾2+𝑟𝑡𝑐) > 0. Since 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧)
decreases with 𝑎, we know that ℎ1(𝑧) ≤ ?ˆ?. Then it follows that ℎ1(𝑧) < 𝑔1(𝑧).
A.3 Computation of the benchmark model
In this section, we describe the algorithms of computing the benchmark model. Section A.3.1
contains the algorithms to compute the stationary equilibrium. Section A.3.2 contains the
algorithms to compute the transitional dynamics. The algorithms to compute the counter-
factual model is very similar to the benchmark model, only with different set of FOCs, budget
constraint, and working capital constraint. Hence they are omitted here.
A.3.1 Stationary equilibrium
∙ Guess equilibrium prices 𝑟, 𝑤, 𝑝1, 𝑟𝑡𝑐.
∙ Given the prices, solve the household problem.
∙ Given the prices, solve the entrepreneurs problem as follows,
1. Discretize the state space.
2. Guess policy function 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧).
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3. For each (𝑎, 𝑧), assume that the entrepreneur is unconstrained, i.e. 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0.
Solve for the system of equations that consists of FOCs and budget constraint.
4. Check whether the working capital constraint is satisfied with the solution to the
above system of equations.
5. If the working capital constraint is not satisfied, it means that 𝜇(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0 and
working capital constraint holds with equality. Solve the systmem of equations
that consists of FOCs, budget constraint, and working capital constraint (with
equality).
6. Use the Euler equation to update the policy function 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑧) until it converges.
∙ Given any arbitrary distribution of (𝑎, 𝑧), iterate using the policy functions derived
above until a stationary distribution is reached.
∙ Generate the aggregate statistics of the four markets: capital, labor, intermediate goods
and trade credit market.
∙ Update (𝑟, 𝑤, 𝑝1, 𝑟𝑡𝑐) until the four markets clear simultaneously.
A.3.2 Transitional dynamics
To compute the transitional dynamics of the economy, we consider a transition path of
𝑇 = 100 periods. The economy is at the initial stationary equilibrium level in period 𝑡 = 1
and we assume that it converges back to the initial stationary equilibrium at period 𝑡 = 𝑇 .
∙ Guess a sequence of prices {𝑟𝑡, 𝑤𝑡, 𝑝1,𝑡, 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑡 }𝑇−1𝑡=2 .
∙ Backward induction. For each 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 1, 𝑇 − 2, ..., 2.
– Discretize the state space.
– Given prices, solve the household problem for period 𝑡.
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– Given prices, solve the entrepreneurs policy functions for period 𝑡.
1. Guess 𝑐𝑡(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇𝑡(𝑎, 𝑧) = 0, solve the system of equations that consists of FOCs
of period 𝑡, budget constraint, and Euler equations (with the next period
policy function 𝑐𝑡+1(𝑎, 𝑧) known).
2. Check whether the working capital constraint is satisfied under the above
solution.
3. If the working capital is not satisfied, 𝑐𝑡(𝑎, 𝑧)𝜇𝑡(𝑎, 𝑧) > 0 and the working
capital constraint holds with equality. Solve the system of equations that
consists of FOCs of period 𝑡, budget constraint, Euler equations (with the
next period policy function 𝑐𝑡+1(𝑎, 𝑧) known), and working capital constraint
with equality.
∙ Forward induction. The first period stationary distribution Φ1,1(𝑎, 𝑧) and Φ2,1(𝑎, 𝑧) is
set to be the stationary equilibrium distribution. Using the policy functions for period
𝑡 = 2, ..., 𝑇 − 1, compute the distribution along the transition path (Φ1,𝑡(𝑎, 𝑧) and
Φ2,𝑡(𝑎, 𝑧))
∙ Generate aggregate statistics for the four markets in every period 𝑡 = 2, ..., 𝑇 − 1 using
the policy functions and the distributions.
∙ Update {𝑟𝑡, 𝑤𝑡, 𝑝1,𝑡, 𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑡 }𝑇−1𝑡=2 until the four markets clear simultaneously in each period
𝑡 = 2, ..., 𝑇 − 1.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Data Sources
Official Statistics The main source for the official statistics of cities is the China City
Statistical Yearbooks (1988–2010).70 In addition, we include three other city statistical col-
lections. First, we take the GDP data for the years 1992 and 1993 from the New China City
in 50 Years Statistical Collection, since these years are missing in the China City Statistical
Yearbooks. Second, for a subset of cities, we collect GDP and investment data for the period
of 1978-1988 from the New China in 60 Years Provincial Statistical Collection.71 Third, we
obtain population and educational attainment data from the China Population Census for
the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.
The main source for province-level statistics is the New China in 60 Years Statistical
Collection. We obtain the province-level price indexes, including the GDP and investment
deflator, from this data set.
Light and Digital Maps Light intensity at night, an alternative measure for local eco-
nomic activity, is provided by the National Geographical Data Center.72 The data is available
in cleaned form (taking into account clouds, forest fires, gas flaring, etc.) and on an annual
basis from 1992 to 2013, but we focus on the period until 2010 for which we also have the
official yearbook data. The light images show the intensity of light on each pixel (approxi-
mately one square kilometer) on an integer scale from 0 (no light) to 63 (maximum light).
In order to map the light intensity of pixels to the administrative entities of cities, we use
digital maps of Chinese cities from 2010.73 This allows us to measure light within adminis-
70We obtained the data from China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).
71These are cities from the following provinces: Fujian, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Inner Mon-
golia, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Shandong, and Shanxi.
72See http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
73The digital maps for several levels of administrative units of the People’s Republic of China were obtained
from the Asian Spatial Information and Analysis Network (ACASIAN), where they were produced by Dr.
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trative boundaries that are held constant over time in order to rule out the possibility that
changes in administrative boundaries mechanically affect the outcome measure. Changes in
administrative boundaries could especially be a concern for the statistical yearbook data on
urban cores, where such changes are more frequent than for the entire city that includes the
periphery. Light measured within constant boundaries does not have this problem, and the
analysis of the effect of SEZ on light exploits this advantage and focuses on the urban core
of each city rather than the area that includes the periphery.
Light is measured by different satellites over time, and they show different light intensities
because of differences in their calibration. These differences do not matter for our regression
analysis since they affect the entire country within a given year and the calibration is therefore
absorbed by year fixed effects. For the descriptive statistics, we calculate the growth rate
for each satellite separately and then report the average (“within satellite”) growth rate.74
Establishment of SEZ We collect data on the establishment of SEZ from the following
sources: 1) the website of the Ministry of Commerce,75 2) the website of China’s Development
Zones,76 and 3) the Report on SEZ (of Commerce, 2006). These sources provide information
on the year in which SEZ were established, their types, and their location.
B.2 Sample Selection
In our main estimations, we focus on a sample of cities for the years 1988–2010. The sample
is unbalanced because of the creation of new cities: in the year 1988 the sample has 171
cities, and this number increases to 276 in the year 2010.77 Our sample covers all provinces
L. W. Crissman.
74For example, if a satellite delivers light images for four years, then we can calculate the growth rate for
all but the first year. We do this for each satellite and then average over all satellites and years.
75See http://english.mofcom.gov.cn.
76See http://www.cdz.cn/.
77See Table 1 in Chung and chiu Lam (2004) for a more detailed assessment of the increase in the number
of cities in China.
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in China except for Tibet, Hainan, and the province-level cities Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin,
and Chongqing. We also exclude the cities of the first wave of CSEZ, Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Shantou and Xiamen.
We discuss below in detail our sample selection criteria.
Prefecture- v.s. County-level Cities The China City Statistical Yearbooks contain
statistics for both prefecture-level and county-level cities. Our sample focuses on prefecture-
level cities. Therefore our sample does not include cities that are county-level throughout the
sample period. Some of the prefecture-level cities were promoted from county-level cities.
For those cities, we only keep the years after the promotion in our sample.
Prefecture-Level Cities and their Urban Core The China City Statistical Yearbooks
report data separately for the entire prefecture-level city (shi) and its urban core (shixiaqu).
Our estimations are, unless stated otherwise, carried out for the entire city.
The urban core is more industrialized than the entire area of a city that includes the
periphery. Most SEZ are located inside and at the edge of the urban core (Zeng, 2010). In
fact, in our sample, all state-level SEZ reside inside of urban cores. However, focusing the
analysis on the entire city has two advantages. First, the administrative boundary of cities
change less frequently than that of urban cores. Although we can control for changes in
land area as reported in the statistical yearbooks, border changes could remain a concern
especially if they correlate with the establishment of SEZ. Second, it is difficult to account
for workers who live in the periphery of cities but commute to their work in the urban core.
This issue is less severe at the city-level since the cross-city commuting population is smaller.
Sample Period Our main estimation covers the period of 1988 to 2010. The GDP data
in the China City Statistical Yearbooks only go back to the year 1988. For a subset of cities,
we can obtain GDP data from the New China in 60 Years Provincial Statistical Collection
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for the period of 1978–1988. We do not use the early data in our main analysis due the lack
of information on population and land area. Instead, we use them in a robustness check of
the effects of SEZ and also in the decomposition in order to get a better estimate of initial
capital stock of these cities in the year 1988.
Inland Sample When we restrict the sample to cities from inland provinces, we define
the following provinces as inland: Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yunnan,
and Inner Mongolia. This classification was not purely based on access to the sea, but also
considers whether the provinces were part of the reform wave targeted towards inland regions.
Population One concern with the population data from the China City Statistical Year-
books is that it only covers the registered population, that is, people with hukou. This would
lead to a bias in the estimation if reformed cities attracted more (or less) migrants than
non-reformed cities.
To address this issue, we make use of the fact that population data in the China Pop-
ulation Census covers both hukou and non-hukou residents. For 1990, 2000, and 2010, we
can take the population data from the China Population Census. We then interpolate the
years in between the Census using the relative year-by-year population growth rate from
the China City Statistical Yearbooks.78 This imputed population data is used in our main
estimations and decomposition exercise.
Measurement Errors Some cities in our sample change borders. Along with the border
change there are changes in population size and land area which can be measured using
78We apply the Stata command ipolate to observations between the census years. This command interpo-
lates the missing observations in the census data based on population data from the yearbooks, but whenever
available it uses the data from the census. We construct the years before the first and after the last census
year by directly applying the growth rate of the yearbook population data to the observation from the census.
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the yearbook data. Changes in these variables should happen in the same year, but we
found cases where there is clearly a delayed discrete jump in some of the variables relative
to others. Therefore, we drop two observations where we observed a jump in land area but
no corresponding jump in population.79
B.3 Decomposition
The following paragraphs provide information on the construction of physical capital per
capita and efficiency unit of labor (raw labor × average human capital) used in the decom-
position exercise.
Physical Capital Stock We apply the perpetual inventory approach to construct the
physical capital stock in each city. The physical capital (𝐾𝑖𝑝𝑡) is the sum of the physical
capital stock after depreciation and new investment (𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑡), such that
𝐾𝑖𝑝𝑡 = (1− 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑡/𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑡 .
The deflator for new investment, 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑡 , is province-specific. We set 𝛿𝑘, the annual
depreciation rate for physical capital, to be 0.08.80
In order to carry out the perpetual inventory approach, we need a reasonable estimate
for the physical capital stock of the initial year, which is the year of 1988 given our sample
period.
For a subset of cities whose investment data go back to 1978, we derive the capital stock
79The two observations are Chuzhou in the year 1993 and Dazhou in the year 1998.
80Given the large amount of creative destruction that took place in China, we pick the number to be higher
than other cross-country growth accounting exercises.
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for those cities in the year 1978 as follows
𝐾𝑖𝑝1978 =
𝐼𝑖𝑝1978
𝑔1978 + 𝛿𝑘
,
where 𝐼𝑖𝑝1978 is the new investment in the year 1978 and 𝑔1978 is the average growth rate of
real physical capital stock before 1978.81 This is the steady state formula for the physical
capital stock of a Solow-type growth model (Caselli, 2005).
For those cities whose investment data begins in 1988, we approximate the initial physical
capital stock in 1988 using the same formula,
𝐾𝑖𝑝1988 =
𝐼𝑖𝑝1988
𝑔1988 + 𝛿𝑘
,
where 𝑔1988 is the average growth rate of physical capital stock before 1988.
Size of Labor Force We use population as an approximation for employment in each city
because the number of employed persons reported in the China City Statistical Yearbooks
has some drawbacks. The most important drawback is that there is a substantial drop in
the number of employed persons in the year 1998, the reason for which is unclear to us. Two
reasons could potentially contribute to this large drop. The first reason is that the reform
of state-owned enterprises laid off a large number of redundant workers around 1998.82 The
second reason is that perhaps the definition of employed persons changes in 1998. Specifically,
before 1998, the employed persons include people who are registered as workers. After 1998,
the number only includes people who are registered and are currently working in that city.83
81The growth rate of the real physical capital stock, 𝑔1978, is calculated using the national physical capital
stock. See the website of Kuai Wai Li (http://personal.cb.cityu.edu.hk/efkwli/ChinaData.html) and Li et
al. (2009) for the detailed construction of the data.
82According to Dong and Putterman (2003), the labor redundancy rate of SOEs is 30% in 1992.
83Wu (2011) provides a detailed discussion of the issues with the employment data.
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Human Capital Following Hall and Jones (1999), we use the average educational attain-
ment (years of schooling) as an approximation for the level human capital of the cities, such
that
ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜑𝑡(𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑡),
where 𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑡 is the average years of schooling and 𝜑𝑡(.) is a piece-wise linear function whose
slopes represent the return to schooling. To construct 𝜑𝑡(.), we take the estimation for the
return to schooling in China over the period 1988-2009 from Li et al. (2009).84
The only data source that reports educational attainment at the city level is the China
Population Census, and it is only available for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. We do a
simple linear interpolation (extrapolation if needed) to obtain the approximation of human
capital for the other years in our sample period.
B.4 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: State- and province-level zones in selected provinces
Province #S #P Avg indus-output share of S Avg indus-output share of P
Jiangsu 12 113 3.13% 0.55%
Guangdong 14 56 4.89% 0.56%
Zhejiang 8 57 4.09% 1.18%
Source: WEFore (2010). The table displays the number of state-level development zones (#S) and
province-level development zones (#P) in three provinces: Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Zhejiang. In
the last two columns, it also displays the average share of the state-level and province-level zones in
the industrial output of each province. The data is for the year 2009.
84The estimation is not available for the year 2010. We simply assume that the return to schooling did
not change between 2009 and 2010, i.e. 𝜑2010(.) = 𝜑2009(.).
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Table A2: Different types of zones
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ETDZ 0.155*** 0.147*** 0.108*** 0.143* 0.104 0.0738
(0.0454) (0.0389) (0.0386) (0.0777) (0.0695) (0.0667)
HIDZ 0.137*** 0.0760** 0.0743** 0.0718 0.104* 0.0688
(0.0360) (0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0663) (0.0528) (0.0471)
EPZ -0.0130 0.0236 -0.0102 0.0275 0.0832 0.0386
(0.0388) (0.0326) (0.0312) (0.0963) (0.0983) (0.0874)
Other types 0.0840 0.113** 0.0797** 0.271*** 0.205** 0.281***
(0.0540) (0.0447) (0.0401) (0.0770) (0.0923) (0.0654)
Province-level SEZ 0.0259 0.00183 -0.00770 0.0208 -0.0122 -0.00669
(0.0223) (0.0181) (0.0164) (0.0309) (0.0251) (0.0233)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5392 5321 5269 2864 2798 2768
Adj. Rsq. 0.961 0.976 0.975 0.949 0.972 0.971
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. The reform indicators for each type
of zone take on value 1 in the year after the introduction of the zone. All specifications include city
fixed effects and the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city
level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A3: Baseline specification (census years only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.222*** 0.177*** 0.141*** 0.280*** 0.250*** 0.175**
(0.0427) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0858) (0.0715) (0.0720)
Province-level SEZ 0.0633 0.00771 -0.0259 0.0681 -0.0103 -0.0238
(0.0429) (0.0328) (0.0308) (0.0601) (0.0442) (0.0408)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 723 708 694 393 378 366
Adj. Rsq. 0.979 0.985 0.984 0.974 0.984 0.984
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level
(respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any
SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects and the interaction of province-year
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01. The
sample is restricted to the census years 1990, 2000, and 2010.
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Table A4: Effect on human capital (census years only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ -0.0102* -0.0203*** 0.0306*** -0.0147 -0.0444*** 0.0591***
(0.00606) (0.00681) (0.00538) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.00643)
Province-level SEZ -0.00664 0.00778 -0.00114 -0.0174*** 0.0160** 0.00143
(0.00526) (0.00626) (0.00352) (0.00606) (0.00688) (0.00516)
Dependent Variable share low edu. share mid. edu. share high edu. share low edu. share mid. edu. share high edu.
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 582 582 582 303 303 303
Adj. Rsq. 0.973 0.884 0.933 0.976 0.908 0.947
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of the population over 6 with a low level education
(primary school or lower), share of the population over 6 with an intermediate level education
(junior and senior high school), or share of the population over 6 with a high level education (college
or above). All specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies,
controls for land area, and controls for population. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: *
𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A5: Spillovers within rings around the city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.180*** 0.185*** 0.194*** 0.179***
(0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0571) (0.0537) (0.0561) (0.0520)
Province-level SEZ -0.00325 -0.00219 -0.00188 -0.00275 -0.0136 -0.0139 -0.0156 -0.0134
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0258) (0.0255)
SEZ in 0-50 ring (distance) 0.00961 0.187*
(0.0863) (0.101)
SEZ in 50-100 ring (distance) -0.0128 0.135
(0.0792) (0.103)
SEZ in 100-200 ring (distance) -0.0711 0.0594
(0.0742) (0.100)
SEZ in 200-400 ring (distance) -0.0798 -0.00959
(0.0675) (0.0831)
SEZ in 0-50 ring (driving time) 0.149 0.250**
(0.0957) (0.112)
SEZ in 50-100 ring (driving time) 0.123 0.207**
(0.0771) (0.103)
SEZ in 100-200 ring (driving time) 0.0902 0.169
(0.0748) (0.105)
SEZ in 200-400 ring (driving time) 0.0644 0.117
(0.0660) (0.0761)
SEZ in 0-50 ring (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.191** 0.185
(0.0752) (0.136)
SEZ in 50-100 ring (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.135* 0.163
(0.0701) (0.118)
SEZ in 100-200 ring (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.0908 0.139
(0.0643) (0.113)
SEZ in 200-400 ring (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.0820 0.0399
(0.0543) (0.110)
SEZ in 0-50 ring (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.188** 0.176*
(0.0752) (0.0999)
SEZ in 50-100 ring (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.123 0.164
(0.0745) (0.110)
SEZ in 100-200 ring (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.0654 0.0827
(0.0727) (0.107)
SEZ in 200-400 ring (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.0546 0.0170
(0.0635) (0.0925)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5321 5321 5321 5321 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. The independent variables are
indicators for zones within the corresponding distances. State-level (respectively province-level)
SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All
specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies, and controls for
land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A6: Exposure to other zones and market access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
State-level SEZ 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.192*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.187***
(0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0295) (0.0580) (0.0619) (0.0594) (0.0596) (0.0592) (0.0592)
Province-level SEZ -0.00253 -0.000214 -0.00127 -0.00120 -0.000867 -0.000838 -0.0124 -0.0118 -0.0114 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0104
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0247)
Exposure to other SEZ (distance) 0.0646 0.311
(0.0767) (0.229)
Market access (distance) -1.073** -0.669
(0.509) (0.962)
Exposure to other SEZ (driving time) 0.0623 0.309
(0.0804) (0.283)
Market access (driving time) -0.811 -0.845
(0.521) (1.174)
Exposure to other SEZ (transport costs, 10 cat) 0.0513 0.340*
(0.0639) (0.204)
Market access (transport costs, 10 cat) -0.331 0.344
(0.457) (0.695)
Exposure to other SEZ (transport costs, 7 cat) 0.0462 0.279
(0.0657) (0.205)
Market access (transport costs, 7 cat) -0.349 0.339
(0.455) (0.705)
Exposure to other SEZ (transport costs, 7 cat, 3km) 0.0491 0.243
(0.0604) (0.197)
Market access (transport costs, 7 cat, 3km) -0.405 0.220
(0.417) (0.631)
Exposure to other SEZ (transport costs, 7 cat, 3km) 0.0573 0.245
(0.0596) (0.197)
Market access (transport costs, 7 cat, 3km) -0.385 0.218
(0.415) (0.632)
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5254 5321 5321 5321 5321 5321 2775 2798 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.977 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. The independent variable exposure
to other zones is a measure of spillover intensity, and we expect a positive coefficient in case of
positive spillovers. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year
after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects and the
interaction of province-year dummies. All specifications also control for the logarithm of land area.
Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A7: Spillover effect on investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.149*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.414*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.396***
(0.0497) (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0490) (0.0692) (0.0727) (0.0696) (0.0701)
Province-level SEZ 0.0310 0.0316 0.0315 0.0315 -0.0229 -0.0255 -0.0256 -0.0242
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0455) (0.0465) (0.0469) (0.0467)
Log km distance next SEZ -0.0262 -0.149**
(0.0437) (0.0674)
Log driving time next SEZ 0.0132 -0.117
(0.0518) (0.0859)
Log transport costs next SEZ (10 cat) 0.00301 -0.126**
(0.0400) (0.0605)
Log transport costs next SEZ (7 cat) 0.00555 -0.115*
(0.0412) (0.0649)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 4950 5016 5016 5016 2587 2609 2609 2609
Adj. Rsq. 0.957 0.957 0.957 0.957 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of fixed asset investment. Investment is measured
in current prices. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year
after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects and the
interaction of province-year dummies. All specifications also control for the logarithm of population
and land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A8: Spillover effect on TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.0707** 0.0651** 0.0645** 0.0637** 0.0831* 0.0675 0.0654 0.0640
(0.0276) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0425) (0.0437) (0.0417) (0.0423)
Province-level SEZ -0.00252 -0.00256 -0.00207 -0.00177 0.0192 0.0187 0.0190 0.0199
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0258)
Log km distance next SEZ -0.0320 -0.0493
(0.0202) (0.0308)
Log driving time next SEZ -0.0693*** -0.0591*
(0.0244) (0.0332)
Log transport costs next SEZ (10 cat) -0.0627*** -0.0643**
(0.0187) (0.0275)
Log transport costs next SEZ (7 cat) -0.0607*** -0.0601**
(0.0186) (0.0270)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 3953 4019 4019 4019 1872 1895 1895 1895
Adj. Rsq. 0.959 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of TFP. TFP is computed using full-sample un-
restricted production function estimation. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy
switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All specifications include
city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies, controls for land area, and controls for
population. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A9: Spillover effect on population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.0451 0.0474* 0.0467* 0.0467* 0.0651 0.0652 0.0627 0.0632
(0.0286) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0397) (0.0395)
Province-level SEZ 0.0151 0.0186 0.0188 0.0188 -0.00202 -0.00270 -0.00225 -0.00224
(0.0118) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Log km distance next SEZ -0.0433* -0.0397*
(0.0225) (0.0228)
Log driving time next SEZ -0.0231 -0.0254
(0.0250) (0.0263)
Log transport costs next SEZ (10 cat) -0.0149 -0.0136
(0.0187) (0.0202)
Log transport costs next SEZ (7 cat) -0.0162 -0.0182
(0.0191) (0.0200)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5207 5275 5275 5275 2746 2769 2769 2769
Adj. Rsq. 0.836 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.883
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of population. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All
specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies, and controls for
land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A10: Spillover effect on FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.461*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.458*** 0.904*** 0.918*** 0.905*** 0.903***
(0.145) (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.302) (0.302) (0.299) (0.300)
Province-level SEZ 0.129* 0.127* 0.127* 0.128* 0.0767 0.0710 0.0739 0.0752
(0.0756) (0.0745) (0.0745) (0.0745) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
Log km distance next SEZ -0.102 -0.102
(0.140) (0.261)
Log driving time next SEZ -0.0846 -0.218
(0.145) (0.270)
Log transport costs next SEZ (10 cat) -0.0832 -0.151
(0.129) (0.231)
Log transport costs next SEZ (7 cat) -0.0754 -0.137
(0.130) (0.240)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 4491 4544 4544 4544 2305 2318 2318 2318
Adj. Rsq. 0.702 0.702 0.702 0.702 0.637 0.635 0.635 0.635
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of effective use of FDI. FDI is measured in current
prices. State-level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the
introduction of any SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects and the interaction
of province-year dummies. All specifications also control for the logarithm of land area. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A11: Effect on core and periphery
Panel A: Urban core
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.190*** 0.147*** 0.0952*** 0.268*** 0.211*** 0.155***
(0.0417) (0.0343) (0.0285) (0.0550) (0.0533) (0.0554)
Province-level SEZ -0.000288 -0.00683 -0.00108 -0.0153 -0.0301 -0.0171
(0.0256) (0.0228) (0.0201) (0.0289) (0.0275) (0.0268)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 5152 5138 5109 2688 2684 2677
Adj. Rsq. 0.960 0.969 0.963 0.961 0.966 0.959
Panel B: Periphery only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.219** 0.107*** 0.157*** 0.310 0.141** 0.248***
(0.0984) (0.0328) (0.0314) (0.246) (0.0580) (0.0531)
Province-level SEZ 0.0797 -0.00517 -0.00518 0.0929 0.00796 0.000886
(0.0501) (0.0222) (0.0176) (0.0658) (0.0324) (0.0224)
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP GDPpc GDP GDP GDPpc
Controlling for log land area No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controlling for log population No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
N 4943 4913 4863 2560 2546 2519
Adj. Rsq. 0.865 0.966 0.977 0.865 0.962 0.976
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP or GDP per capita. State-level
(respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any
SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects and the interaction of province-year
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
Panel A reports the results for the urban core, and Panel B reports the results for the periphery
only (the city excluding the urban core).
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Table A12: Lags of population, population density, and land area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-level SEZ 0.0702** 0.0508 0.0718** 0.0583** 0.0553** 0.0599**
(0.0301) (0.0331) (0.0294) (0.0275) (0.0268) (0.0264)
Province-level SEZ -0.0150 -0.0247 -0.0150 -0.00428 -0.00696 -0.00305
(0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0162) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0185)
1-period lag of log population -0.209*** -0.0564
(0.0561) (0.0617)
1-period lag of log population density -0.0297 -0.314** -0.0725 -0.144
(0.108) (0.129) (0.0898) (0.136)
1-period lag of log landarea -0.224*** -0.0638
(0.0600) (0.0626)
Dependent variable GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc TFP TFP TFP
N 5019 4990 4990 3830 3827 3827
Adj. Rsq. 0.972 0.970 0.973 0.956 0.957 0.957
Notes: The dependent variables are the logarithm of annual GDP per capita and the logarithm
of TFP. TFP is computed using a full-sample unrestricted production function estimation. State-
level (respectively province-level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of
any SEZ at that level. All specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year
dummies, and controls for land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, **
𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
185
Table A13: Allowing different city fixed effects after border changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-level SEZ 0.111*** 0.162*** 0.0543* 0.0455
(0.0304) (0.0569) (0.0294) (0.0504)
Province-level SEZ -0.0156 -0.00627 -0.00861 0.0222
(0.0186) (0.0247) (0.0198) (0.0274)
Sample Full Inland Full Inland
Dependent variable (log) GDP GDP TFP TFP
Controlling for log population No No Yes Yes
N 5321 2798 4019 1895
Adj. Rsq. 0.991 0.991 0.979 0.974
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP per capita or TFP. TFP is computed
using a full-sample unrestricted production function estimation. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. All
specifications include separate fixed effects for cities when they change borders. All regressions also
control for the interaction of province-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the city level:
* 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Table A14: Interactions of the reform indicator with initial characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State-level SEZ 0.0742* 0.0709* 0.139*** 0.0983** -0.00393 0.0346 0.305*** 0.122
(0.0391) (0.0406) (0.0405) (0.0447) (0.0824) (0.0933) (0.0802) (0.0896)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median population 0.0923*
(0.0518)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median population density 0.0865*
(0.0509)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median GDP p.c. -0.0473
(0.0559)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median market access 0.0369
(0.0548)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median population (inland) 0.318***
(0.0996)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median population density (inland) 0.205*
(0.112)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median GDP p.c. (inland) -0.196*
(0.106)
Post-reform indicator x Above-median market access (inland) 0.119
(0.104)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland Inland
N 5321 5321 5321 5321 2798 2798 2798 2798
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. State-level (respectively province-
level) SEZ is a dummy switching on in the year after the introduction of any SEZ at that level. The
treatment indicators are interacted with the logarithms of population, GDP per capita, population
density, and market access relative to the median in the year in which a city enters the sample.
The indicators for above-median values in the inland sample are calculated based on a comparison
to the inland sample median only. All specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of
province-year dummies, and controls for land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: *
𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
187
Table A15: Early and late reformers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-reform indicator for SEZ established prior to 1993 0.140*** 0.182***
(0.0342) (0.0602)
Post-reform indicator for SEZ established 1993 - 2010 0.0473 0.137
(0.0436) (0.137)
Linear trend during 10 years after any state-level zone 0.0192*** 0.0153 0.0255*** 0.0236
(0.00458) (0.0116) (0.00770) (0.0195)
Indicator for 11 to 30 years after any state-level zone 0.192*** 0.153 0.255***
(0.0458) (0.116) (0.0770)
Regional Sample Full Full Full Inland Inland Inland
Reformer Sample All pre-1993 post-1992 All pre-1993 post-1992
N 5321 4654 4086 2798 2729 2453
Adj. Rsq. 0.975 0.972 0.971
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual GDP. Columns (2), (3), and (5) impose
the constraint 𝛽11−30 = 10 * 𝛽𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑. Column (6) does not include an indicator for the years 11-30
years after the reform because in the inland sample after 1992 such observations do not exist. All
specifications include city fixed effects, the interaction of province-year dummies, and controls for
land area. Standard errors are clustered at the city level: * 𝑝 ≤ 0.10, ** 𝑝 ≤ 0.05, *** 𝑝 ≤ 0.01.
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Figure A1: Effects of different types of zones over time
Notes: The four panels show the coefficients of different policy variables estimated in the same
regression. The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of nominal GDP on
indicators for years before and after a type of zone was established. The solid and dashed lines show
the confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line shows the lag at which the number of observations
drops due to the first zones reaching the end of the sample period. The regression also controls for
an indicator for province-level zones, land area, city fixed effects, and province-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by city.
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